Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $3,000, plus interest, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence regarding the defense's expert witness's financial relationship with State Farm.Plaintiff was injured when she was hit from behind by Defendant. Plaintiff brought this suit seeking $150,000 in damages. State Farm insured Defendant at the time of the accident. Dr. William Andres, an orthopedic surgeon, was engaged as the defense's expert witness. Before trial, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of Dr. Andrews' previous relationship with State Farm. The court denied the motion. After trial, Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court's exclusion of evidence of Dr. Andrews' relationship with State Farm violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 262 Va. 484 (2001). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court misinterpreted Lombard as holding that a party must demonstrate a "direct relationship" between an expert and an insurance company before cross-examining the expert on previous payments from the insurance company. View "Graves v. Shoemaker" on Justia Law

In this inverse condemnation action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendants' demurrers and dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court properly granted the demurrers.Plaintiffs, who leased oyster grounds from the Commonwealth for the purpose of raising oysters in the Nansemond River, filed an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Suffolk and the Hampton Roads Sanitation District alleging that discharge from a sewer system operated by Defendants polluted the river's waters, thereby preventing Plaintiffs from properly managing their oyster ground leases. The circuit court granted Defendants' demurrers and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the limited nature of the property interest conferred by a lease of state-owned bottomlands for the purpose of raising oysters forecloses recovery in an inverse condemnation action; and (2) prior takings cases involving different property interests did not control the Court's disposition of Plaintiffs' takings claim here. View "Johnson v. City of Suffolk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiffs' suit, holding that "fair market value" on a specified date, without more specificity, was not a sufficiently certain price term to allow a court to compel specific performance of a contract regarding the purchase of real estate.The decedent executed a will wherein she devised property to Plaintiffs, her three daughters. In the same will, the decedent granted her son, Defendant, an option to purchase the property from his sisters. The decedent then executed a codicil to her will revising the purchase price for the option to "an amount equal to the fair market value at the time of my death." In their complaint, Plaintiffs sought specific performance of a contract for the purchase of real estate. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that there was no enforceable contract because the will and codicil did not determine the purchase price and did not provide a method of determining the purchase price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term "fair market value," as set forth in the codicil, did not provide a price for the property, nor did it provide a mode for ascertaining the price with sufficient certainty. View "Wilburn v. Mangano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendants' convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, holding that Va. Code 19.2-294 does not preclude a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when the defendant was convicted in a prior prosecution of carrying a concealed weapon.Both defendants in these appeals were previously convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and argued that section 19.2-294 parried their prosecution for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The Supreme Court disagreed after clarifying the proper test governing the application of the successive prosecution bar found in section 19.2-294, holding that the statute did not bar Defendants' prosecutions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. View "Evans v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an insurer's payments on a fire insurance policy were not immune from garnishment as "proceeds of the sale or disposition" of property held in trust under former Va. Code 55.20.2(C) and that the contractual right under the insurance policy to receive fire loss payments was not intangible personal property held by the named insured and his wife as a tenancy by the entirety.Terry and Cathy Phillips owned their residence as tenants by the entirety until they retitled the property in the names of separate, revocable trusts as tenants in common. The residence was later damaged by fire. The residence was covered by an insurance policy issued by Chubb & Son, Inc. that named Terry Phillips as the policyholder. Andrea Jones sought satisfaction of a civil judgment she had obtained against Terry by filing this action to garnish insurance payments from Chubb arising out of the fire damage owned by the reciprocal trusts. The Phillipses sought to quash the garnishment, arguing that the insurance payments were immune from garnishment under section 55.1-136(C). The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in holding that section 55.1-136(C) immunized the insurance payments from garnishment. View "Jones v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded the judgment of the trial court in this civil case against Appellant based upon a finding that she had violated Va. Code 8.01-40.4 by unlawfully disseminating images of Appellee, holding that further factual findings were required on the issue of whether the voluntary-payment doctrine mooted Sheehy's appeals of the now fully satisfied judgment.Appellant filed two appeals after the trial court entered judgment. While the appeals were pending, the judgment was paid in full. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the voluntary-payment doctrine mooted Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court temporarily remanded the case to the trial court for factual findings on the voluntary-payment issue, holding that it was necessary for the circuit court to make findings of fact for deciding the motion to dismiss the pending appeals. View "Sheehy v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing a suit by Plaintiffs, local taxpayers, for declaratory and injunctive relief filed against a sheriff and a locality concerning the sheriff's cooperation agreement with the federal government regarding the enforcement of federal immigration laws, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to file this action.The sheriff entered into an agreement with the United States Immigration and Customers Enforcement authorizing the sheriff and his officers to, among other things, interrogate any person they detain about the person's right to be or remain in the United States and serve warrants for immigration violations. Plaintiffs filed this complaint seeking to have the courts prohibit the alleged use of local tax revenue to enforce federal immigration law and assert that the use of local funds for that purpose is unlawful. The circuit court sustained Defendants' demurrers, concluding that Plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the sheriff acted outside the scope of his duty and authority in entering into the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations were insufficient to establish local taxpayer standing. View "McClary v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court concluding that the Fairfax County Police Department's automated license plate recognition (ALPR) satisfied the definition of an "information system" under the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (Data Act), Va. Code 2.2-3800 through -3809, holding that the ALPR system does not constitute an "information system" within the meaning of the Data Act.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the ALPR system did not satisfy the statutory definition of an "information system" because it did not contain "the name, personal number, or other identifying particulars of a data subject," and therefore, the Police Department's passive use of the ALPR system was lawful under the Data Act; and (2) the resolution of this case favorably to the Police Department foreclosed the recovery of attorneys' fees. View "Neal v. Fairfax County Police" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Tracey Martin her agreed-upon share of proceeds of John Wood's insurance policy after he committed suicide, holding that the circuit court did not err.During their divorce proceeding, Wood agreed to maintain a preexisting life insurance policy for the partial benefit of Tracey Martin. The circuit court incorporated the agreement (the agreement) into the final divorce decree. Six years later, in defiance of the court order, Wood removed Martin as a beneficiary and designated his brothers, his new wife, and a friend as beneficiaries on the policy. Wood committed suicide two days later. In a lawsuit initiated by Martin, the insurer interpleaded the policy proceeds. The circuit court awarded Martin her share of the proceeds consistent with the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Va. Code 38.2-3122(B) did not bar Martin's claim because the final divorce decree that ratified and incorporated the agreement created an equitable assignment; and (2) faced with competing equities, the circuit court did not err in finding Martin's beneficial interest in the interpleader proceeds to be superior to that of the new beneficiaries. View "Wood v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court determining that the Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County, Virginia had the authority to dissolve the corporate status of Dumfries-Triangle Rescue Squad, Inc. (DTRS), holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board had the power to dissolve the corporate status of DTRS .The Board filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asserting that the Board had the authority to dissolve DTRS's corporate status under Code 32.1-111.4:7(D). The circuit court determined that DTRS was subject to the corporate dissolution authority of the Board pursuant to section 32.1-111.4:7(D) and appointed a receiver to wind up DTRS's corporate affairs, as requested by the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because DTRS was not incorporated pursuant to section 32.1-111.4:7, the Board could not rely on that authority to dissolve its corporate status; and (2) DTRS was not the type of entity that was subject to dissolution under that section. View "Dumfries-Triangle Rescue Squad v. Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law