Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA) filed a complaint against the St. Joe Company and Advantis Real Estate Services Company alleging unjust enrichment and seeking imposition of a constructive trust and recovery of funds supplied by NRHA to its agent, Advantis, for the payment of contractors who had performed services for NRHA. St. Joe held a perfected secured interest in Advantis's operating account and exercised its rights as a secured creditor over that account to have funds from Advantis's account, including those entrusted to Advantis as NRHA's agent, transferred to a St. Joe account. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of NRHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the imposition of a constructive was was proper and necessary to prevent a failure of justice and unjust enrichment. View "St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev. and Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Rappahannock Goodwill Industries (RGI) enterd into an agreement with Specialty Hospitals of Washington. When Specialty Hospitals failed to perform under the agreement, RGI filed a complaint against Specialty Hospitals, asserting claims for breach of contract, conversion, and quantum meruit. No responsive pleadings were filed on behalf of Specialty Hospitals, and the circuit court entered default judgment in favor of RGI. Specialty Hospitals then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, alleging that service of process was defective, that RGI's claims were against a different entity, and that RGI had erroneously sued Specialty Hospitals. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) failing to find actual notice to Specialty Hospitals, and (2) failing to consider all the factors set forth in Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3:19(d)(1). View "Specialty Hosps. v. Rappahannock Goodwill Indus." on Justia Law

Thomas Porter was convicted in the circuit court of the capital murder of a law enforcement officer, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and grand larceny. The trial court sentenced Porter to death plus twenty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court subsequently dismissed Porter's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) Porter was not denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that his brother was employed as a deputy sheriff, as Porter failed to demonstrate that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question during voir dire; (2) the Commonwealth did not fail to disclose exculpatory information as required by Brady v. Maryland; and (3) Porter failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient for failing to investigate Porter's childhood and educational history. View "Porter v. Warden" on Justia Law

Patricia LaCava was convicted in the circuit court of two counts of embezzlement. LaCava commenced her appeal pro se. LaCava filed a timely notice of appeal and asked the court reporter to order transcripts of the trial proceedings. LaCava subsequently secured representation by appellate counsel, who discovered that the transcripts had not been filed within the sixty-day period required by Va. R. Crim. App. 5A:8(a). After filing the transcripts by hand, counsel filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing transcripts. The court of appeals denied the motion and thereafter denied LaCava's petition for appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying LaCava's motion to extend the deadline for filing her transcript, as LaCava showed good cause to extend the period for filing transcripts; and (2) the court of appeals erred in denying LaCava's petition for appeal because the order was predicated solely on the absence of a transcript or statement of facts. View "LaCava v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Robert Hardick, a Navy sailor, filed suit under general maritime law against John Crane, Inc. (JCI) seeking compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos contained in products manufactured by JCI and that he contracted mesothelioma as a result. Robert died prior to trial, and his action was revived as a wrongful death action by his wife, Margaret. The jury returned a verdict for Margaret, and the trial court required JCI to pay a sum of $2,988,741 to Margaret. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to award Margaret nonpecuniary damages for the wrongful death of Robert, as Robert was a seaman and thus precluded from recovering nonpecuniary damages. Remanded. View "John Crane, Inc. v. Hardick" on Justia Law

Gerald T. Dixon, Jr., LLC retained Hassell & Folkes to survey and mark the boundary lines of a parcel Dixon owned. After completion of the survey, Dixon conveyed the parcel to Brat Development, which began construction of an office building. Thereafter, A&G Partnership filed for injunctive relief alleging that the building encroached upon its adjoining parcel. The circuit court found in favor of A&G and ordered the building's removal. Brat subsequently sued Dixon. Dixon then sued Hassell alleging breach of contract due to Harrell's erroneous determination of the parcel's boundary lines. The circuit court dismissed Dixon's complaint with prejudice, concluding that Dixon's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dixon's cause of action was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was time-barred when Dixon filed its complaint. View "Gerald T. Dixon, Jr., L.L.C. v. Hassell & Folkes" on Justia Law

Maritess Lopez died from aspiration pneumonia secondary to a surgery performed by Dr. Matthew Galumbeck. Plaintiff, Lopez's husband, brought a wrongful-death action against Galumbeck, another doctor, and Plastic Surgery of Tidewater. The trial entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Galumbeck appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Galumbeck's motion for a mistrial due to a juror's alleged misconduct; and (2) admitting unpaid medical bills into evidence. The Court additionally held that Galumbeck's assertions that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing a surgical log into evidence or from using it to refresh a nurse's recollection and in allowing testimony and evidence on a collateral matter were not preserved for appeal. View "Galumbeck v. Lopez" on Justia Law

First American Title Insurance Company (FATIC) provided title insurance for a mortgage refinancing to SunTrust Mortgage through FATIC's title agent, First Alliance. First Alliance subsequently obtained a $100,000 surety bond pursuant to the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) from Western Surety (Western). After the property owner defaulted under the original mortgages, SunTrust lost $734,296. FATIC paid the full amount of this loss then made a formal demand upon Western for $100,000. Western refused to pay FATIC the amount of the surety bond. FATIC sued Western and First Alliance for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in FATIC's favor for $100,000. The Supreme Court held (1) CRESPA does not recognize a private cause of action that may be asserted against a surety and the surety bond issued pursuant to former Va. Code Ann. 6.1-2.21(D)(3); (2) Virginia law nonetheless permits a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond executed pursuant to CRESPA by the assertion of a common law claim; and (3) a title insurance company may have standing, not in its own right, but as a subrogee of its insured, to maintain a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. W. Surety Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Jean Enriquez was found in a drunken condition in a parked motor vehicle with the keys in the ignition switch. Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to convict him as a matter of law of the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-266; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and to support his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. View "Enriquez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

When he was fifteen years old, E.C. pled guilty to breaking and entering and rape. After E.C. was released from custody and placed under parole supervision, a team of attorneys filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on E.C.'s behalf alleging that E.C.'s guilty plea was neither knowing nor voluntary and was unconstitutionally invalid because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Six days after his petition was filed, E.C. was released from parole supervision. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petition and that the habeas corpus proceeding was moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court had active jurisdiction over the proceeding because E.C. was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed; and (2) E.C.'s release from probation during the pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding did not automatically render the proceeding moot, as the collateral consequences imposed on E.C. by the convictions he challenged were sufficient to sustain a continued controversy. View "E.C. v. Va. Dep't of Juvenile Justice" on Justia Law