Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sought coverage under his homeowners' insurance policy issued by Insurer for damages allegedly caused by sheets of drywall manufactured in China that were installed in his home during its construction. Insurer denied Plaintiff's claim and brought an action in the U.S. district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff's homeowners policy did not provide coverage for such losses. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the policy did not provide coverage for the damages allegedly caused by the drywall because of certain policy exclusions. The U.S. court of appeals certified to the Virginia Supreme Court the question of whether the policy exclusions were applicable to Plaintiff's claimed losses. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage damage caused by the Chinese drywall installed in Plaintiff's residence. View "TravCo Insurance Co. v. Ward" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court determined that the circuit court erred in extending summary judgment entered against a defendant motorist to likewise bind the underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance carrier. The Court reversed, holding that despite the UIM carrier's reliance on the defendant and her liability insurer to mount a defense, the UIM insurance carrier retained its own right to defendant in the event that the interests of the UIM insurance carrier and the defendant or her liability insurer diverged, and the circuit court erred in determining otherwise. Remanded to allow the UIM carrier to present a defense. View "Transp. Ins. Co. v. Womack" on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted of aggravated sexual battery. Subsequently, Respondent was determined to be a sexually violent predator and ordered committed to the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Development Services. The circuit court later held an annual assessment hearing of Respondent's status that was conducted by two-way electronic video and audio communications pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 37.2-910(A). At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator and ruled that he should remain in secure inpatient treatment. Respondent appealed, arguing because he was not physically present at the hearing his due process and statutory rights were violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision in Code 37.2-910(A) for conducting annual assessment hearings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act by video conference was neither unconstitutional facially nor unconstitutional as applied in Respondent's case; and (2) the circuit court correctly found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator in need of secure inpatient treatment. View "Shellman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was (1) whether an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of an easement by condemnation also confers the authority to acquire the easement by an action to quiet title, and (2) whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed easements and whether the court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven Dunes Condominium Association was not entitled to compensation for its loss of riparian rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the authorizing ordinance fully encompassed the City's actions in bringing this condemnation proceeding, and the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City had proven it had acquired the easements by implied dedication; but (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven's loss of riparian rights was non-compensable. View "Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law

At issue in this will contest was whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury as to the existence of the presumption of testamentary capacity. In this case, the decedent bequeathed her dog and a cash gift for the dog's care to Appellant and bequeathed the remainder of her residuary estate to charity. Appellant contended that, under the facts of this case, the presumption disappeared, and it was error to instruct the jury regarding the presumption. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the presumption of testamentary capacity does not necessary disappear in the face of evidence to the contrary, and moreover, the circuit court did not rule at the motion to strike that the presumption had been rebutted; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury about the presumption. View "Kiddell v. Labowitz" on Justia Law

The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission filed the present complaint against Jacqueline Waymack, judge of the sixth judicial district, pursuant to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Commission asserted that its charges against Judge Waymack for allegedly violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct were well founded in fact and that the violations were of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for censure or removal by the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge Waymack engaged in either "misconduct" or "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" under Va. Const. art. VI, 10. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Waymack" on Justia Law

This appeal from an order dismissing an action for wrongful death presented the question whether the decedent, who was serving on active duty with the armed forces of the United States at the time of his injury, was covered by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. If his injury, which was the subject of this action, came within the purview of the Act, an award under the Act would have been his estate's exclusive remedy, barring this action. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the decedent never acquired the right to seek compensation under the Act, and therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing the action. View "Gibbs v. Newport News Shipbuildng & Drydock Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred when it found that a county subdivision did not violate a restrictive covenant requiring compliance with the county's subdivision ordinance in effect in 1997. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the county's 1997 subdivision ordinance did not incorporate the requirements of its 1997 zoning ordinance by implication; but (2) erred when it refused to consider claims that the subdivision violated certain provisions of the 1997 subdivision ordinance not specifically referenced in the amended complaint. View "Fein v. Payandeh" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred when it held that Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence for the period he was detained in a Virginia jail awaiting trial. At that time, he was a West Virginia prisoner receiving credit toward his West Virginia sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it held Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence; and (2) the court erred in recharacterizing Defendant's pleading without providing him notice and the opportunity to be heard, but the error was harmless because Defendant was not required to challenge the recharacterization on the appeal, and he was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence. View "Dorr v. Clark" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in the district court of a felony third offense, DUI after being twice convicted of the same offense within ten years. The circuit court subsequently granted Appellant's motion to dismiss the second DUI case for denial of Appellant's right to a speedy trial. Appellant then filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of actual innocence with respect to his felony conviction, contending he was innocent of the felony because one of the requisite predicate misdemeanor convictions had been dismissed with prejudice. A court of appeals panel remanded the case for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of DUI, second conviction. The court of appeals thereafter granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en banc. The court of appeals, with ten judges sitting en banc, dismissed the writ of actual innocence without opinion by an equally-divided court and withdrew the previous order by the panel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the panel's judgment could only have been withdrawn and thus reversed by a majority of the judges sitting in the court en banc. Remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment of the panel. View "Conley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law