Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court interpreting certain provisions of the will of Sandra Larsen's late husband and determining that Sandra did not have a life estate in the decedent's property, holding that the circuit court did not err.The decedent's will divided his estate between Sandra, his children, Pamela and Kirk, and his grandchildren. Pamela and Kirk filed a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting the circuit court to construe the terms of the decedent's will and determine the extent of Sandra's interest in the decedent's house and farm. The circuit court determined that Sandra did not have a life estate in the property, noting that Sandra's rights to the property were subject to be terminated when she was no longer physically or mentally able to reside in the home. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decedent's will did not gave Sandra a life estate in the property; (2) Pamela and Kirk had concurrent rights to access and use the property; and (3) parol evidence was necessary to interpret the scope of Sandra's rights. View "Larsen v. Stack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court sustaining the Virginia Department of Transportation's (VDOT) demurrer as to Plaintiff's action seeking a declaratory judgment ordering the Commissioner of Highways to provide relocation benefits under Va. Code 25.1-406 of the Virginia Relocation Assistance Act (VRAA), holding that no private cause of action for payment of relocation expenses can be implied under section 25.1-406.The VDOT sent Plaintiff a letter informing him that he would be required to relocate his dental office to accommodate an interstate road project. When Plaintiff failed timely to vacate his dental office VDOT initiated eviction proceedings. After moving his practice, Plaintiff submitted a claim to VDOT for $567,278 in relocation assistance payments. VDOT ultimately approved $35,346 in reimbursements and notified Plaintiff that it could not make a decision about the balance of his claim until he submitted additional documentation detailing his expenses. Plaintiff neither submitted the requested documentation, nor did he appeal VDOT's decision. Instead, he brought this suit. The circuit court sustained VDOT's demurrer, finding that there is no private cause of action under the VRAA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the VRAA does not provide a private cause of action. View "Fernandez v. Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) holding that short-term rentals were not authorized by Fairfax County zoning ordinances, holding that this case was moot.The Ratcliffs owned a home in Fairfax County that they made available as a short-term rental. After the decisions of the BZA and circuit court, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court. The Ratcliffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because they had sold the home. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because there was no live controversy. The Court then ordered that the circuit court's judgment be vacated, holding that vacatur of the lower court judgment was appropriate. View "Fairfax Board of Supervisors v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an obstructive act committed before the accrual of a cause of action tolls the statute of limitations under Va. Code 8.01-229(D) regardless of whether the cause of action has accrued at the time of the obstructive act.After Nelson Mackey left a law firm, the remaining partners - Griffith Dodson, Richard Pence, and Richard Viar - formed another partnership. Pence, Dodson, and Viar subsequently passed away. Mackey told Michael Quinn, who helped Joyce Viar with tax matters regarding Richard's estate, that certain stock that the former partnership owned had no financial interest to Mrs. Viar. Therefore, the estate did not attempt to collect the stock. Mackey subsequently sold the stock. When the three estates learned of the stock's existence and Mackey's actions, they sued Mackey alleging conversion of the stock. The trial court concluded that Mackey converted the stock, that section 8.01-229(D) tolled the limitations period, and that the tolling applied to all of the estates. The Supreme Court held (1) Mackey's representation to Quinn was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as to Mrs. Via; but (2) because Mackey demonstrated no obstructive intent as to the Dodson or Pence estates, section 8.01-229(D) did not toll the limitations period for their claims. View "Mackey v. McDannald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the demurrer filed by the City of Chesapeake and dismissing this declaratory judgment action brought by Landowner claiming that the closure of one of two roads from which Landowner accessed its property constituted a taking that entitled it to compensation, holding that where Landowner was not deprived of reasonable access to its property, the trial court did not err.Previously, Landowner's property was accessible from two roads. In 2017, the City closed one road to all but emergency vehicles. Landowner sought a declaration that the City's elimination of direct access from the property from the closed road constituted a taking of its property without just compensation. The City filed a demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer, concluding that Landowner failed to plead that its property right of access was taken or damaged because access to the property still existed from the other road. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer. View "Hooked Group, LLC v. City of Chesapeake" on Justia Law

In this land use case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer and dismissing a landowner's appeal from the decision of the city council, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting a motion craving oyer of the legislative record upon which the city council's decision was based and in thereafter sustaining a demurrer.Plaintiff, who owned a house in the historic district of the City of Alexandria, submitted a plan to install a Victorian metal "wicket and spear" fence pierced by two gates. The Board of Architectural Review (BAR) approved a certificate of appropriateness as to the materials and fence design but with the condition that the width of the double gate not exceed six feet. The City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. In response, the City filed a demurrer and a motion craving oyer of the legislative record that had been before the city council when it made its decision. The court granted the motion craving oyer and then sustained the demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting the motion craving oyer of the legislative record in Plaintiff's appeal or in sustaining the demurrer. View "Byrne v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court upholding the town council's approval of the developers' conditional zoning application, holding that a local government may accept a conditional proffer from a property owner as part of a rezoning application that alters a minimum mixed-use requirement of a zoning district below that specified in the local zoning ordinance.Ten property owners filed an application with the Warrenton Planning Commission to rezone thirty-one acres of land within Warrenton from industrial to industrial planned unit development (I-PUD). The developers' proffer statement included mixed land use percentages that did not comport with the target of the town's zoning ordinance percentages. The town council approved the rezoning. Several residents jointly filed a complaint challenging the approval of the rezoning. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the town council and the developers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly interpreted the language of the ordinance to be in accord with the authorizing statutes and the definitional section of Va. Code 15.2-2201. View "Rowland v. Town Council of Warrenton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court finding that a condominium association's insurance provider waived subrogation against the tenant of an individual unit owner where the tenant was not a named or additional insured, holding that the circuit court erred.As a result of losses sustained from a fire to property managed by Chimney Hill Condominium Association, and consistent with its coverage obligations, Erie Insurance Exchange made payments for the benefit of the Association. Standing in the shoes of the Association, Erie then brought suit against Naomi Alba to recover the payments it made, alleging that Alba negligently caused the fire. Alba, who lived in the unit where the fire originated under a residential lease agreement, filed a third-party complaint against John Sailsman, the unit's owner, for indemnification. The circuit court granted Alba's motion for declaratory judgment, holding that Erie could not pursue subrogation against Alba. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Alba was not an implied insured of the Association because no contractual relationship or agreement existed between the two parties to allocate risks and responsibilities and because the surrounding circumstances reflected the contrary intention of not absolving non-unit owners of responsibility for harm caused by their negligent acts. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Alba" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that closed sessions conducted by the Smyth County Board of Supervisors (the Board) regarding actual or probable litigation violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), Va. Code 2.2-13700 through -3715.In 2016, the Board voted to remove its seven appointees to the Smyth-Bland Regional Library's board of trustees and named its own seven members as new trustees on the Library's board of trustees. Three of the removed trustees sued the Board asking reinstatement to the Library's board of trustees. The Board subsequently held closed sessions discussing the pending litigation and the potential disbandment of the Library. The Board then held a special meeting open to the public adopting a resolution to disband the Library. Plaintiff filed a petition for injunction alleging that the Board failed to comply with several provisions of VFOIA. The circuit court ruled that the closed sessions were properly held and that the discussions in the closed sessions were exempted from the open meeting requirements of VFOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board violated VFOIA. View "Cole v. Smyth County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

In this action in which Plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against the Commonwealth's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the conduct alleged was insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but reversed the circuit court's ruling that Defendant was absolutely immune from Plaintiff's defamation claim.After she was fired, Plaintiff, a former administrative assistant in the Commonwealth's attorney's office, filed this complaint against Chadwick Seth Baker, the Commonwealth's attorney for Dickenson County, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Baker filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss. The circuit court sustained Baker's demurrer, ruling that termination of at-will employment did not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that Baker enjoyed absolute immunity regarding the defamation claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) absolute immunity does not apply to a Commonwealth's attorney's allegedly defamatory statements about why he made the decision to fire an employee; and (2) Plaintiff did not adequately plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Viers v. Baker" on Justia Law