Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Martha Lambert filed a warrant in debt asserting that the Sea Oats Condominium Association failed to pay $500 to repair an exterior door to her condominium. Lambert sought $500 in damages and an award of attorney’s fees. The general district court entered judgment for the Association. The circuit court awarded judgment to Lambert. The court then entered a corrected final order awarding Lambert $500 in damages and $375 in attorney’s fees. Lambert appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by awarding her only $375 in attorney’s fees. The Association asserted that the circuit court erred by awarding Lambert attorney’s fees at all. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to consider relevant factors in its attorney’s fees award that should have been given significant weight; and (2) a party seeking an award of attorney’s fees need not prove the reasonableness of the award in its prima facie case. Remanded. View "Lambert v. Sea Oats Condominium Ass'n" on Justia Law

Client entered into a written representation agreement with Attorney for legal services. An attorney-in-fact for Client later filed a confession of judgment against Client in the amount of $9,460.07, with interest at eighteen percent from a certain date. Attorney subsequently filed a garnishment suggestion against Client in an effort to enforce the judgment. Client moved the court to enter an order declaring the confessed judgment void nunc pro tunc because of failure to serve it on her as required by Va. Code 8.01-438. Attorney moved to suffer a voluntary nonsuit. The court (1) granted the nonsuit, (2) quashed the confessed judgment nunc pro tunc, (3) ordered payment to Client of all sums held by the clerk by reason of the garnishment, and (4) awarded sanctions to be paid by Attorney to Client as reasonable expenses she incurred by reason of the garnishment proceedings. Attorney appealed the order granting sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Attorney breached his duty imposed upon him by section 8.01-438, and that breach resulted in harm to Client, justifying sanctions. View "Westlake Legal Group v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Moonlight Enterprises LLC filed a legal malpractice action against attorneys Francis Mroz and Stephen Zachary. The circuit court granted the attorneys’ pleas in bar and dismissed them both on statute of limitations grounds and, alternatively, dismissing Mroz on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, on the statute of limitations grounds, the circuit court incorrectly found that the continuous-representation rule did not toll Moonlight’s malpractice claims against Zachary but correctly found that the rule did not toll Moonlight’s claims against Mroz. Remanded. View "Moonlight Enterprises, LLC v. Mroz" on Justia Law

Gina Coutlakis filed a third amended complaint against CSX Transportation, Inc., the train’s conductor, and the train’s engineer (collectively, Appellees) alleging that Appellees’ negligence resulted in the death of her husband, James Coutlakis, after he was struck by a part of the train. Appellees demurred, arguing that James’s contributory negligence was evident on the face of the complaint, and therefore, Gina’s claim was barred. Further, Appellees asserted that Gina’s reliance on the last clear chance doctrine was misplaced. The trial court sustained the demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Gina’s third amended complaint contained sufficient allegations to survive the demurrer and that a rational jury could conclude the last clear chance doctrine applies based upon the facts pled and any reasonable inferences therefrom. Remanded. View "Coutlakis v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

The predecessor in title to Mount Aldie, LLC (MA) conveyed a conservation easement to Land Trust of Virginia, Inc. (LTV) covering a sixty-acre tract of land. The easement designated a 100-foot-wide strip of property running along the edge of the Little River, as “riparian buffer” (the buffer). After acquiring the property and conducting certain commercial forest operations, MA performed tree removal and grading work within the buffer. LTV later filed this action seeking an injunction to require MA to return certain property to the condition that it was in prior to the work MA performed within the buffer on grounds that MA breached the easement. The trial court granted LTV’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, finding that MA breached a provision of the easement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of disputed material fact existed over whether MA breached the easement, thereby precluding an award of partial summary judgment to LTV. Remanded. View "Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Trust of Virginia, Inc." on Justia Law

Boasso American Corporation appealed an adverse decision by the Zoning Administrator for the City of Chesapeake to the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Board affirmed. Boasso then filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Zoning Administrator moved to dismiss on the ground that Boasso had failed to name or serve the City Council for the City of Chesapeake, a necessary party by statute. Boasso then sought leave to amend to include the City Council and the City Attorney. The Acting City Clerk, on behalf of the Mayor, moved to quash service of process and filed a plea in bar arguing that Boasso’s failure to name or serve the City Council within thirty days of the Board’s decision was fatal to the petition. The circuit court dismissed Boasso’s petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a litigant who appeals the judgment of a board of zoning appeals under Va. Code 15.2-2314 must identify the governing body as a necessary party in the petition and must do so within thirty days of the board’s final decision; and (2) if those requirements are not met, the circuit court lacks the discretion to permit amendment of the petition and, if asked, must dismiss the case for lack of a necessary party. View "Boasso America Corp. v. Zoning Administrator of the City of Chesapeake" on Justia Law

The Tax Commissioner of Virginia directed Chesterfield County to issue refunds to Verizon Online LLC for local taxes it paid for tax years 2008, 2009 and 2010 on set top boxes it owned. The circuit court upheld the Tax Commissioner’s determination that the set top boxes were not subject to local taxation but concluded that Verizon was not entitled to refunds for tax years 2008 and 2009 due to its failure to file a timely appeal with the local commissioner of revenue. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in ruling that Verizon’s set top boxes are not subject to local taxation; but (2) the issue of the timeliness of Verizon’s local appeal was not preserved for review by the circuit court, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that Verizon was not entitled to refunds for tax years 2008 and 2009. View "Verizon Online LLC v. Horbal" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Appellee, her former employer, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville. The trial court sustained Appellee’s demurrer, which alleged that there were no sufficient allegations of a true public policy violation. Appellant then filed an amended complaint asserting a claim for wrongful termination under Bowman based on allegations that Appellee wrongfully discharged her in violation of the public policy embodied in Va. Code 19.2-152.7:1 through 19.2-152.10. The trial court sustained Appellee’s amended demurrer with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the amended complaint filed by Appellant failed to state a claim for wrongful termination under Bowman, the circuit court did not err in dismissing it with prejudice. View "Francis v. National Accrediting Commission of Career Arts & Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2012, Sheryl Ricketts was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Ricketts underwent surgery for her injuries. In January 2014, Ricketts filed a complaint alleging that Charlie Strange’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the accident. Strange moved to summary judgment, alleging that Ricketts lacked standing to pursue her claim because, in September 2012, she had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the bankruptcy court. Strange argued that because Ricketts failed to properly exempt her negligence claim from the bankruptcy estate, the claim was assertable only by the trustee in bankruptcy. The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Strange. The circuit court subsequently denied Ricketts’s motions to correct a misnomer in her complaint or substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the proper plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly granted Strange’s motion for summary judgment because Ricketts did not properly exempt her negligence claim from the bankruptcy estate, and therefore, Ricketts lacked standing to pursue it; and (2) did not err by denying Ricketts’s motions for leave to amend her complaint. View "Ricketts v. Strange" on Justia Law

The Funny Guy, LLC sued Lecego, LLC, claiming that it was not paid for work it did for Lecego. Funny Guy alleged that Lecego had agreed to pay approximately ninety-seven percent of the fees claimed in an attempt to resolve the dispute but later refused to do so. The trial court sustained Lecego’s demurrer, finding that no such settlement ever existed. Thereafter, Funny Guy again sued Lecego asserting two alternative theories of recovery - breach of contract and quantum meruit. The trial court dismissed this second suit on the basis of res judicata, concluding that these two alternative theories of recovery could have been, and should have been, asserted in the first suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied res judicata in this case. View "The Funny Guy, LLC v. Lecego, LLC" on Justia Law