Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Western Refining Yorktown, Inc. was the owner of a refinery that was subject to the machinery and tools tax. Western challenged the Commissioner of Revenue’s 2010 and 2011 assessments in the circuit court. The trial court upheld the valuation of the refinery’s machinery and tools for purposes of levying the machinery and tools tax, concluding that Western did not carry its burden of proof to show that the property in question was valued at more than its fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in upholding the assessment; and (2) the County of York did not assume inconsistent positions in successive litigation. View "Western Refining Yorktown v. County of York" on Justia Law

In 2012, Ethan Dockendorf proposed to Julia McGrath and offered her an engagement ring worth approximately $26,000. In 2013, Dockendorf broke off the engagement, and the parties never married. Dockendorf subsequently filed an action in detinue seeking the return of the ring. McGrath demurred to Dockendorf’s complaint, arguing that it was barred by Va. Code 8.01-220, the “heart balm” statute. The trial court found that the ring was a conditional gift and that section 8.01-220 did not bar the action in dentine for recovery of the ring. The court then ordered McGrath to either return the ring within thirty days or it would enter judgment in the amount of $26,000 for Dockendorf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the heart balm statute does not bar a detinue action to recover conditional gifts, such as an engagement ring, that were given in contemplation of marriage. View "McGrath v. Dockendorf" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, a preschool education teacher, was convicted of assault and battery of a special needs student. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Defendant acted outside the scope of her official capacity and was therefore not entitled to the benefit of the statutory school personnel exception for simple assault and battery charges afforded under Va. Code 18.2-57(G)(i); and (2) the trial court inappropriately applied the “due deference” standard in section 18.2-57(G). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s alternative holding provided an independent and sufficient basis upon which to support Defendant’s conviction. The trial court’s alternative holding was that Defendant’s response to the student was still “unreasonable” and exceeded the physical contact permitted by school personnel under section 18.2-57(G)(i). That factual finding was fully supported by the record in this action and rendered the section 18.2-57(G)(i) exception inapplicable. View "Commonwealth v. Lambert" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in the trial court for DUI-reckless-victim permanently impaired (DUI maiming). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove causation and the criminal negligence element of DUI maiming, and further, that the court of appeals erred in affirming her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did no err in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of DUI maiming; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in affirming Defendant’s conviction. View "Rich v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2000, Gregory Devon Murphy was indicted for capital murder of a child and two counts of malicious wounding. The Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria found Murphy was incompetent to stand trial, and Murphy received treatment continuing in Central State Hospital in Dinwiddie County. In 2015, Murphy filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County arguing, inter alia, that the Director of Central State Hospital was detaining him without lawful authority. The Director moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Dinwiddie Court lacked jurisdiction under Va. Code 8.01-654(B)(1). The court rejected the augment, finding that section 8.01-654(A)(1) permitted the petition to be filed in any circuit court. The Director filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the Dinwiddie Court from proceeding in Murphy’s habeas matter, arguing that the Dinwiddie Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear Murphy’s petition and that she had no other adequate remedy. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that the Dinwiddie Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy and the Director had alternative remedies. View "In re Vauter" on Justia Law

Defendant was two months short of his eighteenth birthday when he shot and killed Timothy Irving. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eight felonies, including first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison for the first degree murder charge. Defendant appealed the trial court’s refusal to appoint a neuropsychologist at the Commonwealth’s expense to assist in the preparation of his presentence report and its decision to impose a life sentence. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal with regard to the denial of his motion for a neuropsychologist but granted his petition with regard to the sentence imposed. The court of appeals then concluded that the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant because a sentence of life did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder and that because Defendant was not facing a mandatory life sentence, Miller v. Alabama did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that mandated review by the court of appeals; and (2) Miller has no application to the present case. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with forgery, uttering, and attempting to obtain money by false pretenses. Johnson was ordered to appear for a preliminary hearing but did not appear on the scheduled date. Consequently, a grand jury indicted Defendant for three counts of felony failure to appear. Defendant moved to dismiss two of the three indictments on the grounds of double jeopardy, arguing that, at most, he could be convicted of one felony failure to appear. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to three counts of felony failure to appear. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that “the unit of prosecution for failure to appear corresponds to the number of individual felony offenses for which a defendant is obligated to appear.” View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Virginia Department of State Police (VSP), an agency of the Commonwealth, under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) alleging that he was denied a promotion because of his service in the United States Army Reserves. The trial court granted the VSP’s plea of sovereign immunity and dismissed Plaintiff’s USERRA claim, concluding that the VSP could not be sued on a federal right of action in state court absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly held that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff’s USERRA claim against the VSP. View "Clark v. Virginia Department of State Police" on Justia Law

Frank Still and Jane Still, who were married, created trusts in 1991 and amended those trusts in 1999. Also in 1999, Frank executed a durable power of attorney. Frank designated Jane as his attorney-in-fact should he become incapacitated and LaVerne Lemen, his daughter, as his successor attorney-in-fact. Frank’s other child was Jeffrey Still. Frank’s power of attorney vested his agent with broad powers. In 2011, Jane died, and Lemen and Still received nothing from Jane’s estate. Upon Jane’s death, Lemen became Frank’s attorney-in-fact, and she and Still became co-trustees of Frank’s trust and the executors of his will. Lemen and Still relied on the broad power of attorney to create an inter vivos trust that disinherited Jane’s heirs and provided for Lemen and Still to receive Frank’s entire estate at his death. William Reineck, Jane’s heir, filed suit against Lemen and Still, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lemen and Still. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with the exception of the award of attorney’s fees against Reineck personally, holding (1) Lemen’s actions were authorized by the power of attorney; and (2) the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. View "Reineck v. Lemen" on Justia Law

In 1997, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University awarded General Contractor a prime contract for construction work. General Contractor hired Subcontractors to complete portions of the project. Sureties acted as sureties to Subcontractors. After construction was substantially completed, Virginia Tech made final payment to General Contractor in 1999, which made final payment to Subcontractors. All work was concluded in 2000. In 2012, Virginia Tech asserted a claim against General Contractor seeking compensation for the cost of remedying defective workmanship. In 2014, General Contractor settled the claim with Virginia Tech and, the same year, filed this action alleging breach of contract and common law indemnity claims against Subcontractors and breach of contract claims against Sureties. In 2015, the court dismissed the case in its entirety, concluding, as relevant to this appeal, that the statute of limitations barred the breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations had run by the filing of the suit in 2014, and because any breach of Subcontractors occurred at the time of their respective performances, the statute of limitations had similarly run against Sureties. View "Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Thompson Masonry Contractor, Inc." on Justia Law