Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted Roy L. Watford’s petition for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence and vacated his conviction, holding that Watford proved, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the allegations required under Va. Code 19.2-327.3(A) and that no rational trier of fact would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.In 1978, Watford pled guilty to rape and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, entirely suspended for a period of ten years. In 2010, several pieces of evidence in this case were subjected to DNA testing. In 2016, a buccal swab was obtained from Watford. Watford subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-327.2 et seq. The circuit court returned its findings of fact to the Supreme Court following an evidentiary hearing, After considering Watford’s petition, the response of the Commonwealth, the records of the case, the DNA evidence and the circuit court’s findings of fact, the Supreme Court vacated Watford’s conviction, finding that it was highly unlikely that any rational fact-finder would have found Watford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "In re Watford" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain statements proffered by Plaintiff.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in excluding statements that she argued should have been admitted as lay opinion under Va. R. Evid. 2:701 and that the trial court erred in excluding a statement the decedent made after the surgery, contending that the statement should have been admitted under the Deadman’s Statute, Va. Code 8.01-397. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the lay opinion testimony concerning what was disclosed to the patient in this case and what the patient may have one was speculative and inadmissible; and (2) the trial court properly excluded a statement the patient made after the surgery as irrelevant. View "Martin v. Lahti" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court sustaining the a plea of res judicata and dismissing this breach of contract action.In his plea of res judicata, Defendant argued that Plaintiff was barred from bringing the contract action because she had sought identical relief in a show cause petition in a divorce action, which was still pending, and the circuit court had dismissed that petition in the show cause order, which Defendant argued was a final order. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s plea and dismissed the contract action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no final order regarding the claim that Defendant was attempting to preclude by his assertion of res judicata, and therefore, res judicata did not bar Plaintiff’s contract action. View "Kellogg v. Green" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action in which a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s evidence on the ground that Plaintiff failed to prove causation.Plaintiff sued Defendant-doctor, alleging that Defendant negligently perforated her small bowel during a laparoscopic total hysterectomy, failed to detect the perforation, and failed to obtain a general surgery consultation to repair the injury. At the end of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to strike the evidence. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not prove causation and was unable to do so from the evidence presented to the trial court, and therefore, the circuit court should have granted Defendant’s motion to strike the evidence on the basis of lack of causation. View "Dixon v. Sublett" on Justia Law

In this complaint seeking to impeach a will on the grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendants’ plea in bar on the grounds of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and judicial estoppel. The circuit court based its decision on three grounds. The Supreme Court rejected each ground, holding that claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and judicial estoppel did not bar Plaintiff’s complaint to impeach the decedent’s will in this case. The court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "D'Ambrosio v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition to change his name.Appellant, Brian Wendall Jordan, was serving a term of incarceration when he underwent a religious conversion. Appellant filed a petition to change his name to Abdul-Wakeel Mutawakkil Jordan, adding that he would not be hindered from the free exercise of his religion if not allowed to change his name. The circuit court found that Appellant’s application frustrated a legitimate law-enforcement purpose and, thus, the provisions of Va. Code 8.01-217(D) were not satisfied. Specifically, the court concluded that, due to the gravity and brutality of Defendant’s crimes, Defendant must retain his given name for the peace of mind of the victims and the victims’ families. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the basis articulated by the trial court for denying Appellant’s petition did not fall outside the scope of its broad discretion. View "Jordan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a state employee grievance proceeding, a hearing officer’s decision upholding the termination of Nathan Osborn, a special agent with the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), was not contrary to law.ABC terminated Osburn’s employment after receiving a complaint that Osburn rummaged, without permission, through the business records of a business owner who had applied for a retail alcohol license. A hearing officer upheld Osburn’s termination, concluding that the warrantless search was not permissible, resulting in a violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer’s determination. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination that Osborn violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Osburn’s warrantless inspection of the office of the applicant’s business was not permissible under the highly regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement and that the business owner did not consent to Osburn’s warrantless search of the office. View "Osburn v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

The circuit court abused its discretion in this medical malpractice action when it refused to qualify Plaintiff’s only proposed expert witness (Dr. Aboderin) and granted summary judgment for Defendant.After voir dire, Defendant moved to exclude Dr. Aboderin’s testimony on the ground that she failed to meet the two-prong test of Va. Code 8.01-581.20, which governs qualification of medical malpractice expert witnesses. The trial court sustained Defendant’s objection, thus excluding Dr. Aboderin from testifying. Because Dr. Aboderin was Plaintiff’s only proposed expert witness, Plaintiff was unable to establish that Defendant breached the standard of care or that any breach was the proximate cause of her daughter’s injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to qualify Dr. Aboderin as an expert witness because there was evidence that she satisfied both the knowledge and active clinical practice requirements of section 8.01-581.20. View "Holt v. Chalmeta" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in granting Defendant, who was charged with first-degree murder, pre-trial bail.Because Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, for which the maximum sentence was life imprisonment, the circuit court was required to presume, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or set of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance or the safety of the public. Based on its findings, the circuit court granted Defendant’s motion for bail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) applying the doctrine of presumed innocence to a pre-trial bail hearing; (2) finding that the brutal and calculated circumstances of the murder were outweighed by the absence of any threat to any other individuals; (3) speculating that Defendant was “unlikely” to abscond because of his age; and (4) discounting and according no weight to Defendant’s prior history of mental health disorders. View "Commonwealth v. Duse" on Justia Law

Shin was arrested for DWI. Shin declined the arresting officer's demand that he provide a blood and breath sample. The officer then read Form DC-233, “Implied Consent Declaration” to Shin, Code 18.2-268.3(C), which stated: “You shall submit to a breath test. If the breath test is unavailable or you are physically unable to submit to the breath test, a blood test shall be given.” Shin refused to provide a sample and signed a “Declaration of Refusal,” stating that he had been advised of the law and the penalty for unreasonably refusing to provide samples. Shin was convicted of DWI - second offense, unreasonable refusal of a breath or blood test - first offense, and improper lane change. A jury subsequently acquitted Shin of DWI but convicted him of improper lane change. The circuit court found Shin’s refusal unreasonable, in violation of Code 18.2-268.3, and suspended Shin’s license for one year. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, rejecting Shin’s arguments that the implied consent law imposed an unconstitutional condition upon the privilege of driving, was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an objective definition of reasonable refusal, and violated Article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution by compelling him to provide the Commonwealth with potentially incriminatory evidence. View "Shin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law