Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing, without prejudice, this derivative action on the ground that Plaintiff failed to first make a demand for the limited liability company (LLC) to take action, holding that the 2011 amendments to Va. Code 13.1-1042 did not abolish the futility exception to the demand requirement as established by use law preceding enactment of the statute.Plaintiff, derivatively on behalf of an LLC, filed a complaint alleging that Defendants had breached their fiduciary duties towards the LLC. Defendants filed a plea in bar and demurrer, alleging that the complaint was barred because Plaintiff had not made a proper demand as required by section 13.1-1042. The circuit court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that a demand was not required when doing so would be futile. Defendants responded that the 2011 amendments to section 13.1-1042 abolished the futility exception. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not abrogate the futility exception when it amended section 13.1-1042 in 2011, and therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "Davis v. MKR Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err in declaring the constitutional validity of Virginia General Assembly legislative districts that were allegedly drawn in violation of the compartment requirement expressed in Va. Const. art. II, 6.Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Virginia State Board of Elections and several of its officers in their official capacities, seeking a declaratory judgment that the challenged legislative districts violate the Virginia Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the challenged districts were not, in fact, compact as constitutionally required. The circuit court denied Plaintiffs’ request that the challenged district be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that evidence was presented at trial that would lead reasonable and objective people to differ regarding the compactness of the challenged districts and confirming the constitutional validity of the legislative districts under the fairly debatable standard applied to determinations made by the legislature. View "Vesilind v. Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of Patricia Gerald and her daughter, Tarsha Gerald, with driving while on a suspended license, third or subsequent offense, and perjury arising from testimony they gave in the Albemarle County General District Court.On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the Geralds’ perjury convictions; (2) venue for prosecution of the Gerald’ perjury charges was proper in Albemarle County because, even where the perjury was committed in the Albemarle County Courthouse, which was located in the City of Charlottesville, venue for prosecution of crimes committed in the Albemarle County Courthouse is proper in either Albemarle County or the City of Charlottesville; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Tarsha’s conviction for driving while on a suspended license. View "Gerald v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue was what the phrase “has been previously convicted” means in Va. Code 18.2-57.2(B), which makes assault and battery of a family or household member a felony under certain circumstances.Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor and felony assault and battery of a family or household member for October and December offenses, respectively. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that, despite the circuit court’s finding that he was guilty of the October misdemeanor offense, he had not been “convicted” of it within the meaning of section 18.2-57.2(B), and therefore, it could not be used as a predicate offense for his felony conviction. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the court did not need to complete the final phase of adjudication, imposition of sentence or enter a written conviction order memorializing its judgment of conviction for the misdemeanor charge in order to create a predicate conviction within the meaning of the statute; and (2) because the court found Defendant guilty of the misdemeanor charge arising from the October offense, the October offense was properly used as a predicate offense for Defendant’s felony conviction arising from the December offense. View "Lewis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred by dismissing a petition to enforce the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Va. Code 2.2-3700, et seq., on the basis that the petition failed to comply with Va. Code 2.2-3713(A) because it was not properly supported by an affidavit showing good cause.Marian Bragg filed an amended petition against the Rappahannock County Board of Supervisors and its individual members (collectively, the Board), alleging that the Board violated the open meeting requirements of FOIA. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petition satisfied the requirements of section 2.2-3713(A) because the allegations in the petition, which incorporated an acknowledgement of a Board member acknowledging that the Board improperly discussed certain public business matters during closed meetings, were supported by an affidavit showing good cause. View "Bragg v. Board of Supervisors of Rappahannock County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s final judgment against a Lessee and its guarantor in this action brought by the Lessor seeking unpaid rent under a fifteen-year lease after the Lessee vacated the leasehold prior to the expiration of the fifteen-year term.After this action was filed, the Lessee demurred, arguing that the lease was unenforceable under the Statute of Conveyances because it did not contain a seal as required by the common law for a deed or one of the substitutes for a seal available under Va. Code 11-3. The trial court overruled the demurrer and entered judgment against the Lessee. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of the Lessee and its guarantor, holding that the fifteen-year lease was unenforceable as a matter of law because the lease violated the Statute of Conveyances and the common-law seal requirement. View "The Game Place, LLC v. Fredericksburg 35, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final judgment of the trial court in this eminent domain case granting $167,866 in damages to the landowner, holding that the trial court erred in disallowing the expert witness for the Commissioner of Highways from testifying.The Commissioner initiated this condemnation proceeding to acquire a strip of commercial property to create a multi-use trial. At trial to determine just compensation, the trial court allowed the landowner’s expert witness to testify that the take caused $193,270 in damages to the remainder but disallowed the Commissioner’s expert witness from testifying that the take caused $0 in damages to the remainder. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for retrial, holding that the trial court erred by excluding the Commissioner’s expert witness testimony. View "Commissioner of Highways v. Karverly, Inc." on Justia Law

The General Assembly did not intent to abrogate existing common law causes of action when it enacted Va. Code 8.01-226.12, which sets forth some obligations and immunities for landlords and managing agents when visible mold occurs.Tenants filed a multi-count complaint alleging that one of the tenants suffered damages after being exposed to mold in their apartment. The trial court dismissed two counts of the complaint that were based on the common law, concluding that the General Assembly intended to abrogate the application of all common law claims for personal injury involving landlord/tenant relationships. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 8.01-226.12 does not implicitly repeal or modify any common law causes of action that are beyond the plain language of the statute. View "Cherry v. Lawson Realty Corp." on Justia Law

The General Assembly did not intent to abrogate existing common law causes of action when it enacted Va. Code 8.01-226.12, which sets forth some obligations and immunities for landlords and managing agents when visible mold occurs.Tenants filed a multi-count complaint alleging that one of the tenants suffered damages after being exposed to mold in their apartment. The trial court dismissed two counts of the complaint that were based on the common law, concluding that the General Assembly intended to abrogate the application of all common law claims for personal injury involving landlord/tenant relationships. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 8.01-226.12 does not implicitly repeal or modify any common law causes of action that are beyond the plain language of the statute. View "Cherry v. Lawson Realty Corp." on Justia Law

This Court’s holding in Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2012), which recognized the tort of intentional interference with parental rights, did not extend to the factual allegations against Defendants in this case.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging tortious interference with her parental rights. Defendants demurred to the complaint. The circuit court granted the demurrers as to all but one of the defendants, finding that the allegations did not constitute a viable claim as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to state a claim for tortious interference with parental rights against the majority of the defendants. View "Coward v. Wellmont Health System" on Justia Law