Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Robert Charles Gleason, Jr. received two death sentences following pleas of guilty to capital murder in the killings of two fellow inmates, Harvey Grey Watson and Aaron Cooper. Although Defendant was found competent to waive appeal and did so, the Supreme Court conducted the required statutory review and affirmed the judgments of the circuit court, holding (1) the death sentences were not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (2) the sentences were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. View "Gleason v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm during an aggravated malicious wounding. During trial, the Commonwealth moved that the court declare a witness who claimed memory loss unavailable and admit the transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony. The court, relying on the court of appeals' decision in Jones v. Commonwealth, found the witness unavailable. Because the court ruled that the transcript was inadmissible, the court allowed Defendant's counsel at the hearing to testify about the witness's testimony. Defendant thereafter was convicted of both charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring the witness unavailable, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case, Long Lane Associates Limited Partnership challenged ordinances adopted by the town council of the Town of Lessburg concerning property owned by an adjoining landowner. The challenged ordinances rezoned property owned by Cornerstone Chapel, amended the Town Plan to remove a portion of a public road, and approved a special exception to permit Cornerstone to operate a day care center on its property. The circuit court concluded that the amendment to the Town Plan was null and void, ruling that the Town lacked authority to approve Cornerstone's request to rezone its property or amend its zoning conditions without Long Lane's consent because Long Lane had a vested right in the completion of the road and the development set forth in the proffered conditions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Long Lane did not have vested rights in the zoning classification or land uses of its neighbor, even where the property was subdivided from a parcel which was rezoned subject to proffered conditions; and (2) Long Lane did not have a vested right in the construction of a road shown on the Town Plan, and the Town did not need Long Lane's consent to amend its plan. View "Town of Leesburg v. Long Lane Assocs." on Justia Law

Rosa Steward leased a home from Holland Family Properties. Rosa's son Dontral suffered lead poisoning as a result of his exposure to high levels of lead paint, which caused severe physical and mental impairments. Dontral, through his mother (Steward), filed a complaint against Holland and Jean Cross, the owner of property Dontral often visited. Both properties contained lead-based paint. Steward claimed that Defendants were liable for his injuries based on theories of negligence per se and common law negligence. The circuit court dismissed both counts on demurrer. At issue on appeal was whether Defendants, landlords subject to the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (VRLTA), had a duty in tort to the tenants of leased properties to comply with building and housing codes concerning public health and safety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a tort duty was not imposed on these landlords by the common law, the leases executed in this case, or the VRLTA. View "Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, use of a firearm while committing burglary and participation in a criminal street gang. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circuit court did not err by finding the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of gang participation. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Defendant's convictions for gang participation and for use of a firearm in the commission of burglary, holding (1) the circuit court erred in admitting certain evidence offered to support the conviction of criminal street gang participation, and therefore, the Commonwealth failed to prove an essential element of the crime; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for use of a firearm in commission of burglary. View "Rushing v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

John Rives was arrested for using profane, threatening, or indecent language over public airways, a misdemeanor. Convicted in the general district court, Rives appealed to the circuit court where he was again convicted. The court of appeals affirmed after applying the Miller v. California test for the definition of obscenity and finding that the phone calls made by Rives' met the Miller test for obscenity because the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that Rives' language had as its dominant theme an appeal to the prurient interest in sex and was therefore obscene within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed but for a slightly different reason, holding (1) the question of whether language used in telephonic communications is obscene is immaterial in cases involving threats to commit illegal or immoral acts, where the threat is made with the intent to coerce, intimidate or harass any person; and (2) Rives' language was clearly sufficient to enable a rational fact-finder to conclude that he was threatening the complainant with physical injury in the form of a sexual offense, with the obvious intent to intimidate and harass her. View "Rives v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Fred and Mary Ann Hart filed a complaint against Piney Meeting House Investments (PMH), alleging that PMH placed various obstructions in the Harts' easement area on PMH's property that interfered with the Harts' full use and enjoyment of the easement. A commissioner in chancery enjoined PMH from maintaining several encroachments but found that a well and a propane tank could remain underground. The Harts filed exceptions to the commissioner's report and argued that they were entitled to their attorney's fees. The circuit court sustained the Harts' exceptions and found that the Harts were entitled to recover their attorney's fees and costs from PMH. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court insofar as it sustained the Harts' exceptions regarding the buried propane tank and well; (2) affirmed the circuit court in its award of costs to the Harts; and (3) reversed the circuit court in its award of attorney's fees to the Harts. Remanded. View "Piney Meeting House Invs., Inc. v. Hart" on Justia Law

MT Technology Enterprises, LLC filed an amended complaint against Cristol, LLC, several members of Cristol's board of managers, and an employee of Cristol, Cristol's attorney, and the attorney's firm, alleging, inter alia, statutory conspiracy, tortious interference with economic expectancy in MT technologies, and breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court imposed sanctions against Cristol, its board, and its employee (Defendants) for discovery violations. The case proceeded to a jury against Defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of MT. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its interpretation of Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1057(A) and in concluding that MT satisfied the registration requirements of the statute; (2) the trial court did not err in imposing a sanction for discovery abuses; but (3) the trial court abused its discretion by forbidding cross-examination of witnesses regarding damages. Remanded for further proceedings on damages only. View "Nolte v. MT Tech. Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Kesha Napper, one of Kastle Systems' employees, slipped during work hours in the lobby of the building owned by Kastle. Napper filed suit alleging negligence against the janitorial services companies who cleaned the building and the property management company (Defendants). Defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that because Napper had been receiving workers' compensation benefits in connection with her injury, Napper's claims were barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court sustained Defendants' plea in bar and dismissed Napper's complaint with prejudice, finding that Napper and Defendants were statutory co-employees for purposes of the workers' compensation scheme. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' plea in bar because Napper's action against Defendants was not barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision in the Act, as, (1) under Floyd v. Mitchell, Defendants were other parties as contemplated by the Act and strangers to Kastle's particular business of operating a call center; and (2) thus, Defendants and Napper were not statutory fellow employees. Remanded. View "Napper v. ABM Janitorial Servs." on Justia Law

The Jared and Donna Murayama 1997 Trust sought damages arising from a settlement agreement between the Trust, its trustee Jared Murayama, and two of the defendants, NISC Holdings, LLC and Omen LLC, which transaction included NISC's repurchase of the Trust's voting stock in NISC (the "settlement agreement"). The Trust claimed it was damaged from selling the stock to NISC for substantially less than its fair market value as a result of the Trust's reliance on fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations of Defendants. The circuit court found that the Trust's allegations established that, as a matter of law, the Trust did not reasonably rely upon Defendants' alleged fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations regarding the value of the NISC stock at the time of the settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment sustaining Defendants' demurrer, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment based upon both the language of the settlement agreement and the allegations regarding the adversarial relationship between Murayama and the defendants that precipitated the settlement. View "Murayama 1997 Trust v. NISC Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law