Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After his employment was terminated at Horizon House, Michael Ford filed a complaint against the three corporate employers vested with the authority to fire him, including the Horizon House homeowners association. James Mansfield served as counsel to Horizon House. Ford sent a demand letter and a draft complaint marked "for settlement purposes only" to numerous individuals and entities. Ford then filed a complaint, substantially similar to the draft complaint, in the U.S. district court against several defendants, including Mansfield. Mansfield subsequently filed a complaint against Ford and others (Defendants), alleging that he was defamed by statements made about him in the draft complaint. The circuit court sustained Defendants' demurrers, ruling that the allegations made in the draft complaint, sent before the lawsuit was filed, were privileged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that absolute privilege attached to the draft complaint. View "Mansfield v. Bernabei" on Justia Law

Geoff Livingston and 134 other homeonwers or renters (collectively Plaintiffs) in a Fairfax County subdivision brought an inverse condemnation suit against the County and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) after their homes were flooded during a severe storm. The circuit court dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding that a single occurrence of flooding could not support an inverse condemnation claim under Va. Const. art. I, 11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint, if taken as true, established that their homes and personal property were damaged by VDOT's operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocation of a tributary stream, the circuit court erred in dismissing their inverse condemnation suit on VDOT's demurrer. Remanded. View "Livingston v. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment. Employer agreed to voluntarily pay workers' compensation benefits, and the Workers Compensation Commission issued an award order approving the agreements between Employee and Employer. Employer then filed an application with the Commission seeking to suspend Employee's benefits under the order for unjustifiably refusing to participate in vocational rehabilitation. The Commission denied the application. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether Employee should be permitted to offer evidence that his refusal to accept vocational rehabilitation services was justified because of a disabling injury that arose out of the same industrial accident for which he was awarded benefits, but which was not expressly designated in the award as a compensable injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that Employee was precluded from asserting that his refusal of vocational rehabilitation was justified. Remanded for an evidentiary proceeding so Employee could show his refusal was justified in light of his disabling injury. View "Ilg v. United Parcel Serv." on Justia Law

Scott and Martha Giordano were married and later separated. Scott was subsequently killed while working as an insulator in a building. Martha filed a claim for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The deputy commissioner determined that Martha was not a dependent of Scott and, therefore, was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Subsequently, Martha, as personal representative Scott's estate, filed a wrongful death claim against Defendants, Scott's employer, the employer's subcontractors, and a supplier of a product used in the construction process (Builder's Supply). The circuit court sustained Defendants' pleas in bar, concluding that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act barred Martha's action. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in holding that the exclusivity provision barred a non-dependent individual who was not eligible to collect benefits under the Act from bringing an action in tort; but (2) the court erred in holding that this provision of the Act barred an action in tort against Builder's Supply, as mere delivery of product was not within the trade, business or occupation of Scott's employer. View "Giordano v. McBar Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Steven Funkhouser, administrator of the estate of Emily Funkhouser, brought this products liability action against Ford Motor Company and Obaugh Ford, Inc. (collectively "Ford") after his daughter, Emily, died from severe burns she suffered when the family's Ford Windstar minivan caught fire. The circuit court ruled that evidence of seven other Winstar van fires was inadmissible. The parties then entered into an agreed final order wherein Funkhouser stipulated that absent evidence of those fires, he would be unable to prove his failure to warn claims, and therefore, entry of summary judgment was proper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its application of Virginia law governing admissibility of other similar occurrences and in excluding evidence of four of the other Windstar van fires; and (2) the evidence of three of the Windstar van fires was inadmissible. Remanded. View "Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Matthew Cline filed a complaint against Dunlora South, a private landowner on whose property the tree grew, for injuries he sustained when a tree fell on his vehicle as he was driving on a public highway. Cline alleged negligence and that Dunlora's conduct constituted a nuisance because Dunlora failed to maintain the subject property. Dunlora filed a demurrer, which the circuit court sustained. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that common law tort principles did not impose a duty upon private landowners to protect individuals traveling on an adjoining public highway from natural conditions on the landowner's property, nor did precedent support such a ruling. View "Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC" on Justia Law

Jackson Ward Partners (JWP) owned real property in the City of Richmond. JWP filed an amended complaint in the circuit court for correction of erroneous tax assessments on the property for the tax years 2005-2008, claiming that the assessments were clearly erroneous and in excess of the fair market value. The circuit court held that JWP satisfied its burden of proving the City's assessments were erroneous and ordered the City to correct its assessments and issue refunds to JWP for taxes it overpaid based on the erroneous assessment, plus interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that JWP failed to prove the fair market value of the real property at issue. Remanded for entry of an order reinstating the City's tax assessments on the real property for the tax years in question. View "City of Richmond v. Jackson Ward Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this case was a Section Eight tenant in a property owned by Defendants. For reasons beyond her control, Plaintiff prematurely terminated her lease. Defendants retained Plaintiff's security deposit, and Plaintiff filed a warrant in debt seeking the return of her security deposit. The district court ruled in favor of Defendant. The circuit court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that her security deposit could be retained by Defendants to satisfy the alleged rent obligation of the housing authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to preserve this argument for appeal, the argument was waived. View "Brandon v. Cox" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in the circuit court of felony failure to stop at the scene of an accident. Defendant commenced her appeal by filing a timely notice of appeal, but the court reporter failed to file transcripts of proceedings from the date on which the circuit court heard testimony and received evidence ("missing transcript"). The circuit court later entered an order making the missing transcript part of the record and ordering the clerk of court to transmit the missing transcript to the court of appeals. Defendant then filed a petition for appeal in the court of appeals. The court denied the petition, stating that Defendant did not timely file the missing transcript, and without the transcript, the record on appeal was insufficient to allow the court to review Defendant's assignments of error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in failing to consider the missing transcript in its review of the petition of appeal, as (1) the missing transcript was clerical error; and (2) the circuit court thus had authority to make the transcript part of the record, and Defendant was not required to seek an extension of time from the court of appeals. Remanded. View "Belew v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

On his wife's complaint, Defendant was arrested and tried on a misdemeanor warrant for sending emails to his wife accusing his wife of engaging in sexual acts with other men and soliciting sex on Craigslist. Defendant was convicted of harassment by a computer. A panel of the court of appeals reversed on the ground that Defendant's emails were not obscene under the definition of obscenity the court of appeals adopted in Allman v. Commonwealth. However, in its decision en banc, the court of appeals overruled its decision in Allman and adopted a newly broadened definition of obscenity, holding that Defendant's emails were obscene within that definition. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and vacated Barson's conviction, holding (1) the definition of "obscene" provided by the General Assembly in Va. Code Ann. 18.2-372 controlled this case, and accordingly, the court of appeals erred in substituting a dictionary definition for that provided by the General Assembly; and (2) Defendant's emails to his wife did not meet the standard of obscenity provided by section 18.2-372. View "Barson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law