Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Fatima Shaw-McDonald filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia, P.C. after suffering vision loss following cataract surgery. While the lawsuit was pending, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not initially disclose the lawsuit in her bankruptcy filings. Eye Consultants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Shaw-McDonald no longer had standing to pursue it because her interest in the lawsuit had transferred to the bankruptcy trustee. Shaw-McDonald later amended her bankruptcy filings to include the lawsuit and obtained a discharge from the bankruptcy court.The circuit court dismissed the medical malpractice case, concluding that Shaw-McDonald lost standing when she filed for bankruptcy. The court relied on the precedent set by Kocher v. Campbell, which held that a plaintiff loses standing when a cause of action becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Shaw-McDonald appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that Shaw-McDonald had standing to maintain her medical malpractice action. The court reasoned that once the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claim, it reverted to Shaw-McDonald as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Shaw-McDonald did not lose standing permanently when she filed for bankruptcy; rather, her standing was temporarily suspended. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to hold the medical malpractice case in abeyance until the bankruptcy proceedings were resolved, rather than dismissing it. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia P.C. v. Shaw-McDonald" on Justia Law

Sycamore Cross Solar LLC applied for certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to construct and operate a solar facility in Isle of Wight County and Surry County, Virginia. The project aimed to generate up to 240 megawatts of power and included transmission lines and associated facilities. The West Virginia & Appalachian Laborers’ District Council (WVALDC) participated in the case, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (Commission) failed to consider the benefits to specific groups as required by the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA) and did not impose a local hiring condition.The Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing where Sycamore, WVALDC, and Commission staff presented their cases. Sycamore's witness testified about the project's economic benefits and commitment to local hiring, though no firm commitment was made. The Hearing Examiner recommended issuing the CPCNs without a local hiring condition but suggested notifying WVALDC about hiring timelines. The Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's findings but declined the notification requirement, leading WVALDC to seek reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the VCEA only required the Commission to consider the benefits to specified groups, not make specific findings. The Commission's consideration of the evidence and its decision not to impose a hiring-related condition were within its discretion. The Court found no abuse of discretion, as the Commission reasonably concluded that the statutory requirements were met without the need for additional hiring conditions. View "WVALDC v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

Brian Kuang-Ming Welsh was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. Welsh, a drug addict, was financially troubled and had been terminated from his job. On January 29, 2018, he was seen with Rishi Manwani, his drug supplier, and Rishi's friend, Carlos Rodriguez. Later that day, Rishi and his mother, Mala, were found dead in their home, having been shot multiple times. Welsh's phone records and actions on the day of the murders were scrutinized, and he was later found to have given his brother a handgun, which was linked to the crime scene.The trial court allowed the testimony of the Commonwealth's firearms expert, Cara McCarthy, who linked Welsh's gun to the crime scene. However, the court excluded the testimony of Welsh's expert, William Tobin, who was to critique McCarthy's methodology. The jury found Welsh guilty, and he was sentenced to two life terms plus six years. Welsh appealed, arguing that the exclusion of Tobin's testimony was erroneous and not harmless.The Court of Appeals of Virginia assumed the trial court erred in excluding Tobin's testimony but deemed the error harmless and affirmed the convictions. Welsh then appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial court erred in excluding Tobin's testimony, which was not an attack on McCarthy's credibility but a critique of her methodology. The court held that this error was not harmless, as McCarthy's testimony was central to the Commonwealth's case, and Tobin's critique could have influenced the jury's decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Welsh v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Sergeant Hoggard of the Norfolk Sheriff’s Office received information about cocaine in cell block 2K of the Norfolk City Jail. During a search, a narcotics-detecting canine alerted to a personal property bag on Jerome Lee Wilkerson’s bunk. The bag contained toilet paper rolls and paperwork with Wilkerson’s name. Inside one roll was a plastic bag with 1.03 grams of cocaine. Wilkerson admitted the bag was his but denied knowledge of the cocaine. He stated that no one else accessed his bag and that he checked it every 15 minutes.Wilkerson was charged in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk with possession of a controlled substance. At trial, Sergeant Hoggard testified about the search and Wilkerson’s statements. The circuit court denied Wilkerson’s motion to strike, found him guilty, and sentenced him to nine months’ incarceration. Wilkerson appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, stating that Wilkerson’s statement alone was insufficient to prove knowing possession of the cocaine.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence, including Wilkerson’s statement about his exclusive control over the bag, was sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilkerson knowingly possessed the cocaine. The court emphasized that the factfinder could reasonably reject Wilkerson’s hypothesis of innocence. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, finding that the circuit court’s decision was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. View "Commonwealth v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

Tanya Rashae Holland pleaded no contest to felony child neglect resulting in serious injury after giving her three-year-old son methadone, mistaking it for Zyrtec. Her son lost consciousness and nearly died. Holland was indicted and initially chose a jury trial but later entered a no contest plea. Before sentencing, she was appointed new counsel and moved to withdraw her plea, claiming it was entered based on misrepresentations by her former counsel. The trial court denied her motion and sentenced her to five years, suspended on certain conditions.Holland appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her plea. The Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court found that Holland had shown a reasonable defense, moved to withdraw her plea in good faith, and that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate undue prejudice. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for trial.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holland’s motion to withdraw her plea. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court’s findings should be viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and that the burden was on Holland to prove her plea was entered under an honest mistake of fact. The Supreme Court found that the trial court could reasonably conclude that Holland did not meet this burden, given her statements during the plea colloquy and the lack of credible evidence supporting her claims. The final judgment was entered in favor of the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Holland" on Justia Law

On November 10, 2014, a traffic accident occurred at the intersection of Wellington Road and Market Place Avenue involving vehicles driven by Sharon Elizabeth Furr and Janaia Spurlock. Tamara Al-Saray, a passenger in Spurlock's vehicle, suffered significant injuries, including a traumatic brain injury. Spurlock attempted a left turn with a solid green light, requiring her to yield to oncoming traffic. Furr, traveling westbound at the speed limit, collided with Spurlock's vehicle. Al-Saray filed claims against both drivers for negligence but later nonsuited her claims against Spurlock. The trial court excluded evidence of Spurlock's guilty plea for failure to yield.The Prince William County Circuit Court denied Furr's motions to strike the evidence and for reconsideration, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the claim that Furr failed to maintain a proper lookout. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Al-Saray, awarding her $7,000,000 in damages. Furr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish Furr's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals majority found that the evidence was purely circumstantial and did not exclude other possible causes of the accident.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Al-Saray, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Court emphasized that proximate cause can be established by circumstantial evidence and that the jury's inference of Furr's negligence was reasonable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address Furr's remaining assignments of cross-error. View "Al-Saray v. Furr" on Justia Law

In 2017, John Cridler-Smith was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than five pounds of marijuana. The case began when a postal worker in Loudoun County, Virginia, noticed a suspicious parcel from California, a known source state for marijuana trafficking. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant and found over six pounds of marijuana in the parcel. A controlled delivery was conducted to Cridler-Smith’s brother’s residence, where Cridler-Smith was later seen. Inside the residence, officers found drug paraphernalia and another parcel containing marijuana. Cridler-Smith admitted to shipping the marijuana during an interview with Detective Chris Staub.The Loudoun County Circuit Court denied Cridler-Smith’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Cridler-Smith argued that his pre-trial counsel advised him to cooperate with law enforcement without adequate investigation and that his trial counsel failed to move to suppress his incriminating statements. The circuit court found that counsel’s advice was tailored to Cridler-Smith’s objectives of protecting his brother and minimizing jail time. The court initially found that Cridler-Smith had stated a claim regarding the failure to suppress his confession but later dismissed the claim upon reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and found that counsel’s initial advice regarding cooperation was reasonable given Cridler-Smith’s stated objectives. However, the court determined that the failure to seek suppression of Cridler-Smith’s confession might constitute ineffective assistance. The court noted that the applicability of Rule 3A:8(c)(6) to the confession required resolution of a factual question that the circuit court did not definitively address. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve whether the statements were made in connection with an offer to plead guilty. View "Cridler-Smith v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Father Constantine P. Rogakos, an 86-year-old retired Greek-Orthodox priest, visited Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center for an outpatient abdominal ultrasound. He used a cane due to a shuffled gait and had a history of falls. At the hospital, he was provided a wheelchair to reach the waiting room. In the ultrasound room, he was instructed to change into a medical gown. While changing, he leaned on a wheeled hospital stretcher, which moved, causing him to fall and sustain severe injuries. He later died from these injuries.The Administrator of his estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the hospital, alleging negligence by the sonographer, Joanna Regan, for failing to assist and ensure the stretcher's wheels were locked. The circuit court denied the hospital's motion to strike and refused to allow a hospital stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $2,000,000. The hospital's post-trial motions were denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decisions, including the admissibility of Father Rogakos' statements under the Dead Man’s Statute, the refusal to grant a multiple causes jury instruction, and the exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that the Dead Man’s Statute did not preclude the introduction of Father Rogakos' statements as they were conveyed by non-interested witnesses. The court also found no error in the circuit court's refusal to grant the multiple causes jury instruction, exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit, and denial of the hospital's motion to strike, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center v. Rogakos-Russell" on Justia Law

On May 22, 2020, Officers Massie and Hubbard of the Lynchburg Police Department attempted to stop Tara Ann Baez for speeding. After a brief pursuit, Baez stopped her vehicle and was arrested for reckless driving and eluding law enforcement. Officer File arrived and conducted a canine sniff, leading to a search of Baez’s vehicle, where a glass smoking device was found. Officer File also found a folded piece of paper with a substance suspected to be narcotics in Baez’s pocket, which tested positive for cocaine.At trial, the Commonwealth sought to admit video footage from Officer File’s body-worn camera to establish the chain of custody for the drugs. Baez objected, arguing the video lacked foundation and violated the Confrontation Clause. The trial court overruled the objections, finding the video could be authenticated by Officer Massie’s testimony and did not contain hearsay. Baez was found guilty of possession of cocaine but not guilty of eluding. Her conviction was later set aside, and she was placed on probation, which she violated, leading to a finding of guilt and a suspended two-year sentence.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Baez’s arguments that the video was testimonial hearsay and lacked proper authentication. The court held that the video did not contain any conduct intended as an assertion and thus did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. It also found that Officer Massie’s testimony provided a sufficient basis to authenticate the video.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. It held that the video did not contain hearsay and was properly authenticated, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Baez v. Commonwealth of Virginia" on Justia Law

Patrick Austin Carolino was convicted of strangulation after a bench trial. The incident involved Carolino and his then-girlfriend, Hannah Ford, who testified that Carolino choked her during an argument, causing her to experience difficulty breathing and other symptoms. Ford did not immediately report the incident to the police but did so a month later. Evidence included photographs of Ford's injuries and testimony from a nurse examiner and other witnesses.The trial court admitted photographs of bruises on Ford's buttocks from a previous incident where Carolino allegedly whipped her with a belt. Carolino objected to this evidence, arguing it was irrelevant, constituted prior bad acts, and was beyond the scope of direct examination. The trial court overruled these objections and admitted the evidence, which it referenced in its ruling to convict Carolino.The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the belt-whipping evidence solely to attack Carolino’s credibility, violating the precedent set in McGowan v. Commonwealth. The majority found that the evidence was used improperly for impeachment on a collateral matter and that this error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and determined that Carolino did not preserve his argument regarding improper impeachment on a collateral matter at trial. The objections made at trial were limited to relevance, prior bad acts, and scope of direct examination, none of which specifically invoked the rule from McGowan. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated its judgment, and reinstated Carolino’s conviction for strangulation. View "Commonwealth v. Carolino" on Justia Law