Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lessee leased property owned by Owners pursuant to a lease agreement. A billboard was located on the property that had been declared illegal because it exceeded the permitted height limitations. Lessee and Owners filed a joint application for a variance with the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) to allow the billboard to remain at its existing height. The BZA denied the variance. The circuit court upheld the BZA’s decision. Lessee appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by applying an improper standard of review when considering the BZA’s decision to deny the request for a variance. Remanded. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

The City of Richmond brought an enforcement action against the owners of real property (Owners) and the lessee of the property (Lessee), seeking removal of a billboard that Lessee maintained on the property, or, in the alternative, an order requiring the billboard to be lowered to a conforming height. Owners and Lessee filed separate complaints for declaratory judgment against the City, alleging that the City could not require removal of the billboard if the City had been paid taxes for more than fifteen years pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2307. The circuit court sustained the demurrers filed by the City and dismissed the complaint, concluding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation and that private property owners did not have the statutory vested rights protections unless a local government chose to adopt an implementing ordinance thereunder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by holding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

In 1957, special commissioners, appointed in a partition suit, conveyed to Wilkinson an 18.35-acre tract adjoining Route 704 in Washington County. In 1961, the State Highway Commissioner instituted condemnation, acquiring a 3.83-acre strip of land through the tract for construction of Interstate Highway I-81, leaving a 4.88-acre parcel north of I-81 that retained frontage on Route 704 and a 9.64-acre parcel south of I-81 that became landlocked. Condemnation commissioners awarded Wilkinson $1450 for the land taken and $2450 for damages to the residue property. After the condemnation, Wilkinson gained access to the landlocked tract for farming purposes by renting a neighboring 18-acre tract now owned by the Cliftons. In 2006, Wilkinson discontinued farming and ceased to rent the Clifton property. In 2008, the Cliftons, having failed to reach an agreement with Wilkinson’s widow for a purchase of the landlocked parcel, terminated her permissive use of the access lane and blocked it. Wilkinson sought a declaratory judgment that she had an easement by necessity. The trial court ruled that she was entitled to an easement by necessity. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the tract did not become landlocked by a conveyance from a former owner severing a former unity of title, so no implied grant of a right of ingress and egress arose. View "Clifton v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2303.1:1(A), which provides that cash payment made pursuant to a cash proffer offered or accepted for residential construction on a per-dwelling unit shall be accepted by any locality only after the completion of the final inspection of the property. Here several developers and Williamsburg Landing (collectively, Respondents) made proffers to the County, which included per-dwelling cash payments, related to the rezoning of their property. The cash payments for some dwelling units made by Respondents were accepted by the County under the terms of the proffers after June 30, 2010 and prior to the completion of a final inspection of the dwelling units. The County filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, contending that section 15.2-2303.1:1(A) had no application to proffers agreed to prior to its effective date of July 1, 2010. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that section 15.2-2303.1:1(A) applies to all payments of cash proffers due on or after July 1, 2010 regardless of whether the proffers were agreed to prior to that date. View "Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Windmill Meadows, LLC" on Justia Law

Landowner initiated plans to develop his property as a cluster subdivision. Landowner received a compliance letter from the county zoning administrator indicating that Landowner’s property met the standards set forth in the applicable ordinance. After the zoning administrator issued the compliance letter, the county’s board of supervisors repealed the ordinance. Landowner filed a declaratory judgment action against the county and the board, seeking a declaration that he obtained a vested right to develop his property as a by-right cluster subdivision in accordance with the terms of the ordinance. In support of his claim, Landowner asserted that the compliance letter constituted a significant affirmative governmental act under Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2307, which was necessary to find Landowner had vested land use rights. The circuit court ruled in favor of Landowner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the zoning administrator’s issuance of the confirmation letter was not a significant affirmative governmental act; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in holding that Landowner acquired a vested right under section 15.2-2307 to develop his property as a cluster subdivision. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Prince George County v. McQueen" on Justia Law

James and Christine Garner sought side and rear yard variances in connection with a proposed single family home on their property. The City Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) voted to approve the Garners' application and grant the variances. H. Curtiss Martin and Virginia Drewry, whose property adjoined the Garners' property to the west, appealed. The circuit court upheld the decision of the BZA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its judgment because the BZA's decision was contrary to law. Specifically, the Court held that none of the conditions asserted by the Garners to justify their request for a variance satisfied the requirements of section 9.18(b) of the City Charter, which enumerates the conditions and justifications the property owner must show in order for the BZA to authorize a variance. View "Martin v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

The Caroline County Board of Supervisors issued a special exception permit that approved the use of land adjacent to the Rappahannock River for a sand and gravel mining operation. Complainants, the Friends of the Rappahannock and several local landowners and one lessee, challenged the issuance of the permit by filing this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that Complainants lacked standing to bring the suit because the claims alleged were not supported by sufficient facts and because the allegations did not show a loss of a personal or property right different from that "suffered by the public generally." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not erroneously apply the aggrieved party standard in determining standing in this case; and (2) based on the insufficiency of allegations in their complaint, the individual complainants did not have standing to proceed.View "Friends of the Rappahannock v. Caroline County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

A limited liability company (Company) filed an application for a special exception to build a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) bus maintenance facility on a parcel of land in County. A County Board of Supervisors (Board) supervisor disclosed that the supervisor had received campaign contributions from attorneys representing Company, and two other supervisors disclosed that they were principal director and alternate director of WMATA. The Board approved the application. The three supervisors who had made disclosures each voted to approve the application. Plaintiffs filed a complaint (1) seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board's approval of the application was void because Va. Code Ann. 15-2-852(A) required the three supervisors to recuse themselves from consideration of the application, and (2) alleging that the Board's approval of the application was not fairly debatable. The circuit court sustained the Board's demurrer as to the applicability of section 15.2-852(A) and awarded summary judgment to the Board on the remainder of the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Newberry Station Homeowners Ass'n v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County" on Justia Law

In 2005, Angstadt acquired a Fredericksburg parcel, identified on the tax map as a single lot. City records indicated that in 1942 it had been listed as two separate “tax parcels.” In 2008, Angstadt obtained a survey, which drew lines that corresponded to the boundaries of the two parcels shown in 1942. Angstadt recorded the survey, but did not submit it for approval as a subdivision, and subsequently transferred the two purported lots to his company, PBU, by separate deeds. PBU conveyed one lot, containing an apartment building, to Nejati and the other, undeveloped, lot to Stageberg. The Zoning Administrator concluded that a house could not be built because the undeveloped lot did not exist as a separate lot, pursuant to Code § 15.2-2254 and the city code. After exhausting administrative remedies and reaching a settlement with the title insurance company, Stageberg filed a quiet title action against Nejati, alleging that the legal effect of the 2008 deeds from PBU was to create a tenancy in common of the undivided parcel acquired by Angstadt in 2005. The trial court held that the claimed estates in severalty were impermissible because they would circumvent the requirements for a valid subdivision and concluded that the parties were tenants in common of the whole property. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, noting that the deeds unambiguously described the property conveyed and that the parties own the property in severality. View "Nejati v. Stageberg" on Justia Law

In 1998, Norfolk approved the Hampton Boulevard Redevelopment Project created by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority pursuant to Code § 36-49, which authorizes such an authority to "adopt a redevelopment plan for a designated redevelopment area to address blighted areas" and Code § 36-51(A), which authorizes localities to approve redevelopment plans. The approval was based on a redevelopment study which determined that the area was blighted due to incompatible land uses, disrepair, environmental risks, demographic changes, and high crime rates. Properties were classified as good, fair, or poor; about 20 percent were classified as poor. The area was selected to assist in the expansion of Old Dominion University, immediately adjacent to the Redevelopment Project. Challenges to individual condemnations were rejected and a trial court upheld the finding of blight. In 2010 the Authority initiated condemnation of PKO’s apartment building. PKO appealed the adverse decision. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the court erred in permitting the Authority to acquire PKO's property after the effective date of the statutory limitation added by Code § 1-219.1, which provides that property taken for condemnation must itself be blighted at the time the petition for condemnation is filed. The limitation applies to all redevelopment and housing authorities operating pursuant to redevelopment plans adopted prior to January 1, 2007. It does not refer to the filing of a petition for condemnation or the institution of the acquisition of property, but instead limits the "ability of a redevelopment and housing authority ... to acquire property." View "PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth." on Justia Law