Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a property owner within the Lee's Crossing subdivision, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of monetary damages against Defendants, the Lee's Crossing Homeowners Association, the developer of the subdivision, and the general partner, alleging that the Association had perpetrated the misuse of power and other unlawful activities by permitting the developer and general partner to exercise authority under the Lee's Crossing Homeowners Association Declaration to unilaterally amend the Declaration's provisions to the detriment of the individual property owners within Lee's Crossing. At issue between the parties was whether certain provisions of the Virginia Property Owners' Association Act (POAA) restricted the declarant of a recorded declaration creating a property owners' association from unilaterally amending that declaration under its express term providing for such authority. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the POAA did not bar a declarant from providing in a declaration the power to unilaterally amend the declaration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the Declaration provision at issue was not inconsistent with the provisions of the POAA. View "Zinone v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

A jury found Dustin Turner guilty of abduction with intent to defile and first-degree felony murder. Billy Brown, the other person implicated in the crime, later confessed in a signed affidavit that he alone killed the victim. Based on this recantation, Turner filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence. After remanding the matter to the circuit court to further develop the facts, the court of appeals granted Turner's request for a writ of actual innocence and vacated his convictions. Subsequently, the court of appeals granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing and dismissed Turner's petition for a writ of actual innocence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Turner's petition and in denying his request to vacate his convictions because Turner did not meet his evidentiary burden of providing that no rational trier of fact could find Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of abduction with intent to defile as nothing in Brown's recantation or the circuit court's factual findings had any bearing on the question presented in the petition. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A limited liability company (MIC) was formed for the purpose of building and operating a hotel. The original members of MIC were a revocable trust (the Trust), trustee Michael Siska, and Thomas, Jane, and Jason Dowdy. Later, Thomas and Jane Dowdy transferred, without the Trust's involvement, MIC's assets to Milestone Development, the Dowdy's family company. The Trust filed an amended complaint derivatively on behalf of MIC against Defendants, Milestone and the Dowdys. In its amended complaint, the Trust claimed that the transfer of assets to Milestone was not in the best interests of MIC or its members and alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unlawful distribution, and conversion, and seeking to recover damages. The Trust, however, did not join MIC as a party to the derivative action. The circuit court dismissed the Trust's amended complaint, holding that the Trust lacked standing to maintain the derivative action on behalf of MIC because the Trust could not fairly represent the interests of the Defendant shareholders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it would not entertain the appeal on the merits because MIC was a necessary party to the proceeding and had not been joined. Remanded. View "Michael E. Siska Revocable Trust v. Milestone Dev., L.L.C." on Justia Law

McCarthy Holdings filed a complaint against Vincent Burgher, seeking a declaratory judgment concerning an easement agreement. McCarthy, the owner of the dominant estate, sought a declaration that it had the right, as a matter of law, to bar Burgher, the owner of the servient estate, from any use of the easement. The circuit court found that the easement agreement was unambiguous and that it did not bar Burgher from reasonable use of the easement area. McCarthy appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in construing the easement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying McCarthy's request to bar Burgher, as a matter of law, from any use of the easement area based upon the easement agreement; and (2) the circuit court did not improperly consider parol evidence in interpreting the easement agreement. View "McCarthy Holdings L.L.C. v. Burgher" on Justia Law

Justine Critzer died intestate with, apparently, no spouse, siblings, children or parents to survive her. Nancy Donak, the administratrix of Critzer's estate, subsequently discovered that the Mary Kummer ("Mrs. Kummer"), the deceased mother of Richard and Charles Kummer and Jane Kummer Stolte ("Kummer children"), was the biological sister of Critzer. Consequently, the Kummer children were Critzer's closest surviving heirs. After the Kummer children began to administer the estate, Donak filed a motion for rule to show cause against distribution based upon the fact that Mrs. Kummer had been adopted at the age of fifty-three by her aunt by marriage. At a hearing to determine the effect of Mrs. Kummer's adoption, the court held (1) the Kummer children were not Critzer's heirs at law because Mrs. Kummer's adoption severed their legal ties to Critzer and her estate, and (2) Virginia's statutory scheme does not distinguish between the adoption of an adult and the adoption of a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the Kummer children were not heirs-at-law of the Critzer estate because their mother's adult adoption severed their inheritance rights. View "Kummer v. Donak" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Fox Rest Associates (Fox Rest) was formed to purchase Fox Rest Apartments. Defendants in this case were George Little, Fox Rest's legal counsel through his law firm, George B. Little and Associates (GBL&A), George Little's wife, and GBL&A. This action took place after Mr. Little sold the Apartments without knowledge of Fox Rest and transferred a portion of the proceeds from the sale in an account he held with Mrs. Little. Unable to satisfy a previous judgment finding Mr. Little and GLB&A liable to Fox Rest for, inter alia, malpractice and double billing, Fox Rest filed this action against Defendants, seeking to void various transactions by Mr. Little as fraudulent conveyances and voluntary conveyances. The court granted Defendants' motion to strike, finding that Fox Rest did not present sufficient evidence in its case in chief to establish a prima facie case for its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, except for a portion of the claims relating to the sale of certain equipment, the circuit court erred in striking Fox Rest's fraudulent conveyance and voluntary conveyance claims. Remanded. View "Fox Rest Assocs., L.P. v. Little" on Justia Law

James Proffitt was convicted of a felony sexual offense involving a minor and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The circuit court, shortly thereafter, appointed Melissa Doud as Proffitt's guardian and conservator. Doud then brought an action against the county, the sheriff, the sheriff's deputies and jailors, and the Commonwealth, alleging Proffitt suffered serious injuries during his incarceration at the county jail due to the negligence of the sheriff's deputies. Doud's theory of recovery against the Commonwealth was based entirely on respondeat superior. The circuit dismissed the action. At issue on appeal was whether the Commonwealth's express waiver of sovereign immunity for damage caused by the negligent act of any employee acting within the scope of his employment rendered the Commonwealth liable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth was not waived with respect to Doud's tort claim because the sheriff was not an "employee" of the Commonwealth within the definitions contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. View "Doud v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

An employee of the general contractor on a construction site was allegedly injured by the negligent act of the employee of a subcontractor who carried no workers' compensation insurance. Plaintiff, the injured party, brought a common-law action against Defendants, the uninsured subcontractor and its employee, the alleged tortfeasor. The Defendants filed a plea in bar, asserting that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act was Plaintiff's sole remedy. The circuit court held that Defendants' failure to carry workers' compensation insurance deprived them of the protections afforded by the Act because they were not participants in the statutory workers' compensation system. The court denied the plea in bar, permitting the action to go forward, but certified the case for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and entered final judgment dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants' plea in bar because Defendants were entitled to the exclusivity protection provided by the Act notwithstanding their lack of workers' compensation insurance. View "David White Crane Serv. v. Howell" on Justia Law

Leslie Todd gave birth to a female child while incarcerated. Lucretia Copeland eventually became the baby's primary physical custodian. Approximately two years later, Copeland filed a petition to adopt the child without the consent of Todd pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1202(H). The circuit court granted Copeland's petition, holding that Todd failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition as required by section 63.2-1202(H), and, in the alternative, that Todd had withheld her consent contrary to the child's best interests under Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1203 and -1205. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the final decree of adoption, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in reversing the circuit court's holding that Todd's consent to the adoption was not necessary under section 36.2-1202(H), but (2) the court of appeals erred in its judgment that the circuit court violated Todd's constitutional rights under sections 63.2-1203 and -1205 as the circuit court gave adequate consideration to Todd's due process rights and Todd's equal protection rights were not violated. View "Copeland v. Todd" on Justia Law

Lawton Rogers, an attorney, and three associates (Plaintiffs) formed a partnership (the Firm) by signing a partnership agreement. Each Plaintiff signed a note securing his indebtedness with his interest in the Firm. Later, all four partners joined a new firm, and the Firm remained extant but inactive. Several years later, Rogers and his wife later filed an amended complaint against Plaintiffs, demanding repayment of the notes. Plaintiffs filed a separate complaint asserting that Rogers had overdrawn his capital account by $611,147 and that this amount was owed to the Firm under the partnership agreement. Plaintiffs sought a final accounting and judgment against Rogers in favor of the Firm, the distribution of the Firm's assets equally among the partners, and the judicial dissolution of the Firm. The circuit court consolidated the two cases and ultimately ordered the judicial dissolution of the Firm without performing an accounting and settlement of the partners' accounts. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, (1) remanding for an accounting and settlement of the Firm's assets and liabilities, and (2) affirming the portion of the circuit court judgment awarding Rogers unpaid interest on his $150,000 capital contribution to the Firm. View "Comtois v. Rogers" on Justia Law