Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee John Jennings operates a commercial marina/boatyard. He challenged the local zoning board's authority to regulate the construction of additional mooring slips that would lie beyond the mean low-water mark of a navigable body of water on his property. Appellant also challenged the authority's "special exception permit" ordinance, claiming that the ordinance lacks adequate standards to guide the governing body's decision to grant or deny a permit. On review, the Supreme Court found no errors from the lower court's record on either ground: "the County's zoning authority 'embrace[s] the entirety of [Appellee's] proposed construction, even the portion that 'extends into the Chesapeake Bay's tidal tributaries.'" The Court affirmed the lower court's denial of Appellee's request for declaratory relief.

In December, 2002, Appellee Alyssa Chalifoux saw her family physician after experiencing headaches and other symptoms on the right side of her face. The doctor referred Appellee for an MRI with Appellant Radiology Associates of Richmond. Between 2002 and 2005, Appellee received an MRI approximately every six months, and each time, the reviewing radiologist reported no abnormalities. On her last MRI in October, 2005, the radiologist detected an abnormality in Appellee's right sinus. In his report, the radiologist commented that the abnormality "probably ha[d] been the cause of the patient's clinical symptoms and in retrospect is visible on the previous exams dating to [December, 2002]." Appellee filed suit, alleging that Appellants negligently read and interpreted various radiological studies that would have shown the tumor in her sinus as early as December, 2002. In their answer to the complaint, Appellants asserted that the suit was time-barred by the statute of limitations, and and that the "continuing treatment rule" does not apply because the care she received was episodic. The parties produced competing experts; the court sustained Appellant's plea of the statute of limitations, denied Appellee's motion for reconsideration, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that Appellee's treatment over the course of three years created a physician-patient relationship to defeat the assertion that the repeated visits were episodic. The Court held that the circuit court erred by ruling that the statue of limitations had run, and for not applying the continuing treatment rule to Appellee's case. The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal and remanded it for further proceedings.

Appellee Winston Burton was convicted for abduction in violation of state law. The victim brought her car to Appellee for service. Appellee asked the victim for "help" while he examined the car; after five to ten minutes, the victim began to feel uncomfortable, and exited the car. As she stepped away, she saw Appellee squatting down near the rear wheel with his hand in his unzipped pants. The victim told Appellee she needed to leave, but Appellee stepped in front of her "kind of block[ing]" her way to the car. She repeated that she needed to leave, and Appellee stepped aside. Appellee was indicted for abduction and found guilty after a jury trial. Appellee challenged his conviction to the appellate court which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed to review the record, and found the evidence at trial insufficient to prove that Appellee intended to deprive the victim of her personal liberty. The Court held that it was clear from the record that Appellee's intent was to deceive the victim into positioning herself in the car in such a way that he could gain sexual gratification by observing her; however briefly detained, the Court found Appellee's actions were made in pursuit of the gratification not with the intent to deprive the victim of her personal liberty. The Court vacated the lower court's conviction and dismissed the indictment.

Petitioner Marquis Byrd was indicted for first-degree murder, aggravated malicious wounding of another, and for the use of a firearm in both offenses. At a jury trial, he was convicted of second-degree murder and the unlawful wounding of another and use of a firearm in the murder; Petitioner was acquitted of the firearm charge in the wounding case. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, defense counsel made a motion to strike, which the court denied. At the close of all evidence, defense counsel failed to renew the motion. Petitioner's trial counsel was given leave to withdraw from the case with respect to sentencing; substitute counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict, but did not argue it and therefore never obtained a ruling. Petitioner was sentenced to 33 years' imprisonment for the three offenses. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on grounds that the sufficiency of evidence had not been preserved by either a renewal of the motion to strike or the motion to set aside the verdict. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging he had been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at both trial and sentencing. The Supreme Court, in applying Strickland, found that if counsel had performed without any professional errors and petitioner's direct appeal had been available for review, there would be "no reasonable probability that a different result would have been reached." The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the circuit court erred in its interpretation of a management agreement between Condominium Services, Inc. (CSI) and First Owners' Association of Forty Six Hundred Condominium, Inc. (FOA). FOA filed a complaint alleging CSI breached the terms of the management agreement and had wrongfully converted FOA's funds. CSI filed a counterclaim and amended counterclaim for breach of contract. The circuit court sustained FOA's demurrers to the counterclaim and amended counterclaim. FOA's claims proceeded to a jury trial; the jury returned a verdict in favor of FOA on both its claims . CSI sought to strike the jury verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court denied the motion and CSI appealed. On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's holding and affirmed the judgment in favor of FOA.

In 2008, the Board of County Supervisors filed a petition for condemnation in trial court against Appellee's Charles and Anna Dean, seeking to obtain the Deans' property to expand a bus maintenance facility and parking structure. The Deans' property consisted of approximately one acre, and had been used previously as a gas station and transmission repair shop. The County had tried to purchase the property, but had been unable to reach an agreement regarding compensation for the property. Before trial, the County filed a motion in limine requesting the court exclude evidence of a purported comparable sale that the Deans relied on to arrive at a price for their property. At trial, the County's expert appraiser testified that the Deans' property was worth $475,000; the Deans' expert valued the property at $900,000. Ultimately the jury fixed the property's value at $488,750. The Deans filed exceptions to the jury's report that the court overruled and denied. On review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the County's motion in limine and excluding evidence regarding the "comparable sale," and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Dunn, McCormack & MacPherson (Dunn), a Virginia law firm, served as legal counsel to the Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing Authority for thirty years. Dunn worked for the Authority on an at-will contract for legal representation, which was terminated in September, 2005. Dunn filed a complaint against the County Board of Supervisors, alleging that the Chairman of the Board tortiously interfered with Dunn's contract with the Authority. The circuit court sustained the Board's demurrer, holding that Dunn's complaint failed to state sufficient facts to support a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract. Dunn amended its complaint, but ultimately failed to convince the court to rule in its favor. On appeal, the Supreme Court found the record clearly demonstrated that the circuit court sustained the County's demurrer for failing to "adequately state a prima facie cause of action" and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Bataa Baasanjav rented an automobile from Appellant Enterprise Leasing Company (Enterprise). Baasanjav declined to purchase supplemental liability insurance for the rental. The lease agreement contained an indemnification provision in which the renter would have financial responsibility to Enterprise for any losses associated with the rental. Baasanjav was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Appellee Farmers Insurance for his own automobile. The Farmers policy would pay for "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay. . .because of injury to or destruction of property. . .arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned vehicle." Under the terms of the policy, "owned vehicle" included the rental. Baasanjav was involved in an accident with another driver while driving the Enterprise rental. The parties stipulated Baasanjav was liable for damages to the other driver's car; Enterprise paid the damages to the other driver. Enterprise sought indemnification from Baasanjav; Baasanjav refused. Farmers filed a complaint for declaratory relief asking the court to determine whether Enterprise had a right to recover from Farmers or Bassanjav or both, under the terms of the Farmers policy and the Enterprise lease agreement. The circuit court ruled that Farmers is liable to Enterprise for the amount paid to the other driver; Farmers appealed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellant John Gordon suffered a compensible injury by accident while working at Appellee Ford Motor Company's production plant in 2000. Based on this injury, the Workers' Compensation Commission entered a series of awards of compensation to Appellant for various periods of temporary total and temporary partial disability. The last of these awards was in 2003 for temporary partial disability. In 2006, Appellant was temporarily laid off from his position at Ford because the plant was shut down. Appellant filed a change-in-condition application seeking temporary total disability benefits based on lost wages caused by the plant shut down. Ford defended against the 2006 application for benefits, by arguing that the twenty-four month tolling provision in Code §65.2-708 (C) could be triggered only once, when Appellant returned to work in a light duty position in 2000. The commission rejected Ford's argument and awarded Appellant the benefits he requested. On appeal, the full commission held that Appellant's change-in-condition was time barred based on the tolling provision in the code. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the commission; Ford moved for a hearing en banc, and the court again reversed the commission. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the tolling provision runs anew under each successive award of compensation for a particular compensable injury, and is triggered on the last day for which compensation was paid. "Consequently. . . the statute of limitations was tolled through April 20, 2005 and that [Appellant's] change-in-condition application. . . was not time-barred under the statute."

In 1999, Thomas Laffey was injured when his car was hit by a car owned by Sharon Bass. Sharon's daughter Krystal was the car's primary user; Steven Parent was driving the car at the time of the accident. Sharon had a family automobile insurance policy issued by Appellee Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), which listed the car. The policy insured Sharon, or any resident in her household, or any other person using the car with permission of the named insured, provided his actual use of the car was within the scope of such permission. Steven's mother Annie also had an automobile insurance policy with GEICO. Annie's policy covered bodily injury for those it insured while they operated a car owned by another. After the accident, Laffey presented claims to GEICO under Sharon's and Annie's policies. The claims were denied on the ground that Steven lacked permission to operated the car at the time of the accident. Laffey also submitted a claim to his own automobile insurer, Appellant United Services Automobile Association (USAA), and filed a motion for judgment alleging Steven had been negligent in his operation of the car. GEICO filed a declaratory judgment action against USAA, Annie, Steven, Sharon, Krystal and Laffey seeking a determination that it was not obligated to pay for the accident. The court held that Steven was entitled to coverage under both Sharon's and Annie's policies. GEICO appealed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding and entered final judgment in favor of GEICO.