Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Donald Gunter originally filed an action against Appellant Robbie Martin individually and in her capacity as administrator of the estate of George Martin in 2005. Gunter alleged that the decedent died intestate. She listed herself as sole heir, but he was the biological child of the decedent, therefore the list of heirs filed with the estate was incorrect. Gunter petitioned the court to allow an amended list of heirs to be filed; Martin moved to dismiss on the grounds that Gunter failed to bring his action within one year of the decedent's death. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action. In 2009, Gunter filed a complaint for quiet title and for allotment or sale or real property, naming Martin in her individual capacity as sole defendant. Gunter alleged that the decedent died intestate, Martin was his widow, he was the biological son of the decedent, and that the real property in question could not be partitioned conveniently. Martin filed a plea in bar of res judicata, arguing that the relief Gunter seeks relies on a determination of whether he is the decedent's biological child, which had been decided in the 2005 matter. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the remedy sought in the 2005 action was different from the remedy in the 2009 action, and reversed the lower court decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

While sitting in the driver's seat of his parked truck talking with a customer on his cell phone, Appellee Michael Lewis was approached by a ten-year-old child and asked for a ride home. Appellee did not know the child, but offered to give him a ride. As the child got into the truck, Cedrick Williams, who knew neither the child nor Appellee, came from him home and approached the truck, yelling for the child to get out of the truck. Williams called 911, reporting that he witnessed an attempted abduction. Appellant Officer Brian Kei obtained an arrest warrant for Appellee based solely on the report by Williams. Appellee was held for 41 days in jail. After the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney spoke with the child and verified Appellee's version of the incident, charges against Appellee were dropped nolle prosequi. On petition, the circuit court expunged the record of Appellee's arrest, but the police website, as well as several news station websites still reported the incident, quoting arresting officer Kei with statements that proved to be unfounded. Appellee brought suit alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and defamation against Kei; the court entered an order sustaining a demurrer to all claims against Kei. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the demurrer on all counts except defamation, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim.

Appellee Shawn Necaise was arrested on warrants charging felonious disregard of a police officer's signal to stop, and feloniously assaulting an officer engaged in public duties. The court records show the charges were reduced to misdemeanors. Represented by counsel, Appellee plead guilty to both charges; the Commonwealth took nolle prosequi to other pending misdemeanors. The court accepted the pleas, found him guilty of both, and imposed fines and suspended jail time. Two years later, Appellee filed a petition in the circuit court seeking expungement of all police and court records pertaining to the two felony charges and the misdemeanors that had been dismissed nolle prosequi. The court ordered the expungement with regard to the charges disposed of by nolle prosequi, but denied the expungement pertaining to the two felonies. On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the misdemeanors to which Appellee was convicted were lesser included offenses of the felonies with which he was originally charged, all of the elements of the offenses were subsumed within the felony charges and formed the sole bases for the misdemeanor convictions. "The record as it stands contains a true account of the events that actually occurred and creates no injustice to either party." The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Appellant Sara Forbes (Trustee) created a trust to convey a parcel of real estate to the City of Newport News in which she acted as trustee. The trust provisions prohibit the trustee from selling the property except to a condemner in the event the property is condemned. The provisions require the trustee to distribute all net income generated by the trust to grantor for her lifetime. The principal of the trust would be distributed to Appellee Riverside Healthcare Association (Riverside). In 2008, the Commonwealth acquired a portion of the property in trust by certificate of take. Because the trustee and Riverside disagreed as to whether the compensation received in the eminent domain action should be allocated to principal or income, they entered an escrow agreement directing the escrow agents to hold the condemnation compensation and disburse the fund in accordance with future directions from the trustee and Riverside. Subsequently, the Trustee sought declaratory relief against Riverside asking that the condemnation compensation be paid as income for distribution to the grantor according to the terms of the trust. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of who got the compensation; the circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. Riverside appealed, seeking Supreme Court review of whether the state Uniform Principal and Income Act controlled the distribution of the condemnation compensation, and whether the remainder beneficiary could bring suit seeking an equitable accounting of the trust. The Court found the lower court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to the Trustee, but reversed the lower court's ruling on the equitable accounting issue, and remanded for further proceedings.

From March 2005 to November 2007, Appellee Wilma Ruby entered into a total of 33 payday loan agreements with Appellant Cashnet, Inc. The amount of each loan increased over time. Appellee failed to pay her last loan. In 2008, Appellee brought suit against Cashnet alleging that with each loan she made, she was refinancing, renewing or extending the previous loan, in violation of state law. She further alleged that the annual percentage rate for each loan exceeded the finance fee allowed under state law. Appellee sought the return of interest paid or statutory damages and attorney's fees. A bench trial was held on Appellee's claims; the circuit court ruled in Cashnet's favor, holding that the loans did not constitute a refinance, renewal or extension, and were not in violation of the law. On appeal, the Supreme Court gave ordinary meaning to the terms at issue in the lower court's ruling: "refinance" and "renew." The Court found that "refinancing" is the exchange of an old debt for a new one; "renewal" is the recreation of a legal relationship or the replacement of an old contract with a new one. By looking at the substance of the transactions between Cashnet and Appellee, the Court deduced that the proceeds from each new loan were being used to repay the previous loan, therefore each transaction was refinanced. The Court held that Cashnet's practice of making loans to Appellee immediately after she repaid a previous loan was a refinancing in violation of state law. It reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1925, the owner of a parcel of land adjacent to the James River obtained the right to construct a wharf and pier extending into the river and adjacent to public land, then owned by the Isle of Wight County. Over time, the wharf was extended to include a pavilion and attached piers resting on pilings placed in the subsurface lands of the river, within the area between the mean low-water mark and the line of navigation. Through a chain of successive recorded transfers, the pavilion and piers were acquired by members of the Bracey family, including Appellee R. Forrest Scott. The family performed extensive renovations and began using the pavilions as a family retreat. The pavilion and connecting piers were destroyed by hurricane in 2003, and although a number of pilings that supported the original structures remain in place, there has been no reconstruction. In 2006, Appellant Burwell's Bay Improvement Association received approval to construct a pier from its property into the riparian area formerly containing the pavilion and piers that were destroyed in 2003. In March, 2007, Scott and other members of the Bracey sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit court that they own the riparian and other rights on and adjacent to the public area, to determine the extent of those rights, and to enjoin construction by Appellant that would interfere with the family's rights. The circuit court found that the family failed to establish ownership of the riparian rights by adverse possession or a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to review whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the use of the riparian rights was exclusive and continuous for the required period of time. The Court found because the family chose not to reconstruct after the 2003 hurricane, the piers that remained was not enough to use tacking to establish exclusive and continuous use of the area and riparian rights. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Prior to November, 2006, Grievant Tammy Estep worked for the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC) as a Superintendent of the Central Virginia Correctional Unit. She had consistently been given good performance reviews until November 13th, when she was involuntarily demoted to a lower position. She filed a grievance that ultimately came before a hearing officer. The officer found the demotion was unwarranted, and ordered the DOC to reinstate Estep to a comparable position as either a Superintendent or Assistant Warden, and that she be reimbursed for any lost pay as a result of the demotion. Estep's former position had been filled; in an attempt to comply with the hearing officer's order, the DOC transferred Estep to a different location, and into a newly-created position with the same rate of pay, but different duties, responsibilities and authority. Estep brought suit at the circuit court seeking implementation of the hearing officer's order. The court held that the DOC failed to implement the hearing officer's order, and ordered Estep be reinstated to her old position since the DOC could not find an adequate substitute. The DOC appealed. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the matter, and found that the record supported the circuit court's decision to reinstate Estep to her former position.

This appeal stems from an application made by the City of Virginia Beach to the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC). The City sought to install a stormwater pipeline over state-owned bottomlands. After a public hearing, the VMRC approved the pipeline project. City residents appealed the decision to the circuit court seeking to enjoin the project. VMRC responded, in part, that the Residents' pleading was insufficient because they did not specify how they were aggrieved by the pipeline project. The City also challenged the Residents' complaint, arguing that it lacked a "proper jurisdictional basis." The circuit court agreed that the Residents' complaint lacked standing and dismissed it, and denied the Residents' motion to amend the petition for appeal. The Residents then raised the matter to the Court of Appeals, and the appellate court reversed the dismissal. On appeal by the City and VMRC, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court misapplied the rule that supported the appellate court's decision, saying the court "misconstrues the role of the rules in such appeals and is inconsistent with established and relevant principles of jurisprudence." The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the circuit court's decision in favor of the City and VMRC.

Petitioner Corey Smith was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by Richmond police officers for a broken tail light. The officers asked the driver and Petitioner for identification, and processed that information using the police database known as "PISTOL" (Police Information System Totally On Line), which was accessed through a computer in the police patrol car. PISTOL returned an "alert" stating that Petitioner was "probably armed and a narcotics seller/user." On receiving the alert, the officers asked Petitioner out of the car and conducted a pat down search of his person. The officer detected a gun in Petitioner's pocket. Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of state law. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the pat down, arguing that the search, based solely on the information in PISTOL was unreasonable and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion; Petitioner entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The appellate court concluded that "in the absence of some contemporaneous indication that the individual might be carrying a weapon, the facts do not provide reasonable suspicion to believe he may presently be armed and dangerous" and overturned the lower court's conviction. On review, the Supreme Court holds that the record supports the conclusion of the trial court, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk, and affirmed the conviction.

In April, 2006, Charles Volpe drowned in the Maury River below a low-head dam during a visit to a park owned by the Appellant City of Lexington. His parents S. Charles and Kim Volpe (Appellees) brought suit against the City seeking damages for gross negligence, willful and wanton negligence and public nuisance. The matter proceeded to a jury trial; in the end, the court struck the ordinary negligence claims and refused to instruct the jury on public nuisance. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the gross negligence claim, and the circuit court granted a renewed motion to strike that claim, finding the danger posed by the dam was open and obvious and therefore the City owed no duty to warn Charles. The record reflected that while many people swam in the waters created by the dam without incident, there was a deadly, hidden hydraulic created by an unusually strong current that the City knew existed. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the "natural, ordinarily encountered dangers" of the river were open and obvious to Charles, the hidden hydraulic was not. The Court held that the City had a duty to warn Charles of the hidden dangers, and that the lower court erred by striking the Volpes' claims of gross negligence against the City, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment striking the claim of willful and wanton negligence.