Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Plaintiff’s application for a name change under Va. Code 8.01-217, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by finding that good cause did not exist for consideration of the application and by employing an inappropriate procedure to make that determination.Brian Allen Leonard (Plaintiff), an inmate who was transitioning from a male to female identity, filed an application to change her name to Bree Anna Leonard. In denying the application, the circuit concluded that good cause did not exist for consideration of the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the application for good cause and by deviating from the statutory process for assessing a name-change application. View "Leonard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed, without prejudice, Appellant’s appeal of the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of its prior order denying his second motion to dismiss his capital indictments, holding that the Court was without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.Appellant was indicted for two counts of capital murder. Eleven years after the circuit court determined that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the capital indictments. The court denied the motion, finding that Appellant remained incompetent to stand trial, that his continued treatment was medically appropriate, and that he presented a danger to himself and others. Appellant then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that Va. Code 19.2-169.3(F), which required the circuit court to do periodic evaluations of Appellant, violated his rights to due process, equal protection and a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion and Appellant’s subsequent motion to reconsider. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that this appeal was from a purported judgment in a criminal case, and therefore, an appeal lay first with the court of appeals. View "Martinez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that Defendant’s dog was a “dangerous dog” within the meaning of Va. Code 3.2-6540(A), finding that Defendant was the custodian or harborer of the dog, and ordering Defendant to pay restitution for the injuries to another dog, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendant’s dog was a dangerous dog and that she was liable for restitution as the dog’s custodian; (2) the determination that Defendant was the custodian or harborer of the dog was not plainly wrong; and (3) based on the evidence, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution in the amount of $3,896.15. View "Frouz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant’s conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle under Va. Code 18.2-154, holding that the plain language of the statute did not require the prosecution to prove that the shooter was located outside of the vehicle when he fired shots at an occupied vehicle.While inside a vehicle, Defendant shot one of the vehicle’s occupants. Among other things, Defendant was convicted of maliciously shooting at an occupied vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that he could not violate section 18.2-154 unless he was aiming in the direction of the car while standing outside of said car. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the plain language of the statute contains no requirement that the shooter who maliciously shoots at an occupied vehicle must be positioned outside of the vehicle. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court’s judgment denying a motion for nonsuit, prospectively denying an inmate in forma pauperis status pursuant to Va. Code 8.01-692, and imposing a pre-service review with possible summary dismissal on the inmate’s future filings, holding one portion of the judgment was proper but the remainder must be vacated and remanded.Specifically, the Court held (1) because Appellant had at least three cases dismissed for failure to state a claim, the circuit court’s judgment denying him prospective in forma pauperis status was proper; (2) the portion of the judgment imposing pre-service review and summary dismissal on any future complaints Appellant might file in the Wise County Circuit Court must be vacated and remanded for the circuit court’s consideration of the four-factor test established in Adkins v. CP/IPERS Arlington Hotel LLC, 293 Va. 446, 452-53 (2017); and (3) the part of the judgment holding that the complaint was speculative and failed to establish irreparable harm and the lack of an adequate remedy at law must be vacated and remanded for entry of an order of nonsuit. View "Gordon v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus asking the court to compel the City of Virginia Beach to limit the scope of the redaction the City provided in response to Appellant’s request for documents under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), holding that the circuit court’s application of the attorney-client and work-production exceptions was excessively broad.Appellant made a request under VFOIA asking for records of all legal fees an expert invoices relating to all of the City’s expenses in litigating against him in federal court. After the City provided extensively redacted records Appellant filed his petition for writ of mandamus. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that the attorney-client exception and the work-product exception justified the City’s redactions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a further in camera review and for disclosure of unreacted billing records, holding that the circuit court allowed the City to withhold some entries from disclosure when those records plainly did not fall within the VFOIA exceptions for work-product and attorney-client privilege. View "Bergano v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment against Defendants as to Plaintiff’s claims for tortious interference and statutory business conspiracy, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that Defendants were liable for tortiously interfering with their own contract and in therefore finding that their tortious interference could serve as the predicate unlawful act for statutory business conspiracy.Plaintiff, Read Properties, LLC, filed a complaint against Defendants, Francis Hospitality, Inc. and Delta Educational Systems, Inc., alleging breach of contract, intentional interference with contract, and statutory business conspiracy. The circuit court found in favor of Plaintiff on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the breach of contract claim and otherwise reversed, holding (1) Defendants could not tortiously interfere with their own contract; and (2) because Plaintiff’s underlying claims of tortious interference with a contract against Defendants failed, its claims of statutory business conspiracy must also fail. View "Francis Hospitality, Inc. v. Read Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court dismissing on demurrer Sweely Holdings, LLC’s suit against SunTrust Bank alleging breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, and constructive fraud, holding that an agreement between the parties defeated Sweely’s breach of contract claim and that Sweely failed to state a claim for fraud.SunTrust loaned Sweely $18.3 million and later sought to recover collateral when Sweely defaulted and threatened bankruptcy. SunTrust and Sweely negotiated an agreement that provided Sweely with another opportunity to pay its debt, but when Sweely failed to do so, SunTrust took action against the collateral. Thereafter, Sweely filed this lawsuit. The circuit court sustained SunTrust’s demurrer to the complaint and dismissed all counts with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) interpreting the agreement to preclude Sweely’s breach of contract claim, and (2) ruling that the fraud claims failed because Sweely had not alleged any justifiable reliance on SunTrust’s alleged misrepresentation. View "Sweely Holdings, LLC v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that multiple mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, imposed for multiple convictions under Va. Code 18.2-308.2(A) are required to be served consecutively and vacated Defendant’s sentences because they were run concurrently.The circuit court sentenced Defendant to five years for two violations of section 18.2-308.2(A) and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in ordering that the sentences for Defendant’s two convictions run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded this case for resentencing, holding (1) the court of appeals properly interpreted section 18.2-308.2(A); and (2) mandatory minimum terms of confinement ordered pursuant to 18.2-308.2(A) must run consecutively with any other sentence, including other mandatory minimum terms ordered pursuant to the statute. View "Botkin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the decision of the circuit court granting the demurrers filed by Carilion Clinic and Carilion Healthcare Corporation (collectively, Carilion) and dismissing all of Lindsey Parker’s claims against it, including both vicarious and direct liability claims, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the direct liability claims but erred in dismissing the vicarious liability claim on demurrer.Parker sued Carilion and two Carilion employees, alleging that they had disclosed her confidential medical information to others. Parker served process on Carilion but did not serve either employee. The circuit court sustained Carilion’s demurrers. The Supreme Court held (1) Parker’s notice of appeal was timely; (2) the circuit court erred in granting the demurrer to the extent that it dismissed Parker’s respondent superior claim against Carilion; and (3) the circuit court properly found that Carilion was not directly liable under Fairfax Hospital v. Curtis, 254 Va. 437, 442 (1997) or under the doctrine of negligence per se. View "Parker v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law