Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Arvid and Lucy Keith were married, Arvid had a son from a previous marriage, Walter Keith (Keith), and Lucy had a daughter, Veronica Lulofs (Lulofs). Arvid and Lucy executed wills in 1987 that were mirror images of each other. Each will left the estate first to the surviving spouse and then to Keith and Lulofs equally. Arvid died in 1996 and his estate passed to Lucy. Lucy then executed a new will 1996 in which she left the entirety of her estate to Lulofs and made no provision for Keith. After Lucy's death, Lulofs attempted to probate Lucy's will, which Keith challenged. The trial court concluded that Keith failed to provide that the 1987 wills executed by Arvid and Lucy were irrevocable, reciprocal wills and accepted Lucy's 1996 will for probate, entering judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding that (1) the wills did not form an irrevocable contract between the testators; and (2) Keith's testimony presenting circumstantial evidence that Arvid and Lucy intended for the wills to be contracts was not corroborated as required by the Dead Man's statute. View "Keith v. Lulofs" on Justia Law

A developer contracted with B&R Construction Management (B&R) for the demolition a redevelopment and housing authority facility (hereafter referred to as the Contract). B&R subcontracted some of the demolition work to Beamon Enterprises (Beamon). Beamon, in turn, subcontracted with Environmental Staffing Acquisition Corporation (En-Staff) to provide labor. After Beamon failed to pay En-Staff for the work performed, En-Staff filed a complaint against B&R seeking the amount it was owed under its contract with Beamon. En-Staff asserted it had standing to bring a breach of contract claim against B&R as a third-party beneficiary of the Contract. B&R filed a demurrer disputing En-Staff's status as a third-party beneficiary. The circuit court sustained B&R's demurrer and dismissed En-Staff's claims against B&R with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that the language of the Contract precluded third-party action against B&R, but the error was harmless; and (2) En-Staff was not a third-party beneficiary of the Contract because it benefitted only incidentally from the Contract. View "Envtl. Staffing Corp. v. B & R Constr. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were several individuals comprising the Committee of Petitioners of the Buckroe Beach Bayfront Park Petition (the Committee). The Committee filed a complaint against POH 2010 LLC (POH) and the City of Hampton seeking an order declaring that POH's proposed development of a certain residential subdivision located in the City was unlawful and enjoining such development. The circuit court dismissed the Committee's complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Committee lacked standing to bring the action based on the limited authority granted to the Committee by the City Charter, which, under its referendum provisions, restricted the Committee's activities to pursuing a petition to repeal a newly enacted City zoning ordinance permitting the proposed development. View "Deerfield v. City of Hampton" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute between two attorneys, John Cattano and Carolina Bragg, the only shareholders of Cattano Law Firm. Bragg filed an amended complaint including claims for a writ of mandamus for the copying and inspection of corporate records, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, and judicial dissolution. A jury returned a verdict finding (1) Bragg owned 27.35 percent of the firm; (2) in Bragg's favor on her claim of derivative conversion, awarding the firm damages; and (3) in favor of Bragg on the breach of contract and judicial dissolution claims, awarding Bragg damages individually. The circuit court then awarded what it determined to be reasonable fees to Bragg. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that there was no error in the judgment of the circuit court. View "Cattano v. Bragg" on Justia Law

These companion appeals arose out of a personal-injury suit brought by a former high school student who was injured in a fight with another student on school grounds. On the morning of the fight, an assistant principal received a report that the fight would occur sometime that day, but he did not act on the report before the fight. The injured student sued two students and the assistant principal, asserting claims for simple and gross negligence, assault, and battery. The circuit court entered judgment against all three defendants, awarding the injured student a total of $5 million in damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred by (1) holding that the assistant principal was not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's simple negligence claim under the common law; and (2) refusing Plaintiff's proffered jury instruction on gross negligence. Remanded for a new trial limited to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim against the assistant principal. View "Burns v. Gagnon" on Justia Law

Mary Arnold, who was injured in an automobile collision, brought a negligence action against the other driver, Jonathan Wallace, who was uninsured. Travelers Insurance Company, Arnold's carrier, defended the suit pursuant to its uninsured motorist coverage. The jury awarded a verdict for Arnold in the amount of $9,134. Arnold appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in admitting medical records under the business records exception, as there was established a sufficient foundation for the admission of the evidence; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding an expert physician qualified to testify when her partner previously had been retained by the opposing counsel. View "Arnold v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The AES Corporation paid premiums to Steadfast Insurance Company for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. In February 2008, the village and city of Kivalina, a community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (the Complaint) in the U.S. district court against AES and other defendants for allegedly damaging the village by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity regarding the Complaint. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege property damage caused by an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, and therefore, such a loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A putative class action was filed in the U.S. District Court. The representative plaintiffs in the class action asserted claims of strict liability, negligence and medical monitoring against Merck & Co., Inc. Class certification was eventually denied, and the class action was dismissed. Prior to the dismissal of the putative class action, four Virginia residents filed individual state law actions against Merck in the southern district of New York, asserting federal diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Merck's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs' actions were untimely under Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, and the pendency of the putative class action did not toll Virginia's limitations period for the four plaintiffs' state law claims. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Virginia Supreme Court accepted certification to determine questions of state law. The Court held that Virginia law recognizes neither equitable nor statutory tolling of a Virginia statute of limitations for unnamed putative class members due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction. View "Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Namina Barber was a passenger in an automobile that was hit by a vehicle driven by Billy Wakole. As a result of her injuries Barber brought an action against Wakole, who admitted liability for the accident but disputed the extent of Barber's damages. The jury returned a verdict for $30,000 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing counsel for Barber to argue in his closing that each item of damage was separate and had a fixed numerical value and permitting him to enumerate each item of damages to the jury, as the argument made by Barber for specific amounts for various types of damages did not invade the province of the jury nor did it violate Va. Code Ann. 8.01-379.1. View "Wakole v. Barber" on Justia Law

Su, a citizen of the People's Republic of China, was accepted by the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) after attending high school in Minnesota. At the time Su matriculated at VCU, he was classified as an out-of-state student for tuition purposes. Su subsequently sought to change his classification to in-state status and filed an application for in-state tuition benefits. VCU's residency appeals officer denied Su's application, finding that federal law prohibited an F-1 visa holder to establish Virginia domicile. VCU's residency appeals committee denied Su's appeal. The circuit court reversed, holding (1) VCU was incorrect in asserting that Su had no domicile and that he was an V-1 visa holder, rather than a permanent resident, when he matriculated; and (2) Su had established that he was domiciled in Virginia and had abandoned any previous domicile for at least one year prior o the date of entitlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in reversing VCU's decision denying Su's application for in-state tuition benefits and that VCU's decision could not reasonably be said to be contrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to law. View "Va. Commonwealth Univ. v. Su" on Justia Law