Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two property owners’ associations (POAs) sued various owners and developers of parcels in a shopping center, claiming that the shopping center’s sediment basins discharged sediment into a creek that flowed into a lake owned by the POAs. The POAs asserted two common-law rights of action, trespass and nuisance, and sought an award of compensatory and punitive damages along with an injunction abating the ongoing sediment incursion. The circuit court sustained pleas in bar brought by Defendants asserting the five-year statute of limitations, concluding that the incursion of sediment had been occurring for more than five years before the suit was filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in applying the statute of limitations to the POAs’ claim of trespass damages and in denying the POAs’ motion for summary judgment. View "Forest Lakes Community Ass’n, Inc. v. United Land Corp. of America" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the search that led to his arrest on the ground that the probable cause for the search was provided by the warrantless use of a drug-sniffing dog in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress and found Defendant guilty of felony possession with intent to distribute. After Defendant’s conviction became legal, the United States Supreme Court decided Florida v. Jardines, which announced that use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch constitutes a search within the meaning of the of the Fourth Amendment. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging that Jardines confirmed that the search of his home was invalid and that Jardines was retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that Jardines introduced a new rule and was not retroactive. The court also denied a plenary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jardines does not apply retroactively to convictions such as Defendant’s because it announced a new rule of constitutional law; and (2) the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for a plenary hearing. View "Oprisko v. Director" on Justia Law

Dr. Matthew Mayr, a surgeon, mistakenly fused the wrong level on Michael Osborne’s spine. Catherine Osborne, Michael’s wife and the administrator of his estate, filed suit, alleging that Dr. Mayr was negligent and that he committed a battery. Thereafter, Plaintiff nonsuited her negligence claim and proceeded to trial exclusively on her battery claim. The trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff could proceed on a theory of battery or whether the law confined Plaintiff to recovery under a negligence theory. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) battery and negligence constitute distinct theories of recovery, with distinct elements of proof; and (2) the undisputed facts of this case did not support a claim for battery. View "Mayr v. Osborne" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford guilty plea to capital murder and other related charges. The trial court imposed a life sentence pursuant to the plea agreement plus a sixty-eight-year term of incarceration on the remaining charges. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his life sentence, claiming that it violated the principles articulated in Miller v. Alabama. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed. Acting on a petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana. On remand, the Supreme Court reinstated its holding in Jones I, subject to the qualifications made herein, and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate, holding that Defendant need not be resentenced to a specific term of years under either Miller or Montgomery. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant seeking damages arising from personal injuries she claimed to have sustained when a vehicle being operated by Defendant struck the rear bumper of the vehicle Plaintiff was operating. Defendant admitted liability, and the trial was limited to the issue of damages. The jury awarded a verdict in favor of Plaintiff but awarded her no damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial; and (2) the trial court did not err in excluding a racially charged statement made by Defendant at the scene of the vehicle accident. View "Gilliam v. Immel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of petit larceny, third or subsequent offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 16 to the jury rather than Instruction O, Defendant’s proposed alternate instruction, and that he suffered a denial of due process resulting from the challenged jury instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give Instruction O because Instruction 16 did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense. View "Lindsey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony The circuit court sentenced Defendant to six years’ active incarceration on the robbery count and three years’ active incarceration on the firearm count. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by excluding a redacted portion of an email sent by the detective investigating the robbery and by refusing his proffered instruction endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Holley. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error in the court of appeals’ judgment. View "Payne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two Arlington County taxpayers, challenged the County’s inclusion of transferrable development rights (TDRs) in their real estate assessment, arguing that the County had no authority assess and tax TDRs on their properties for tax years 2012 through 2015. The circuit court ruled in favor of the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the County may not tax TDRs under Va. Code 15.2-2316.2 unless it enacts an ordinance that conforms to the detailed requirements of that statute; and (2) the County lacks the authority to tax TDRs under section 15.2-750 and its ordinance until it has approved and accepted a site plan. View "Johnson v. Arlington County" on Justia Law

Western Refining Yorktown, Inc. was the owner of a refinery that was subject to the machinery and tools tax. Western challenged the Commissioner of Revenue’s 2010 and 2011 assessments in the circuit court. The trial court upheld the valuation of the refinery’s machinery and tools for purposes of levying the machinery and tools tax, concluding that Western did not carry its burden of proof to show that the property in question was valued at more than its fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in upholding the assessment; and (2) the County of York did not assume inconsistent positions in successive litigation. View "Western Refining Yorktown v. County of York" on Justia Law

In 2012, Ethan Dockendorf proposed to Julia McGrath and offered her an engagement ring worth approximately $26,000. In 2013, Dockendorf broke off the engagement, and the parties never married. Dockendorf subsequently filed an action in detinue seeking the return of the ring. McGrath demurred to Dockendorf’s complaint, arguing that it was barred by Va. Code 8.01-220, the “heart balm” statute. The trial court found that the ring was a conditional gift and that section 8.01-220 did not bar the action in dentine for recovery of the ring. The court then ordered McGrath to either return the ring within thirty days or it would enter judgment in the amount of $26,000 for Dockendorf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the heart balm statute does not bar a detinue action to recover conditional gifts, such as an engagement ring, that were given in contemplation of marriage. View "McGrath v. Dockendorf" on Justia Law