Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that the Historic Alexandria Foundation lacked standing to pursue the claims asserted in this case, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's judgment.Vowell, LLC filed applications to obtain certain permits for the renovation of property located in the Old and Historic District of the City of Alexandria. The Old and Historic Alexandria District Board of Architectural Review (the BAR) approved Vowell's applications, and the City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. The Foundation appealed the City's Council decision. The circuit court dismissed the matter with prejudice, concluding that the petition did not establish that the Foundation was an aggrieved party with standing to pursue the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Foundation lacked standing because the allegations of the petition failed to establish that the Foundation suffered particularized harm that differed from that suffered by the public in general. View "Historic Alexandria Foundation v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding costs to Defendants under Va. Code 8.01-380 after the entry of a nonsuit order, holding that, under Rule 1:1, the written order awarding costs was untimely and must be vacated.Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against Defendants. After the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to disqualify Plaintiff's expert witness, Plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the case. Twenty days after entry of the nonsuit order, the court stated from the bench that it would award costs to Defendants. However, the court's written order awarding costs was entered more than twenty-one days after entry of the nonsuit order. The Supreme Court held that the order was void because it was entered more than twenty-one days following entry of the nonsuit order. View "Kosko v. Ramser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, second offense, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-308, holding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the statutory exception to criminal liability recognized in subsection 18.2-308(C)(8).The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for violating section 18.2-308(A). On appeal, Defendant argued that the statutory exception to criminal liability recognized by subsection 18.2-308(C)(8) applied to the undisputed facts of this case. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to the protection of subsection (C)(8)'s exception to criminal liability for carrying a concealed weapon because the handgun at issue in this case was secured in a container within Defendant's personal, private vehicle. View "Myers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint in this fraudulent conveyance suit, holding that the circuit court erred in shifting only the burden of production, and not the burden of persuasion, to Defendants after Plaintiff established a presumption of fraudulent conveyance.Plaintiff filed this suit seeking to void a purported fraudulent conveyance of a certain residence. The circuit court found that Plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to establish a presumption that the conveyance was fraudulent but eventually dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the circuit court erred in ruling that after a plaintiff in a fraudulent conveyance case proves a badge of fraud, which creates the presumption of a fraudulent conveyance, the plaintiff still retains the burden of persuasion to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a fraudulent conveyance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it (1) did not shift to Defendants the burden of persuasion along with the burden of production, and (2) did not apply a standard of proof that required strong and clear evidence in determining the sufficiency of Defendants' evidence offered to rebut the presumption of a fraudulent conveyance. View "White v. Llewellyn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Jane Doe's amended complaint alleging that, while she was a minor, she was sexually molested by the retired but still active pastor of her church, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing several of Doe's claims.Doe's amended complaint named as defendants various individual and institutional churches and alleged negligent hiring or retention, negligent failure to warn and protect, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and other claims. The circuit court dismissed the case in its entirety. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in dismissing the negligent hiring or retention counts to the extent they were based on the church hiring or retaining the pastor as an employee or agent following his retirement as pastor; (2) erred in dismissing the vicarious liability claim and the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (3) did not err in dismissing the remaining claims. View "Doe v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking to quiet title to certain property, holding that a deed restriction for the use of a particular church was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation.In 1875, Edna and Levi Lynn executed a deed granting one acre of land to the Woodbine Baptist Church. Woodbine used the land until 2006, when its trustees gifted it to a Virginia corporation. The corporation received a loan in 2007, and the bank's title search of the property did not disclose the 1875 deed. When the corporation defaulted on the loan, Canova Land and Investment Company acquired title to the property at a foreclosure sell but did not take possession of the property. Canova later brought suit to quiet title to the property, arguing that a reverter clause in the 1875 deed, providing that if the property was not used for purposes expressed in the deed it should revert to the grantors or their heirs, should be voided as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, upholding the 1875 deed as valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reverter was a restraint on use and not unreasonable. View "Canova Land & Investment Co. v. Lynn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court awarding compensatory and punitive damages arising from Appellants' intentional statutory torts of racial harassment and stalking, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the award.William Ellis, a black man, worked for John Powell, a white man, and his company, Northern Virginia Kitchen, Bath & Basement, Inc. (NVKBB) as an independent contractor. A dispute arose when Ellis worked at the home of a certain homeowner, referred to as Ms. C. NVKBB filed a complaint against Ms. C and Ellis, alleging, inter alia, defamation. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment against Powell for violating Va. Code 8.01-42.1 and -42.3. Thereafter, the circuit court returned a verdict in favor of Ellis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying NVKBB and Powell's motions to strike and to set aside the jury's verdict; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the award of compensatory damages. View "Northern Virginia Kitchen, Bath & Basement v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for refusing to take a breath or blood test in violation of Va. Code 29.1-738.2 and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred when it held that Defendant had been required to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest prior to trial pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-266.2.During trial, Defendant argued that his arrest was unlawful and that certain evidence had not been supported by probate cause. The trial court ruled that Defendant's objection to his arrest had to be raised by motion or objection before trial, in accordance with section 19.2-266.2(A), and denied his objection. Thereafter, the trial court found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by not permitting him to present evidence in support of his challenge to the lawfulness of his arrest. View "Green v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing with prejudice an amended complaint filed by Lisha Bryant-Shannon (Shannon) against the Hampton Roads Community Action Program, Inc. (HRCAP) alleging its liability for defamatory statements made by Tina Vick, the HRCAP interim executive director, holding that the circuit court properly granted HRCAP's special plea of absolute privilege.After Shannon was terminated from her position she applied for unemployment benefits, but the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) denied the application following a hearing. Shannon subsequently filed this action stating claims for defamation based in part on allegedly defamatory statements made during employment-related disciplinary proceedings and in part on Vick's allegations during the VEC proceedings. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statements in the disciplinary form (1) Va. Code 60.2-623(B) grants absolute privilege to statements made during VEC proceedings; and (2) the circuit court did not err in granting HRCAP's special plea of absolute privilege. View "Bryant-Shannon v. Hampton Roads Community Action Program, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court declining to award attorney's fees to Plaintiffs in this case, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to award the amount of attorney's fees Plaintiffs incurred in defending lawsuits initiated by Defendant as damages in this action for breach of a covenant not to sue.During bankruptcy proceedings, the parties in this case entered into a settlement agreement wherein Plaintiffs relinquished all rights to sue Defendants. Less than one year later, Defendant breached the covenant not to sue by suing Plaintiffs twice in state court and once in federal court. Plaintiffs then brought this action alleging breach of the settlement agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs but declined to award attorney's fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by denying an award of attorney's fees. View "Bolton v. McKinney" on Justia Law