Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court finding that a condominium association's insurance provider waived subrogation against the tenant of an individual unit owner where the tenant was not a named or additional insured, holding that the circuit court erred.As a result of losses sustained from a fire to property managed by Chimney Hill Condominium Association, and consistent with its coverage obligations, Erie Insurance Exchange made payments for the benefit of the Association. Standing in the shoes of the Association, Erie then brought suit against Naomi Alba to recover the payments it made, alleging that Alba negligently caused the fire. Alba, who lived in the unit where the fire originated under a residential lease agreement, filed a third-party complaint against John Sailsman, the unit's owner, for indemnification. The circuit court granted Alba's motion for declaratory judgment, holding that Erie could not pursue subrogation against Alba. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Alba was not an implied insured of the Association because no contractual relationship or agreement existed between the two parties to allocate risks and responsibilities and because the surrounding circumstances reflected the contrary intention of not absolving non-unit owners of responsibility for harm caused by their negligent acts. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Alba" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that closed sessions conducted by the Smyth County Board of Supervisors (the Board) regarding actual or probable litigation violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), Va. Code 2.2-13700 through -3715.In 2016, the Board voted to remove its seven appointees to the Smyth-Bland Regional Library's board of trustees and named its own seven members as new trustees on the Library's board of trustees. Three of the removed trustees sued the Board asking reinstatement to the Library's board of trustees. The Board subsequently held closed sessions discussing the pending litigation and the potential disbandment of the Library. The Board then held a special meeting open to the public adopting a resolution to disband the Library. Plaintiff filed a petition for injunction alleging that the Board failed to comply with several provisions of VFOIA. The circuit court ruled that the closed sessions were properly held and that the discussions in the closed sessions were exempted from the open meeting requirements of VFOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board violated VFOIA. View "Cole v. Smyth County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

In this action in which Plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against the Commonwealth's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the conduct alleged was insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but reversed the circuit court's ruling that Defendant was absolutely immune from Plaintiff's defamation claim.After she was fired, Plaintiff, a former administrative assistant in the Commonwealth's attorney's office, filed this complaint against Chadwick Seth Baker, the Commonwealth's attorney for Dickenson County, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Baker filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss. The circuit court sustained Baker's demurrer, ruling that termination of at-will employment did not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that Baker enjoyed absolute immunity regarding the defamation claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) absolute immunity does not apply to a Commonwealth's attorney's allegedly defamatory statements about why he made the decision to fire an employee; and (2) Plaintiff did not adequately plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Viers v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court holding that a general contractor was liable for construction materials provided by a supplier to one of the general contractor's subcontractors, holding that the distinct circumstances of this case permitted the supplier to obtain relief for the general contractor's unjust enrichment.General Contractor contracted with Subcontractor to assist with a residential condominium project. Subcontractor agreed to purchase materials from Supplier and to pay Supplier for materials delivered. General Contractor and Subcontractor entered into a joint check agreement specifying a method for how Supplier would be paid for the materials it shipped to the job. Supplier ultimately shipped $252,062 in materials for which it was not paid due to the Subcontractor's financial difficulties. General Contractor ultimately used those materials to complete the project. Supplier sued General Contractor and Subcontractor alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Supplier obtained a default judgment against Subcontractor. After a trial, the court ruled for Supplier in its claim of unjust enrichment against General Contractor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the joint check agreement did not foreclose relief; (2) General Contractor was not being compelled to pay twice for the materials; and (3) Supplier was permitted to obtain relief for General Contractor's unjust enrichment. View "Davis Construction Corp. v. FTJ, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendants' demurrers to Plaintiff's claims alleging that various professionals who participated in custody and visitation proceedings tortiously interfered with her parental rights, holding that the tort of interference with parental rights did not extend to the facts alleged by Plaintiff.Plaintiff, the mother of three children, challenged the proceedings resulting an order awarding sole legal and physical custody of the children to their father. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged tortious interference with parental rights and defamation. Plaintiff alleged that professionals such as the children's guardian ad litem, counselors, and therapists conspired, lied, and acted maliciously to deprive her of the rightful custody of her children. Plaintiff further alleged that one of the therapists defamed her. The circuit court granted the defendants' demurrers to the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the allegations made in the complaint did not give rise to a cause of action for tortious interference with parental rights; and (2) the circuit court properly dismissed the defamation claims against the therapist. View "Padula-Wilson v. Landry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the workers' compensation commission's award based on Va. Code 65.2-503 for Michael Richardson's loss of use before hip replacement surgery, holding that the court of appeals did not err in holding that, pursuant to the statute, loss of use is calculated before any surgery that improves functionality by use of a prosthetic device.Richardson sustained a work-related hip injury that would have deprived him of seventy-four percent of the normal use of his left leg if it remained untreated. Richardson's employer, however, paid for a total hip replacement that left Richardson with an eleven percent permanent loss of the use of his leg. Richardson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits based on a seventy-four percent loss of use of his left leg. The Commission awarded Richardson permanent partial disability benefits reflecting a seventy-four percent loss-of-use rating. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that loss of use under section 65.2-503 is calculated before any surgery that improves functionality by use of a prosthetic device. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute was reasonable. View "Loudoun County v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of defrauding a hotel restaurant when she obtained food from the restaurant without paying, holding that a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant was convicted of violating Va. Code 18.2-188(b)(2), which makes it unlawful for any person who "without paying therefor, and with the intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper to...obtain food from a restaurant or other eating house." On appeal, Defendant argued that the plain language of section 18.2-188(b)(2) requires proof of specific intent to defraud at the time the benefit is received and that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to prove she possessed the intent to defraud at the time she obtained the meal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 18.2-188(b)(2) required proof that Defendant had the intent to cheat or defraud the hotel restaurant at the time she gained possession of the food; and (2) the trial court did not find the essential element of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt - that Defendant possessed the intent to cheat or defraud the hotel restaurant at the time she obtained the food. View "Caldwell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for aggravated involuntary manslaughter and driving while intoxicated, holding that the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to support jury verdicts finding that Defendant had, prior to the accident, self-administered intoxicants that impaired his ability to drive safely.At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, Defendant moved to strike it on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs in his blood were self-administered. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's assignments of error relating to the question of whether the drugs found in his blood had been self-administered were without merit. View "Lambert v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court declaring that the School the City of Richmond's School Board's UM/UIM motorist coverage was $1 million, as provided in the contract between the School Board and the Virginia Association of Counties Group Self-Insurance Risk Pool (VACORP), holding that the $1 million in UM/UIM coverage the School Board contracted for was the amount of available UM/UIM coverage.Maisia Young was injured while riding a school bus. Young filed suit against the School Board seeking damages for her personal injuries. The School Board was self-insured through a self-insurance risk pool managed by VACORP. Young filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of the coverage available to the School Board under the UM/UIM provisions of its contract. VACORP argued that $50,000 was the maximum amount of coverage available, as set by statute. In response, Young argued that the statutes set a minimum, not a cap, and that the maximum available was what was specified in the contract. The circuit court agreed with Young. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the School Board's UM/UIM coverage was $1 million, as provided in the contract between the School Board and VACORP. View "VACORP v. Young" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court striking the evidence supporting a claim for punitive damages against Defendant, a physician who repeatedly prescribed narcotic pain medication to a patient, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred by granting Defendant's motion to strike.The patient in this case died from an accidental overdose of oxycodone, alcohol, and prescription medications. Plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Defendant. In addition to damages permitted in wrongful death actions the administrator requested an award of punitive damages. Defendant conceded that he breached the applicable standard of care with respect to his care and treatment of the decedent but moved to strike the punitive damages claim. The circuit court granted the motion to strike. At issue was whether a jury could have concluded that Defendant's actions constituted a "willful and wanton" disregard for the decedent's health and safety. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the administrator's punitive damages claim should have been submitted to the jury. View "Curtis v. Highfill" on Justia Law