Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The predecessor in title to Mount Aldie, LLC (MA) conveyed a conservation easement to Land Trust of Virginia, Inc. (LTV) covering a sixty-acre tract of land. The easement designated a 100-foot-wide strip of property running along the edge of the Little River, as “riparian buffer” (the buffer). After acquiring the property and conducting certain commercial forest operations, MA performed tree removal and grading work within the buffer. LTV later filed this action seeking an injunction to require MA to return certain property to the condition that it was in prior to the work MA performed within the buffer on grounds that MA breached the easement. The trial court granted LTV’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, finding that MA breached a provision of the easement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of disputed material fact existed over whether MA breached the easement, thereby precluding an award of partial summary judgment to LTV. Remanded. View "Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Trust of Virginia, Inc." on Justia Law

Boasso American Corporation appealed an adverse decision by the Zoning Administrator for the City of Chesapeake to the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Board affirmed. Boasso then filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Zoning Administrator moved to dismiss on the ground that Boasso had failed to name or serve the City Council for the City of Chesapeake, a necessary party by statute. Boasso then sought leave to amend to include the City Council and the City Attorney. The Acting City Clerk, on behalf of the Mayor, moved to quash service of process and filed a plea in bar arguing that Boasso’s failure to name or serve the City Council within thirty days of the Board’s decision was fatal to the petition. The circuit court dismissed Boasso’s petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a litigant who appeals the judgment of a board of zoning appeals under Va. Code 15.2-2314 must identify the governing body as a necessary party in the petition and must do so within thirty days of the board’s final decision; and (2) if those requirements are not met, the circuit court lacks the discretion to permit amendment of the petition and, if asked, must dismiss the case for lack of a necessary party. View "Boasso America Corp. v. Zoning Administrator of the City of Chesapeake" on Justia Law

The Tax Commissioner of Virginia directed Chesterfield County to issue refunds to Verizon Online LLC for local taxes it paid for tax years 2008, 2009 and 2010 on set top boxes it owned. The circuit court upheld the Tax Commissioner’s determination that the set top boxes were not subject to local taxation but concluded that Verizon was not entitled to refunds for tax years 2008 and 2009 due to its failure to file a timely appeal with the local commissioner of revenue. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in ruling that Verizon’s set top boxes are not subject to local taxation; but (2) the issue of the timeliness of Verizon’s local appeal was not preserved for review by the circuit court, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that Verizon was not entitled to refunds for tax years 2008 and 2009. View "Verizon Online LLC v. Horbal" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Appellee, her former employer, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville. The trial court sustained Appellee’s demurrer, which alleged that there were no sufficient allegations of a true public policy violation. Appellant then filed an amended complaint asserting a claim for wrongful termination under Bowman based on allegations that Appellee wrongfully discharged her in violation of the public policy embodied in Va. Code 19.2-152.7:1 through 19.2-152.10. The trial court sustained Appellee’s amended demurrer with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the amended complaint filed by Appellant failed to state a claim for wrongful termination under Bowman, the circuit court did not err in dismissing it with prejudice. View "Francis v. National Accrediting Commission of Career Arts & Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2012, Sheryl Ricketts was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Ricketts underwent surgery for her injuries. In January 2014, Ricketts filed a complaint alleging that Charlie Strange’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the accident. Strange moved to summary judgment, alleging that Ricketts lacked standing to pursue her claim because, in September 2012, she had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the bankruptcy court. Strange argued that because Ricketts failed to properly exempt her negligence claim from the bankruptcy estate, the claim was assertable only by the trustee in bankruptcy. The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Strange. The circuit court subsequently denied Ricketts’s motions to correct a misnomer in her complaint or substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the proper plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly granted Strange’s motion for summary judgment because Ricketts did not properly exempt her negligence claim from the bankruptcy estate, and therefore, Ricketts lacked standing to pursue it; and (2) did not err by denying Ricketts’s motions for leave to amend her complaint. View "Ricketts v. Strange" on Justia Law

The Funny Guy, LLC sued Lecego, LLC, claiming that it was not paid for work it did for Lecego. Funny Guy alleged that Lecego had agreed to pay approximately ninety-seven percent of the fees claimed in an attempt to resolve the dispute but later refused to do so. The trial court sustained Lecego’s demurrer, finding that no such settlement ever existed. Thereafter, Funny Guy again sued Lecego asserting two alternative theories of recovery - breach of contract and quantum meruit. The trial court dismissed this second suit on the basis of res judicata, concluding that these two alternative theories of recovery could have been, and should have been, asserted in the first suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied res judicata in this case. View "The Funny Guy, LLC v. Lecego, LLC" on Justia Law

Two property owners’ associations (POAs) sued various owners and developers of parcels in a shopping center, claiming that the shopping center’s sediment basins discharged sediment into a creek that flowed into a lake owned by the POAs. The POAs asserted two common-law rights of action, trespass and nuisance, and sought an award of compensatory and punitive damages along with an injunction abating the ongoing sediment incursion. The circuit court sustained pleas in bar brought by Defendants asserting the five-year statute of limitations, concluding that the incursion of sediment had been occurring for more than five years before the suit was filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in applying the statute of limitations to the POAs’ claim of trespass damages and in denying the POAs’ motion for summary judgment. View "Forest Lakes Community Ass’n, Inc. v. United Land Corp. of America" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the search that led to his arrest on the ground that the probable cause for the search was provided by the warrantless use of a drug-sniffing dog in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress and found Defendant guilty of felony possession with intent to distribute. After Defendant’s conviction became legal, the United States Supreme Court decided Florida v. Jardines, which announced that use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch constitutes a search within the meaning of the of the Fourth Amendment. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging that Jardines confirmed that the search of his home was invalid and that Jardines was retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that Jardines introduced a new rule and was not retroactive. The court also denied a plenary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jardines does not apply retroactively to convictions such as Defendant’s because it announced a new rule of constitutional law; and (2) the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for a plenary hearing. View "Oprisko v. Director" on Justia Law

Dr. Matthew Mayr, a surgeon, mistakenly fused the wrong level on Michael Osborne’s spine. Catherine Osborne, Michael’s wife and the administrator of his estate, filed suit, alleging that Dr. Mayr was negligent and that he committed a battery. Thereafter, Plaintiff nonsuited her negligence claim and proceeded to trial exclusively on her battery claim. The trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff could proceed on a theory of battery or whether the law confined Plaintiff to recovery under a negligence theory. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) battery and negligence constitute distinct theories of recovery, with distinct elements of proof; and (2) the undisputed facts of this case did not support a claim for battery. View "Mayr v. Osborne" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford guilty plea to capital murder and other related charges. The trial court imposed a life sentence pursuant to the plea agreement plus a sixty-eight-year term of incarceration on the remaining charges. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his life sentence, claiming that it violated the principles articulated in Miller v. Alabama. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed. Acting on a petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana. On remand, the Supreme Court reinstated its holding in Jones I, subject to the qualifications made herein, and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate, holding that Defendant need not be resentenced to a specific term of years under either Miller or Montgomery. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law