Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the City Council revoked a blanket special exception permitting two business establishments (the Establishments) operating in the City to operate as "entertainment establishments" serving alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption and denied their individual applications for special exceptions to continue such operations. The City later filed a complaint requesting that the Establishments be permanently enjoined from selling or serving alcohol or providing entertainment in their businesses. The Establishments filed a separate complaint and petition for appeal, asserting that the City Council's actions impaired their vested rights and that the manner in which the Council executed these actions violated their statutory notice and due process rights. The circuit court denied the relief requested by the Establishments and granted the City's request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Establishments did not acquire any vested rights under Va. Code 15.2-2307 or Va. Code 15.2-2311(C); and (2) because the Establishments had actual notice of and actively participated in the City Council meeting, any statutory notice issues were waived and their constitutional rights were not violated.View "Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

A real estate developer (Developer), purchased property contained within a proposed sudivision. The County issued to Developer a total of fifty-two building permits, for which Developer paid a proffer fee of $12,000, which was $4,000 more than Developer expected to pay. In 2007, Developer filed an action asking the trial court to declare that the County could not lawfully assess the $4,000 fee. In 2011, after the fee had been paid on all fifty-two permits, the court found that the $4,000 fee was unlawful. In 2008, Developer instituted a restitution action seeking reimbursement of the fees. The trial court consolidated this restitution action and the declaratory judgment action for a bench trial. After ruling in Developer's favor in the declaratory judgment action, the court ruled in the restitution action that Developer was barred from being awarded reimbursement of the unlawful fees because it paid them "voluntarily" within the meaning of the voluntary payment doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding that Developer's action for reimbursement of the disputed fees was barred under the voluntary payment doctrine.View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Three fitness clubs filed declaratory judgment actions challenging the lease of public property by the City of Charlottesville to the Piedmont Family YMCA and a use agreement governing the leased property entered into between the City, Albemarle County, and the YMCA. The circuit courts of the City and County sustained the County Board of Supervisors' and City Council's demurrers to the actions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the circuit courts and dismissed the declaratory judgment actions, holding that the circuit courts did not have authority to exercise jurisdiction because none of the claims asserted in the declaratory judgment actions presented a justiciable controversy. View "Charlottesville Fitness Club Operators Ass'n v. Albemarle County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred when it found that a county subdivision did not violate a restrictive covenant requiring compliance with the county's subdivision ordinance in effect in 1997. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the county's 1997 subdivision ordinance did not incorporate the requirements of its 1997 zoning ordinance by implication; but (2) erred when it refused to consider claims that the subdivision violated certain provisions of the 1997 subdivision ordinance not specifically referenced in the amended complaint. View "Fein v. Payandeh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of garaged lots in a subdivision, filed a complaint against the homeowners' association (HOA) alleging that the unequal treatment resulting from the HOA's assignment of parking spaces only to ungaraged lots in an amendment violated the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (the Declaration). The circuit court determined that the amendment was invalid and ruled that the reservation of parking spaces in the common area for use solely by owners of ungaraged lots violated the Declaration. The court also found Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling the Declaration requires that parking spaces in the common area be assigned equally among all lot owners; (2) did not err in ruling that the amendment was invalid; (3) erred in its award of certain compensatory damages but did not err in awarding other compensatory damages; and (4) did not err in ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and in determining the amount of that award. Remanded for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs subsequent to the court's entry of the judgment appealed from. View "Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt" on Justia Law

In this case, Long Lane Associates Limited Partnership challenged ordinances adopted by the town council of the Town of Lessburg concerning property owned by an adjoining landowner. The challenged ordinances rezoned property owned by Cornerstone Chapel, amended the Town Plan to remove a portion of a public road, and approved a special exception to permit Cornerstone to operate a day care center on its property. The circuit court concluded that the amendment to the Town Plan was null and void, ruling that the Town lacked authority to approve Cornerstone's request to rezone its property or amend its zoning conditions without Long Lane's consent because Long Lane had a vested right in the completion of the road and the development set forth in the proffered conditions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Long Lane did not have vested rights in the zoning classification or land uses of its neighbor, even where the property was subdivided from a parcel which was rezoned subject to proffered conditions; and (2) Long Lane did not have a vested right in the construction of a road shown on the Town Plan, and the Town did not need Long Lane's consent to amend its plan. View "Town of Leesburg v. Long Lane Assocs." on Justia Law

Geoff Livingston and 134 other homeonwers or renters (collectively Plaintiffs) in a Fairfax County subdivision brought an inverse condemnation suit against the County and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) after their homes were flooded during a severe storm. The circuit court dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding that a single occurrence of flooding could not support an inverse condemnation claim under Va. Const. art. I, 11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint, if taken as true, established that their homes and personal property were damaged by VDOT's operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocation of a tributary stream, the circuit court erred in dismissing their inverse condemnation suit on VDOT's demurrer. Remanded. View "Livingston v. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were several individuals comprising the Committee of Petitioners of the Buckroe Beach Bayfront Park Petition (the Committee). The Committee filed a complaint against POH 2010 LLC (POH) and the City of Hampton seeking an order declaring that POH's proposed development of a certain residential subdivision located in the City was unlawful and enjoining such development. The circuit court dismissed the Committee's complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Committee lacked standing to bring the action based on the limited authority granted to the Committee by the City Charter, which, under its referendum provisions, restricted the Committee's activities to pursuing a petition to repeal a newly enacted City zoning ordinance permitting the proposed development. View "Deerfield v. City of Hampton" on Justia Law

Albemarle County enacted a zoning ordinance governing construction on slopes within the county. Under the waiver provision of the county code, the planning commission was authorized to grant a waiver from the restrictions otherwise imposed by the ordinance. Kent Sinclair, who owned property in the county, filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the county exceeded the power delegated to it by the General Assembly in violation of the Dillon Rule because its procedure for considering waiver applications was not authorized by state law. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Sinclair. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that the decision to grant or deny waiver applications may be delegated to the planning commission, as the delegation was legislative in nature and not authorized by state law. Accordingly, in enacting the waiver provision, the county exceeded its authority from the General Assembly in violation of the Dillon Rule and the waiver provision was void. Remanded. View "Sinclair v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC" on Justia Law

An unincorporated association purporting to represent the general public filed a complaint for injunctive relief against several property owners, alleging that the property owners blocked access to a public road by the general public by erecting pole gates. In their answer, the property owners denied that the road was a public road. The circuit court granted injunctive relief to the association after finding that the association had proven that the general public was entitled to unrestricted use of the road. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding there had been no dedication and acceptance of the road as a public road; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that the association had established that the road was public solely by virtue of its long and continuous use by the general public and recognition of that use by the county; and (3) the circuit court erred in its ruling insofar as it would allow a traditional prescriptive easement could be created in favor of the general public, but the court's ruling that prescription had not been proven was nonetheless a correct result in light of its finding that there had been no acceptance. View "Dykes v. Friends of the C.C.C. Road" on Justia Law