Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the workers' compensation commission's award based on Va. Code 65.2-503 for Michael Richardson's loss of use before hip replacement surgery, holding that the court of appeals did not err in holding that, pursuant to the statute, loss of use is calculated before any surgery that improves functionality by use of a prosthetic device.Richardson sustained a work-related hip injury that would have deprived him of seventy-four percent of the normal use of his left leg if it remained untreated. Richardson's employer, however, paid for a total hip replacement that left Richardson with an eleven percent permanent loss of the use of his leg. Richardson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits based on a seventy-four percent loss of use of his left leg. The Commission awarded Richardson permanent partial disability benefits reflecting a seventy-four percent loss-of-use rating. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that loss of use under section 65.2-503 is calculated before any surgery that improves functionality by use of a prosthetic device. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute was reasonable. View "Loudoun County v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of defrauding a hotel restaurant when she obtained food from the restaurant without paying, holding that a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant was convicted of violating Va. Code 18.2-188(b)(2), which makes it unlawful for any person who "without paying therefor, and with the intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper to...obtain food from a restaurant or other eating house." On appeal, Defendant argued that the plain language of section 18.2-188(b)(2) requires proof of specific intent to defraud at the time the benefit is received and that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to prove she possessed the intent to defraud at the time she obtained the meal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 18.2-188(b)(2) required proof that Defendant had the intent to cheat or defraud the hotel restaurant at the time she gained possession of the food; and (2) the trial court did not find the essential element of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt - that Defendant possessed the intent to cheat or defraud the hotel restaurant at the time she obtained the food. View "Caldwell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for aggravated involuntary manslaughter and driving while intoxicated, holding that the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to support jury verdicts finding that Defendant had, prior to the accident, self-administered intoxicants that impaired his ability to drive safely.At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, Defendant moved to strike it on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs in his blood were self-administered. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's assignments of error relating to the question of whether the drugs found in his blood had been self-administered were without merit. View "Lambert v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court declaring that the School the City of Richmond's School Board's UM/UIM motorist coverage was $1 million, as provided in the contract between the School Board and the Virginia Association of Counties Group Self-Insurance Risk Pool (VACORP), holding that the $1 million in UM/UIM coverage the School Board contracted for was the amount of available UM/UIM coverage.Maisia Young was injured while riding a school bus. Young filed suit against the School Board seeking damages for her personal injuries. The School Board was self-insured through a self-insurance risk pool managed by VACORP. Young filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of the coverage available to the School Board under the UM/UIM provisions of its contract. VACORP argued that $50,000 was the maximum amount of coverage available, as set by statute. In response, Young argued that the statutes set a minimum, not a cap, and that the maximum available was what was specified in the contract. The circuit court agreed with Young. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the School Board's UM/UIM coverage was $1 million, as provided in the contract between the School Board and VACORP. View "VACORP v. Young" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court striking the evidence supporting a claim for punitive damages against Defendant, a physician who repeatedly prescribed narcotic pain medication to a patient, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred by granting Defendant's motion to strike.The patient in this case died from an accidental overdose of oxycodone, alcohol, and prescription medications. Plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Defendant. In addition to damages permitted in wrongful death actions the administrator requested an award of punitive damages. Defendant conceded that he breached the applicable standard of care with respect to his care and treatment of the decedent but moved to strike the punitive damages claim. The circuit court granted the motion to strike. At issue was whether a jury could have concluded that Defendant's actions constituted a "willful and wanton" disregard for the decedent's health and safety. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the administrator's punitive damages claim should have been submitted to the jury. View "Curtis v. Highfill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court awarding FoxFire Towing damages in the amount of $56,595, holding that the doctrine of quantum merit was not applicable in this case and that while FoxFire was entitled to relief under a theory of unjust enrichment it was only to the extent that T. Musgrove Construction Company was benefitted.Musgrove owned a truck that was involved in an accident. FoxFire returned the truck to an upright position, towed the damaged truck away and stored it, and cleaned up the scene. FoxFire sent Musgrove a bill for $12,380. When Musgrove did not pay, FoxFire sued. By the time the suit was filed the storage fees had risen to $28,980. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $56,595. Musgrove appealed, arguing that most of the charges FoxFire impressed were unjustified because they constituted a recovery that was not warranted under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) a cause of action for quantum merit did not apply; and (2) established principles governing the unjust enrichment remedy foreclosed recovery for some of the charges FoxFire sought to obtain. View "Musgrove Construction Co. v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing as untimely Defendant's appeal of his convictions, holding that Defendant's immediate appeal was untimely.Defendant was convicted of abduction and assault and battery of a family member. Because the original sentencing order contained a scrivener's error the court entered an amended order adding handwritten notations on the first and last pages. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, noting that the original order was the final appealable order and that the amended order was entered to correct a scrivener's error. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that the amended order was not the final order for purposes of noting his appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the original order, and not the amended order, was the final appealable order in this case and that, therefore, Defendant's appeal was untimely. View "Jefferson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction and use of a firearm in the commission of a malicious wounding, holding that the court of appeals did not err in upholding the convictions even though the jury did not find Defendant guilty of the predicate offenses of abduction and malicious wounding.On appeal, Defendant argued that the two firearm convictions could not stand when the jury had failed to find him guilty of the predicate offenses. The court of appeals dismissed the petition based upon Defendant's mistaken reference to robbery rather than malicious wounding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Reed v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 594 (1990) and related cases, the court of appeals did not err in upholding the jury's verdicts. View "McQuinn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court sustaining demurrers to Plaintiff's claim seeking the equitable rescission of a foreclosure sale and her claim asserting that the trustee conducting the foreclosure sale breached its fiduciary duty, holding that the circuit court did not err by sustaining the demurrers.When Appellant failed to make timely payments toward a debt secured by a deed of trust, Equity Trustees, LLC, Bank of America's substitute trustee, foreclosed upon the property. After the property was sold at a foreclosure sale Appellant filed an amended complaint requesting the equitable rescission of the foreclosure sale based on Bank of America's breach of the terms of the deed of trust and asserting that Equity breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. The defendants each filed demurrers to the complaint, which the circuit court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's amended complaint failed to plead facts establishing that she incurred any harm resulting from the alleged breach of the deed of trust or that Equity breached its fiduciary duty by conducting the foreclosure sale. View "Young-Allen v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's appeal from the decision of the trial court refusing to entertain Defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under Va. Code 19.2-303, holding that the lower courts did not err in concluding that the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to hear Defendant's motion following his transfer to the Department of Corrections (DOC).Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine by a prisoner. After Defendant incurred new convictions the circuit court revoked Defendant's suspended sentence. Defendant later filed a motion for modification of sentence asking the court to reconsider its order revoking his entire suspended sentence. Five days before a scheduled hearing on the motion, the court learned that Defendant had been taken into the custody of the DOC. At a later hearing, the trial court concluded that it was barred from considering Defendant's motion. The court of appeals denied Defendant's appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly held that once Defendant had been transferred to the DOC the trial court could no longer modify his sentence; and (2) no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights occurred in this case. View "Akers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law