Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dr. Matthew Mayr, a surgeon, mistakenly fused the wrong level on Michael Osborne’s spine. Catherine Osborne, Michael’s wife and the administrator of his estate, filed suit, alleging that Dr. Mayr was negligent and that he committed a battery. Thereafter, Plaintiff nonsuited her negligence claim and proceeded to trial exclusively on her battery claim. The trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff could proceed on a theory of battery or whether the law confined Plaintiff to recovery under a negligence theory. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) battery and negligence constitute distinct theories of recovery, with distinct elements of proof; and (2) the undisputed facts of this case did not support a claim for battery. View "Mayr v. Osborne" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford guilty plea to capital murder and other related charges. The trial court imposed a life sentence pursuant to the plea agreement plus a sixty-eight-year term of incarceration on the remaining charges. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his life sentence, claiming that it violated the principles articulated in Miller v. Alabama. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed. Acting on a petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana. On remand, the Supreme Court reinstated its holding in Jones I, subject to the qualifications made herein, and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate, holding that Defendant need not be resentenced to a specific term of years under either Miller or Montgomery. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant seeking damages arising from personal injuries she claimed to have sustained when a vehicle being operated by Defendant struck the rear bumper of the vehicle Plaintiff was operating. Defendant admitted liability, and the trial was limited to the issue of damages. The jury awarded a verdict in favor of Plaintiff but awarded her no damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial; and (2) the trial court did not err in excluding a racially charged statement made by Defendant at the scene of the vehicle accident. View "Gilliam v. Immel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of petit larceny, third or subsequent offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 16 to the jury rather than Instruction O, Defendant’s proposed alternate instruction, and that he suffered a denial of due process resulting from the challenged jury instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give Instruction O because Instruction 16 did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense. View "Lindsey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony The circuit court sentenced Defendant to six years’ active incarceration on the robbery count and three years’ active incarceration on the firearm count. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by excluding a redacted portion of an email sent by the detective investigating the robbery and by refusing his proffered instruction endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Holley. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error in the court of appeals’ judgment. View "Payne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two Arlington County taxpayers, challenged the County’s inclusion of transferrable development rights (TDRs) in their real estate assessment, arguing that the County had no authority assess and tax TDRs on their properties for tax years 2012 through 2015. The circuit court ruled in favor of the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the County may not tax TDRs under Va. Code 15.2-2316.2 unless it enacts an ordinance that conforms to the detailed requirements of that statute; and (2) the County lacks the authority to tax TDRs under section 15.2-750 and its ordinance until it has approved and accepted a site plan. View "Johnson v. Arlington County" on Justia Law

Western Refining Yorktown, Inc. was the owner of a refinery that was subject to the machinery and tools tax. Western challenged the Commissioner of Revenue’s 2010 and 2011 assessments in the circuit court. The trial court upheld the valuation of the refinery’s machinery and tools for purposes of levying the machinery and tools tax, concluding that Western did not carry its burden of proof to show that the property in question was valued at more than its fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in upholding the assessment; and (2) the County of York did not assume inconsistent positions in successive litigation. View "Western Refining Yorktown v. County of York" on Justia Law

In 2012, Ethan Dockendorf proposed to Julia McGrath and offered her an engagement ring worth approximately $26,000. In 2013, Dockendorf broke off the engagement, and the parties never married. Dockendorf subsequently filed an action in detinue seeking the return of the ring. McGrath demurred to Dockendorf’s complaint, arguing that it was barred by Va. Code 8.01-220, the “heart balm” statute. The trial court found that the ring was a conditional gift and that section 8.01-220 did not bar the action in dentine for recovery of the ring. The court then ordered McGrath to either return the ring within thirty days or it would enter judgment in the amount of $26,000 for Dockendorf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the heart balm statute does not bar a detinue action to recover conditional gifts, such as an engagement ring, that were given in contemplation of marriage. View "McGrath v. Dockendorf" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, a preschool education teacher, was convicted of assault and battery of a special needs student. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Defendant acted outside the scope of her official capacity and was therefore not entitled to the benefit of the statutory school personnel exception for simple assault and battery charges afforded under Va. Code 18.2-57(G)(i); and (2) the trial court inappropriately applied the “due deference” standard in section 18.2-57(G). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s alternative holding provided an independent and sufficient basis upon which to support Defendant’s conviction. The trial court’s alternative holding was that Defendant’s response to the student was still “unreasonable” and exceeded the physical contact permitted by school personnel under section 18.2-57(G)(i). That factual finding was fully supported by the record in this action and rendered the section 18.2-57(G)(i) exception inapplicable. View "Commonwealth v. Lambert" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in the trial court for DUI-reckless-victim permanently impaired (DUI maiming). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove causation and the criminal negligence element of DUI maiming, and further, that the court of appeals erred in affirming her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did no err in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of DUI maiming; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in affirming Defendant’s conviction. View "Rich v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law