Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this complaint seeking to impeach a will on the grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendants’ plea in bar on the grounds of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and judicial estoppel. The circuit court based its decision on three grounds. The Supreme Court rejected each ground, holding that claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and judicial estoppel did not bar Plaintiff’s complaint to impeach the decedent’s will in this case. The court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "D'Ambrosio v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition to change his name.Appellant, Brian Wendall Jordan, was serving a term of incarceration when he underwent a religious conversion. Appellant filed a petition to change his name to Abdul-Wakeel Mutawakkil Jordan, adding that he would not be hindered from the free exercise of his religion if not allowed to change his name. The circuit court found that Appellant’s application frustrated a legitimate law-enforcement purpose and, thus, the provisions of Va. Code 8.01-217(D) were not satisfied. Specifically, the court concluded that, due to the gravity and brutality of Defendant’s crimes, Defendant must retain his given name for the peace of mind of the victims and the victims’ families. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the basis articulated by the trial court for denying Appellant’s petition did not fall outside the scope of its broad discretion. View "Jordan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a state employee grievance proceeding, a hearing officer’s decision upholding the termination of Nathan Osborn, a special agent with the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), was not contrary to law.ABC terminated Osburn’s employment after receiving a complaint that Osburn rummaged, without permission, through the business records of a business owner who had applied for a retail alcohol license. A hearing officer upheld Osburn’s termination, concluding that the warrantless search was not permissible, resulting in a violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer’s determination. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination that Osborn violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Osburn’s warrantless inspection of the office of the applicant’s business was not permissible under the highly regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement and that the business owner did not consent to Osburn’s warrantless search of the office. View "Osburn v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

The circuit court abused its discretion in this medical malpractice action when it refused to qualify Plaintiff’s only proposed expert witness (Dr. Aboderin) and granted summary judgment for Defendant.After voir dire, Defendant moved to exclude Dr. Aboderin’s testimony on the ground that she failed to meet the two-prong test of Va. Code 8.01-581.20, which governs qualification of medical malpractice expert witnesses. The trial court sustained Defendant’s objection, thus excluding Dr. Aboderin from testifying. Because Dr. Aboderin was Plaintiff’s only proposed expert witness, Plaintiff was unable to establish that Defendant breached the standard of care or that any breach was the proximate cause of her daughter’s injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to qualify Dr. Aboderin as an expert witness because there was evidence that she satisfied both the knowledge and active clinical practice requirements of section 8.01-581.20. View "Holt v. Chalmeta" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in granting Defendant, who was charged with first-degree murder, pre-trial bail.Because Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, for which the maximum sentence was life imprisonment, the circuit court was required to presume, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or set of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance or the safety of the public. Based on its findings, the circuit court granted Defendant’s motion for bail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) applying the doctrine of presumed innocence to a pre-trial bail hearing; (2) finding that the brutal and calculated circumstances of the murder were outweighed by the absence of any threat to any other individuals; (3) speculating that Defendant was “unlikely” to abscond because of his age; and (4) discounting and according no weight to Defendant’s prior history of mental health disorders. View "Commonwealth v. Duse" on Justia Law

Shin was arrested for DWI. Shin declined the arresting officer's demand that he provide a blood and breath sample. The officer then read Form DC-233, “Implied Consent Declaration” to Shin, Code 18.2-268.3(C), which stated: “You shall submit to a breath test. If the breath test is unavailable or you are physically unable to submit to the breath test, a blood test shall be given.” Shin refused to provide a sample and signed a “Declaration of Refusal,” stating that he had been advised of the law and the penalty for unreasonably refusing to provide samples. Shin was convicted of DWI - second offense, unreasonable refusal of a breath or blood test - first offense, and improper lane change. A jury subsequently acquitted Shin of DWI but convicted him of improper lane change. The circuit court found Shin’s refusal unreasonable, in violation of Code 18.2-268.3, and suspended Shin’s license for one year. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, rejecting Shin’s arguments that the implied consent law imposed an unconstitutional condition upon the privilege of driving, was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an objective definition of reasonable refusal, and violated Article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution by compelling him to provide the Commonwealth with potentially incriminatory evidence. View "Shin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2003, Rickman was convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual battery, two of forcible sodomy, one of abduction of a minor, one of object sexual penetration, one of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and one of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising from Rickman’s abuse of his biological and step-children over several years. He was sentenced to 75 years of imprisonment with 60 years suspended. In 2015, the Commonwealth sought to have Rickman civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Code 37.2-900 to -921 (SVPA), which calls for a hearing within 90 days to determine whether probable cause exists. The respondent may waive a hearing and either party may request a continuance. The deadline for Rickman's probable-cause hearing was November 26. The parties exchanged emails to find an available date for the assistant attorney general, the Commonwealth’s expert, Rickman’s counsel, and the court. They settled on January 8, 2016. In an email to the assistant attorney general and court docket clerk, Rickman’s counsel acknowledged that she was available that day, but “[would] need to note an objection. Neither party sought a continuance. After November 26, Rickman unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the SVPA petition. The circuit court civilly committed Rickman. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The requirement, even if violated, does not require dismissal of the SVPA petition. The options are orders: granting a conditional, temporary release, expediting the proceeding, and disallowing evidence at the hearing. The court should make its discretionary decision by balancing any prejudice to the respondent, the length of and reasons for the delay, and any bad faith. View "Rickman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The carbon monoxide detector in an apartment sounded. A maintenance worker replaced the batteries; the alarm later sounded again. The following morning, tenants called Virginia Natural Gas (VNG). VNG’s inspector measured the apartment’s CO levels as hazardous, turned off the gas, and “red-tagged” the furnace. A maintenance worker later declared that he had checked the furnace and vent pipes for leaks, found an attic vent pipe loose, reattached it, and rechecked the CO level, Although not licensed to make heating system repairs, he used screws to secure the sections, contrary to specifications. A code enforcement officer determined that CO levels were within the acceptable range, without visiting the attic or inspecting the equipment. Weeks later, the alarm sounded again. A VNG inspector red-tagged the furnace. With a new furnace installed, the CO levels remained high. The adjoining apartment's furnace was venting into the attic. When the flue was repaired, CO levels dropped. The tenants suffered injuries. In their suit, the court ruled that the tenants failed to establish the requisite level of negligence for punitive damages. They were permitted, over the landlord’s objection, to increase their prayers for compensatory damages. The jury awarded three tenants $200,000 each and a fourth $3,500,000. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed in part and remanded for a new trial. The court erred in admitting the testimony of an environmental medicine specialist, which had not been disclosed under Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i); erred in admitting testimony regarding alleged defects in the installation of the new furnace--such defects were after-the-fact and not relevant; in permitting amendment of the prayers for relief; in granting a spoliation instruction with regard to tenants’ inability to inspect the furnace. View "Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Pijor was found guilty of perjury, Code 18.2-434, based on testimony Pijor gave during a larceny trial in which he was acquitted. Pijor, having testified that he had not taken his ex-girlfriend’s dog, was later found to be in possession of the dog. Pijor claimed he had found the dog after the trial. The Court of Appeals rejected Pijor’s arguments that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from indicting him for perjury due to his previous acquittal and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed perjury. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Pijor failed to prove that the precise issue of fact he sought to preclude--that he had not seen and had no information about the dog-- was determined in the larceny trial. A rational factfinder could have found all of the necessary elements for the crime of perjury established beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Pijor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ahmed alleged that as an inmate at Greensville Correctional Center, he suffered an injury to his head and neck on September 10, 2013, when the telephone he was using fell from the wall and struck him. Ahmed filed informal complaints on the same day against the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC). DOC responded on September 27. Ahmed filed grievances on September 30, which the DOC ruled to be “[u]nfounded” on October 22. On October 24, Ahmed filed an appeal, triggering a “Level II” review under the Inmate Grievance Procedure. DOC affirmed on October 30, informing Ahmed that “Level II is the last level of appeal” and that he has “exhausted all administrative remedies.” Ahmed filed notice of a tort claim against the Commonwealth on September 22, 2014, with his required affidavit verifying that he had exhausted administrative remedies. Ahmed filed a complaint on February 24, 2016. The circuit court dismissed, finding that Ahmed’s notice of claim was not filed within one year (VTCA 8.01-195.7). The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. Code section 8.01-195.3(7) states that “[t]he time for filing the notice of tort claim shall be tolled during the pendency of the grievance procedure." The grievance process continued until October 30, 2013. View "Ahmed v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law