Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting Isle of Wight County's motion to strike International Paper Company's application for correction of a machinery and tools tax assessment that International Paper claimed was nonuniform, invalid, and illegal, holding that the court erred in sustaining the County's motion to strike as to counts 4 and 5 regarding uniformity.International Paper owned a paper production facility in the County that utilized paper-making machinery for its manufacturing operations. International Paper filed an application for a correction of the County's "nonuniform, invalid & illegal" assessment of International Paper's machinery and tools taxes for tax year 2017. The refund action had five counts. After a bench trial, the County moved to strike International Paper's evidence and claims. The circuit court granted the motion to strike and dismissed the refund action with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in sustaining the County's motion to strike as to three counts regarding vested rights, separation of powers, and the County's alleged lack of statutory authority; but (2) the circuit court erred in sustaining the County's motion to strike as to two counts regarding uniformity. View "International Paper Co. v. County of Isle of Wight" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the misidentification of a defendant in a complaint was a misnomer, not a misjoinder, and therefore, the filing of a new complaint to correct the error after a nonsuit was not barred by the statute of limitations.Calvin Hampton, who was injured in a car accident, filed a negligence complaint seeking damages. The complaint identified the driver of the other vehicle as Michael Meyer. Later, however, Hampton learned that Noah Meyer, and not his father Michael, had been driving the vehicle at the time of the collision. Hampton subsequently obtained an order nonsuiting his complaint. Hampton then filed a new complaint asserting that, under this Court's decision in Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60 (2016), the use of the wrong name in his complaint was merely a misnomer rather than a misjoinder. Noah filed a plea in bar asserting that the new complaint was time-barred. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar, ruling that naming Michael in the original complaint was a misjoinder, not a misnomer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the misidentification of the driver in the original complaint were merely a misnomer, not a misjoinder; and (2) therefore, under Volk, the new complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Hampton v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees from the unrepresented parties in her partition suit under Va. Code 8.01-92 and denying Plaintiff's requests to share the costs for bringing the action and for an award of the rental value of the subject property from the parties who occupied it, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiff and her four siblings inherited real property from their mother. Plaintiff later brought suit to partition the property and requested that the trial court compel its sale and divide the proceeds according to the parties' respective rights and interests after subtracting the expenses of Plaintiff's suit. Two siblings appeared at trial pro se. The trial court ordered that the property be sold and the proceeds be split equally among all five siblings and denied Plaintiff's request for fair rental value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in refusing to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees out of the shares of the unrepresented siblings in the proceeds of the sale of the property; (2) did not err in failing to divide the costs of the partition suit equally among the siblings; and (3) did not err in failing to award fair rental value. View "Berry v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed an order of the State Corporation Commission denying Walmart's petitions filed pursuant to Va. Code 56-577(A)(4) seeking the Commission's permission to combine the electric-energy demand of separate Walmart locations to qualify to buy electricity from sources other than the incumbent public utilities regulated by the Commission, holding that the Commission exercised its delegated discretion in a manner consistent with its statutory authority.On appeal, Walmart conceded that the Commission was given the discretion under section 56-577(A)(4) to grant or deny Walmart's request but that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously and erred as a matter of law in denying its petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission interpreted section 56-577(A)(4) correctly; (2) there was no error in the Commission's fact-finding; and (3) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Walmart's motion to reconsider. View "Wal-Mart Stores East, LP v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal from the judgment of the court of appeals, denied Plaintiff's motion for sanctions, and sanctioned Plaintiff pursuant to Va. Code 8.01-271.1, holding that Plaintiff's jurisdictional statement did not satisfy Rule 5:17(c)(2) and that Plaintiff's conduct merited sanctions.This appeal was the latest in a series of "habitually frivolous" litigation Plaintiff initiated against Plaintiff as a part of a continual effort to contest child custody, visitation, and support orders. The appeal challenged the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's (1) denial of a series of motions filed by Plaintiff, (2) determination of the amount of attorney's fees to award Defendant in connection with litigation related to the custody and visitation of the parties' children, and (3) award of additional fees to Defendant. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's jurisdictional statement did not satisfy Rule 5:17(c)(2); (2) Plaintiff's conduct warranted the sanction of Plaintiff paying Defendant's reasonable attorney's fees in costs; and (3) Plaintiff shall be prohibited from filing in the Supreme Court any pleading or paper against Defendant without obtaining the services of a practicing Virginia attorney or obtaining leave of the Court to file any pro se pleading. View "Barrett v. Minor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ordering the removal of Herbert Townes and David Silvestro from the City of Hopewell Electoral Board, holding that the circuit court erred by setting the burden of proof as a preponderance of the evidence and abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) because removal proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature due to the high penalty they impose on a removed official, the correct burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence, a higher standard than that applied by the circuit court in this case; (2) the circuit court did not improperly allow the Commonwealth to expand its grounds for removal beyond the grounds pled in its petition for removal; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion when it excluded certain defense evidence at trial. View "Townes v. Virginia State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying a request for declaratory and injunctive relief to bar enforcement of the Franklin County School Board's policy requiring parents to provide a birth certificate and proof of residence in the county for any child who is homeschooled, holding that the policy was contrary to the Homeschool Statute, Va. Code 22.1-254.1.In denying declaratory and injunctive relief the circuit court found that the board's policy was not contrary to the Code, was not ultra vires, and addressed the "valid public policy of ensuring the children monitored by [the Board] are between the ages of five (5) and eighteen (18) and are residents of Franklin County." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board did not have authority to adopt the policy pursuant to section 22.1-78 because that statute only allows school boards to adopt regulations for the supervision of public schools, not home instruction. View "Sosebee v. Franklin County School Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing a suit for wrongful death against Virginia medical providers on the basis that Plaintiff had received a personal injury settlement against Kentucky medical providers concerning the same injury, holding that the circuit court erred in granting the motions to dismiss.Plaintiff, the husband of the decedent, filed wrongful death and personal injury actions in a Virginia circuit court and a Kentucky circuit court, asserting that the decedent died as a result of medical professions in both states failing to identify and treat the decedent's mesenteric ischemia. Plaintiff settled with the Kentucky defendants for an undisclosed amount, and the Kentucky circuit court dismissed all claims in the Kentucky action. The circuit court subsequently granted the Virginia defendants' motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing the case on the grounds that Plaintiff elected a remedy when he settled the Kentucky personal injury action and that Plaintiff's wrongful death action was barred by Va. Code 8.01-56; and (2) none of the doctrines of claim-splitting, double recovery, or judicial estoppel supported the circuit court's granting of the motions to dismiss. View "Green v. Diagnostic Imaging Associates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court interpreting certain provisions of the will of Sandra Larsen's late husband and determining that Sandra did not have a life estate in the decedent's property, holding that the circuit court did not err.The decedent's will divided his estate between Sandra, his children, Pamela and Kirk, and his grandchildren. Pamela and Kirk filed a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting the circuit court to construe the terms of the decedent's will and determine the extent of Sandra's interest in the decedent's house and farm. The circuit court determined that Sandra did not have a life estate in the property, noting that Sandra's rights to the property were subject to be terminated when she was no longer physically or mentally able to reside in the home. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decedent's will did not gave Sandra a life estate in the property; (2) Pamela and Kirk had concurrent rights to access and use the property; and (3) parol evidence was necessary to interpret the scope of Sandra's rights. View "Larsen v. Stack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court sustaining the Virginia Department of Transportation's (VDOT) demurrer as to Plaintiff's action seeking a declaratory judgment ordering the Commissioner of Highways to provide relocation benefits under Va. Code 25.1-406 of the Virginia Relocation Assistance Act (VRAA), holding that no private cause of action for payment of relocation expenses can be implied under section 25.1-406.The VDOT sent Plaintiff a letter informing him that he would be required to relocate his dental office to accommodate an interstate road project. When Plaintiff failed timely to vacate his dental office VDOT initiated eviction proceedings. After moving his practice, Plaintiff submitted a claim to VDOT for $567,278 in relocation assistance payments. VDOT ultimately approved $35,346 in reimbursements and notified Plaintiff that it could not make a decision about the balance of his claim until he submitted additional documentation detailing his expenses. Plaintiff neither submitted the requested documentation, nor did he appeal VDOT's decision. Instead, he brought this suit. The circuit court sustained VDOT's demurrer, finding that there is no private cause of action under the VRAA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the VRAA does not provide a private cause of action. View "Fernandez v. Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law