Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq., requires that public bodies permit members of the public to be physically present in the room where an open meeting occurs, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiff brought this action against the Board, a Board member, and superintendent of schools alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA's open meeting provisions by excluding her from a meeting room where a Board open meeting took place. The trial court granted judgment for Plaintiff and awarded her attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that the Board violated VFOIA by denying Plaintiff entry into the meeting room; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error. View "Suffolk City School Bd. v. Wahlstrom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for an expungement under Va. Code 19.2-392.2, holding that, in light of this Court's clarification of the standard that applies to the review of expungement petitions when the claim is that the original charge was "otherwise dismissed," remand was appropriate.Appellant was arrested on the charge of accessory after the fact of homicide and pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice, an amended charge. Appellant later filed a petition for expungement, arguing that the accessory after the fact of homicide charge qualified for expungement because it was "otherwise dismissed." The circuit court denied the petition on the grounds that the original charge that was later amended was not "completely separate and unrelated." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the circuit court did not rely on a Blockburger comparison of the elements to deny the expungement petition, remand was necessary. View "Williams v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ranger purchased a new Hyundai vehicle in 2018. Ranger experienced some problems with the vehicle, and it had to be repeatedly repaired. His lawyer wrote a demand letter to Hyundai, seeking a refund of the purchase price “along with all interest paid on the finance note as well as attorney fees and incidental and consequential damages.” Hyundai offered to repurchase the vehicle “pursuant to the applicable statutes” and offered to pay some of the attorney’s fees. Ranger refused the offer on the basis that Hyundai failed to sufficiently reimburse him for his pre-litigation attorney’s fees.Ranger then sued under the Lemon Law, Code 59.1-207.10. The circuit court dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. To satisfy the refund requirements under Virginia’s Lemon Law, a manufacturer is not required to pay pre-litigation attorney’s fees. The manufacturer’s refund satisfied the requirements of the Lemon Law. View "Ranger v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the circuit court that it lacked the authority to amend the Military Pension Division Order (MPDO) it issued earlier memorializing the parties' negotiated agreement regarding the division of Defendant's military retirement pay, holding that the court of appeals erred.After the final decree was entered in this case, Husband moved to amend the final decree, the equitable distribution order, and the MPDO. The circuit court dismissed the motion on the ground that the court had no authority to amend the MPDO because more than twenty-one days had passed since the order was entered. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that federal law preempted Virginia law on questions involving the divisibility of military retirement benefits. The Supreme Court adopted the holding of the court of appeals in Owen v. Owen, 14 Va. App. 623 (1992), with regard to the division of military retirement benefits and reversed, holding that federal law did not bar the parties' in this case from upholding the MPDO. View "Yourko v. Yourko" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Residents' claims against the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint.Residents brought this action seeking declaratory relief and to enjoin the Board from adopting an updated zoning ordinance via electronic meeting. In the alternatively, if the Board adopted the ordinance via an electronic meeting, Residents sought a declaration that any action by the Board or approval concerning the ordinance was void ab initio. The circuit court denied relief, finding, among other things, that Residents' claims were moot and that the Board had the authority to adopt the ordinance in an electronic meeting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board's adoption of the ordinance mooted Residents' declaratory judgment claim; (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint as premature; and (3) the Board adopted the ordinance in a manner that violated the open meeting provisions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq. View "Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating a jury verdict convicting Defendant of using a firearm during the commission of a robbery, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its discretion as to a jury instruction and in holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.Defendant handed a note to a cashier demanding money or her life and then put her hand in a pocket and pointed what appeared to be a handgun at the cashier, who took the threat seriously. The jury convicted Defendant of using a firearm during the commission of a robbery. The court of appeals vacated the verdict, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting at least one of Defendant's ten supplemental jury instructions and that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the bulge in Defendant's pocket was a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not supplementing an agreed-upon jury instruction defining a firearm; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Barney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in this property dispute, holding that the evidence did not support the judgment in connection with Kevin and Meredith Horn's claim of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat on James and Hong Webbs' property.The Horns claimed a prescriptive easement to store small watercraft on the Webbs' land and further claimed a prescriptive easement to lock a boat on the Webbs' property. The Webbs brought this complaint alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking a declaratory judgment of their rights. The Horns counterclaimed that they had a prescriptive easement to both dock the boat and to store the watercraft. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Webbs and awarded them compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in rejecting the Horns' claim of a prescriptive easement to store smaller watercraft; (2) the Horns established the existence of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat; and (3) nothing in the record established malice on the part of the Horns in filing their lawsuit, and therefore, the award of punitive damages was improper. View "Horn v. Webb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this case brought by several homeowners against the Board of Supervisors of Hanover County, holding that the circuit court erred.Plaintiffs brought this complaint argument that the Board violated Virginia law by approving rezoning and special-exception requests authorizing the nearby construction of a large distribution and warehousing facility. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' demurrers on the grounds that Plaintiffs did not have standing to assert their claims and that some of the claims were speculative and not ripe for adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in finding that Plaintiffs' pleadings did not allege a sufficient factual basis for standing; and (2) erred when it dismissed three claims on the alternative ground that those counts asserted speculative claims not ripe for adjudication. View "Morgan v. Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court entering judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of the estate of Jeffrey Tyree on a battery count but for the defense on a gross negligence count, holding that the circuit court erred in declining to grant the motion to strike filed by Detective Bradley Colas.Colas, a police officer, shot and killed Tyree. Tyree's estate brought this action against Colas and another police officer, Officer Nigal Tuft-Williams, alleging gross negligence and battery. During trial, the trial court granted Tuft-Williams' motion to strike and denied Colas' motions to strike. After the jury found for the estate on the battery count Colas appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred in declining to grant Colas' motion to strike. View "Colas v. Tyree" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition seeking to expunge a felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge from his record, holding that the circuit court did not err.Appellant was arrested and charged with felony DWI. When it was determined that Appellant did not have a prior felony DWI conviction the arrest warrant was subsequently amended to charge Appellant with a misdemeanor DWI. Appellant was found guilty of the misdemeanor DWI. While his appeal was pending, Appellant filed a petition seeking to expunge the felony DWI charge from his record. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendment to the arrest warrant did not render the felony DWI charge "otherwise dismissed" for the purposes of Va. Code 19.2-392.2. View "Forness v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law