Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Brooke Road, LLC's demurrers to Troy Ayers' complaints to vacate several confessed judgments, holding that the circuit court erred.In his second amended complaint, Ayers alleged that he was never served with certified copies of the confessed judgments, and therefore, the confessed judgments were void ab initial under the terms of Va. Code 8.01-438. Brooke Road filed a demurrer, arguing that the deadline set forth in Va. Code 8.01-433 barred Ayers' claims. The circuit court sustained Brooke Road's demurrer based on the application of section 8.01-433. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Brooke Road's demurrers based on the application of the provisions of section 8.01-433. View "Ayers v. Brooke Road, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting demurrers as to all claims filed by John Mark Rohrbaugh Sr.'s daughter seeking both an equitable and a statutory accounting from her brother in his former capacity as an agent managing their father's financial affairs pursuant to a power of attorney (POA) and in his current capacity as co-executor of their father's estate, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this complaint against John Mark Rohrbaugh Jr. in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as a co-executor of the Rohrbaugh Sr. estate requesting a statutory accounting from Rohrbaugh Jr. concerning his actions pursuant to his father's POA and requesting an equitable accounting. The circuit court granted the demurrers to the complaint and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it dismissed on demurrer Plaintiff's equitable and statutory accounting claims. View "Phillips v. Rohrbaugh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding whether, under Virginia common law, an individual can be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy, in the positive and that the accusation of "sodomy" involves a crime against nature under extant criminal law.In a federal district court, Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant objected to the United States' request that he receive an enhanced sentence based on his prior convictions for three predicate violent felonies, including a Virginia robbery conviction, arguing that under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), a felony is defined as a violent felony only if it categorically requires a physical force element and that the physical force element is not always required to prove robbery in Virginia. The Supreme Court agreed, held that Virginia's longstanding common-law robbery doctrine, which recognizes that threatening to accuse someone of committing a crime against nature can be constructive violence, remains the law of the Commonwealth. View "White v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioners' amended complaint against iTech AG, LLC and Robbins Law Group, PLLC (collectively, Appellees) alleging malicious abuse of process, slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy arising out of the filing of a lis pendens, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Appellees' demurrers.In their demurrers to Petitioners' complaint, Appellees argued that the filing of a lis pendens is entitle to absolute privilege and that the complaint dd not plead valid claims for slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, or civil conspiracy. The circuit court sustained the demurrers on the basis that the information contained in a memorandum of lis pendens is subject to absolute privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the information contained in the lis pendens was not sufficiently "relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry" for absolute privilege to apply in this case. View "Givago Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Plaintiff had not articulated a legally viable cause of action and denied any requests made for injunctive relief, holding that there was no reversible error in the judgment.Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning Governor Ralph S. Northam's order to the Department of General Services to remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia from Commonwealth property. The circuit court dismissed the claims, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he possessed the legal right to prohibit the Commonwealth from moving the monument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's claim with prejudice. View "Gregory v. Northam" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Governor Ralph S. Northam's order to remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia from property owned by the Commonwealth was not improper or unlawful, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were without merit.At issue in this case was whether language in an 1890 deed, signed by the then Governor of Virginia, and an 1889 joint resolution of the General Assembly requesting and authorizing the Governor to sign the deed, prohibited Governor Northam from ordering the removal of the state-owned Lee Monument from state-owned property. The circuit court found that the language in the deed created restrictive covenants but that those restrictive covenants were unenforceable and that the Governor's actions seeking to remove the Lee Monument did not contradict public policy or violate the Virginia Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the circuit court did not err. View "Taylor v. Northam" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals applying the law of the case doctrine to this appeal of an award of workers' compensation benefits but affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the Workers Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff, holding that the evidence supported the award.Plaintiff's claim was initially denied on the basis that, although Plaintiff had clearly suffered an injury, he failed to establish an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event that caused the injury. The Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner's ruling and entered an award of benefits. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its application of the law of the case doctrine; and (2) the evidence supported the Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff. View "City of Charlottesville v. Sclafani" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' abuse of process claim, holding that the claim for abuse of process failed as a matter of law.Mathews County initiated criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs alleging that Plaintiffs added an expansion of their residence and that the expansion encroached on neighboring property. The warrants were later dismissed or nolle prossed. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against the County Administrator and two County employees alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The circuit court granted the County employees' demurrer and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the "thing decided" doctrine does not apply to a claim of malicious prosecution or abuse of process; (2) Plaintiffs' allegations of malicious prosecution were sufficient to withstand demurrer; and (3) Plaintiffs' claim of abuse of process failed as a matter of law because Plaintiffs did not allege that any particular process was abused. View "Eubank v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting a plea in bar and dismissing a complaint alleging that an employer operating a residential program for at-risk youth had negligently failed to protect an employee who had been murdered by one of the residents, holding that the court correctly held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the employee's death.Plaintiff, the estate of the murdered employee, filed a negligence claim against Defendant, the employer, claiming that the employer had negligently created an unsafe work environment for the employee. Defendant responded by filing a plea in bar, arguing that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Va. Code 65.2-307(A) precluded the negligence and wrongful death claims. The court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly held that the employee's murder had arisen out of the conditions of her employment and that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act applied. View "Lopez v. Intercept Youth Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment finding that a Buell Classifier was ordinary building material and, as such, was subject to Virginia's statute of repose, holding that the Buell Classifier at issue was equipment within the meaning of Va. Code 8.01-250.Luck Stone Corporation owned and operated a stone quarry. A part of its operation was system for the production of manufactured sand. In 2007, Luck Stone replaced earlier equipment with two Buell Classifiers and other components of the sand manufacturing system with products manufactured by BFK, Inc. Daniel Potter, who was employed by Luck Stone as a driver, was killed during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff, Daniel's father, brought an action under the Virginia Wrongful death Act, Va. Code 8.01-50, against BFK. BFK filed a plea in bar, arguing that Plaintiff's action was barred under the statute of repose because the Buell Classifier did not qualify as equipment or machinery. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the action against BFK. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Buell Classifier was equipment within the meaning of section 8.01-250, and therefore, the circuit court erred in sustaining BFK's plea in bar based on its conclusion that the Buell Classifier qualified as ordinary building materials. View "Potter v. BFK, Inc." on Justia Law