Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Derek Bell was declared by a jury in circuit court to be a sexually violent predator and was civilly committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services for appropriate treatment. After Bell's first annual review, the circuit court found that Bell remained a sexually violent predator but that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release from the custody of the Department set forth under Va. Code Ann. 37.2-912. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judgment of the circuit court was without evidence to support it as Bell had not satisfied the first criterion set forth in section 37.2-912(A) and continued to need secure inpatient treatment. Final judgment entered in favor of the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Bell" on Justia Law

These appeals arose out of two cases brought after Mother was shot and killed by her only child, Clayton Lynn. Mother's will identified Lynn as the sole beneficiary of her estate. Lynn's daughters (Granddaughters) filed separate actions seeking declaratory judgment that Lynn be declared a "slayer" for the purposes of the Slayer Statute and that the Granddaughters be declared the sole heirs of Mother's estate. The circuit court consolidated the two actions and held that Mother's mother was the sole and rightful heir to Mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder controlled the distribution of Mother's estate in this case, and as a result, the trial court was correct in concluding that under the laws of intestate succession at the time of Mother's death, as modified by the Slayer Statute in effect, Mother's estate passed to the next living person who was neither the slayer nor making a claim through the slayer; and (2) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder neither implicated nor violated Virginia's prohibition against corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. View "Bell v. Casper" on Justia Law

After Roger Hudspeth's employment with the Bank of the Commonwealth was terminated, Hudspeth filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging the Bank failed to pay him compensation owed for his employment. The Bank filed a motion to stay and compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), arguing (1) the Bank was a "customer" as defined by the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Customer Code), (2) Hudspeth was an associated person of a "member," and (3) because the dispute was between a customer and an associated person of a member, arbitration was mandatory under the Customer Code. The circuit court denied the Bank's motion, concluding that the Bank was not a customer under the Customer Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Customer Code was susceptible to an interpretation under which the Bank could be considered a customer, and (2) because under the Federal Arbitration Act any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the circuit court erred when it denied the Bank's motion in this case. Remanded. View "Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

Kivalina, a native community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (Complaint) in a California district court against The AES Corporation, a Virginia-based energy company, and numerous other defendants for allegedly damaging the community by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast Insurance, which provided commercial general liability (CGL) to AES, provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights. Later AES filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage in the underlying suit. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast, and that Steadfast, therefore, did not owe AES a defense or liability coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, but rather that its damages were the natural and probable consequence of AES's intentional actions, and such loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Barabara Rutter filed a wrongful death action in June 2000 against Oakwood, a living center, Prism Rehab, a company providing physical therapy services, and the president and employee of Prism Rehab. Dixon and Prism Rehab filed a notice of bankruptcy stay, and in October 2000 the circuit court entered a bankruptcy stay order. At issue was whether the order dismissed the action or only removed the action from the circuit court's docket. Oakwood argued the order served to discontinue Rutter's action in October 2003 pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-335(B) because, as of that date, the action had been inactive for three years. The circuit court entered an order in 2009 stating that because Rutter had not re-filed her action before 2003, the case was dismissed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute does not allow the prospective discontinuance of an action and that the 2000 order merely removed Rutter's action from the docket. However, because the 2009 order only adjudicated Rutter's claim against Oakwood, that order was not final for purposes of the appeal. The Court held it had no jurisdiction over the appeal, and dismissed the case without prejudice. View "Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers" on Justia Law

The City of Richmond provides a partial exemption from real estate taxes for qualifying rehabilitated property if a property increases in value by at least forty percent because of rehabilitation. According to the city code, the amount of the partial exemption is the difference between the property's assessed value before rehabilitation and its initial rehabilitated assessed value. At issue in this case was whether the City Assessor's policy of determining a property's initial rehabilitated assessed value not as of the date its rehabilitation is completed but as of the date its owner's application for the program is submitted was consistent with the requirements of the city code. The circuit court held the policy departed from the requirements of the code because the ordinance requires that a property's first assessed value after rehabilitation be used to determine the amount of a partial exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "initial rehabilitated assessed value" means the first assessed value after rehabilitation and not, as the city argued, value attributable to rehabilitation. View "Riverside Owner v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

In 2008 the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner of Virginia condemned the Taco Bell restaurant building located near a federal highway. Taco Bell argued that approximately 42 pieces of equipment used in the restaurant as part of Taco Bell's business were fixtures and therefore should be included in determining the just compensation for the property taken. The trial court held that the items in question were personal property and there was no factual determination to be made by the jury because the evidence showed that the items could have been removed from the property. Taco Bell appealed, arguing that the trial court did not properly apply the Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement test for determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to submit the issue to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the items in question were moveable, there was evidence the items were of the type needed for the purpose to which the property was devoted, and therefore the evidence on the issue whether the items were fixtures or personalty for condemnation purposes was sufficient to submit to the jury. View "Taco Bell of America, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Geoffrey Sanders was convicted by a jury of forcible sodomy, rape, object sexual penetration, and taking indecent liberties with a child. During the trial, the circuit court allowed the commonwealth's medical expert, a doctor, to rely on the results of a laboratory report as the basis of her opinion that the victim had a sexually transmitted infection. Sanders appealed, arguing that this portion of the expert's testimony violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals found the laboratory report in this instance was not testimonial for purposes of Sixth Amendment confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the laboratory report was for medical treatment purposes as it was created to permit the doctor to medically diagnose and treat the victim for sexually transmitted infections and was thus non-testimonial; and (2) a laboratory technician under these circumstances would not have reason to believe the results of his or her testing would be used in later trial and thus the report and the expert's testimony as to its content were not subject to exclusion under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. View "Sanders v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Gardiner Mulford purchased a tract of land after being advised by the seller that it might be landlocked and reviewing an appraisal that concluded an access easement would need to be acquired. Mulford began to use an old plank road on Walnut Hill Farm Group's land to access his property. Mulford was arrested for trespassing. Mulford then filed a four-count complaint against Walnut Hill, alleging the roadbed was a lawful, recorded easement. The trial court held for Walnut Hill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in finding (1) a public body did not accept an offer to dedicate the roadway, and therefore the roadbed was not public; (2) the elements of proof for a prescriptive easement, including use of an easement by prior occupants, were not established, and therefore Mulford was not entitled to a prescriptive easement; and (3) because Mulford did not allege that Walnut Hill made any representation regarding an easement upon which he relied, Walnut Hill was not equitably estopped from denying the easement. View "Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2005, Southwest Emergency Physicians, Inc. (SWEP) and Alldredge entered into a contract under which SWEP's physician-employees staffed Lewis-Gale's emergency department. The contract provided that it could be terminated by either party without cause. In 2008, Alldredge became involved with some signatories to a letter addressed to the Lewis-Gale administration voicing work-related concerns. Certain Lewis-Gale administrators expressed concern that Alldredge had become involved in the hospital's personnel matters, and SWEP later terminated Alldredge's employment. Alldredge sued Lewis-Gale for tortious interference with her employment contract with SWEP, and the circuit court found in favor of Alldredge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the administrators' statements of intimidation and animus toward Allredge did not rise as a matter of law to the level of "improper methods"- such as fraud, deceit, or defamation - necessary to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract expectancy when a contract is terminable at will. View "Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge" on Justia Law