Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought an action against the Virginia State Board of Elections, the Department of Elections, and various officers in their official capacities, alleging that eleven districts were unconstitutional and seeking to enjoin the use of the current district map in future elections. Subpoenas duces tecum were served upon several members of the General Assembly (the Virginia Senators) and the Division of Legislative Services (DLS) demanding production of certain documents and communications. Claiming legislative privilege, the Virginia Senators and DLS (collectively, Appellants) filed motions to quash. The circuit court denied the motion to quash, holding that the legislative privilege does not extend to DLS or to documents and communications between members of the General Assembly and consultants, DLS, or other third parties. When Appellants refused to comply with the production order, the court held Appellants in civil contempt. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the order holding Appellants in contempt, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by holding Appellants in contempt because the material sought in the subpoenas duces tecum were protected by the legislative privilege. View "Edwards v. Vesilind" on Justia Law

Miller & Rhoads Building, LLC (MRB) purchased a building that was subject to a city-wide real estate tax and an annual special district tax. MRB sought a partial exemption from real estate taxes for the property under the City of Richmond’s Tax Abatement for Rehabilitated Real Estate Program (the Partial Exemption). The City applied the Partial Exemption to the base real estate tax but refused to apply it to the special district tax. MRB paid the special district taxes under protest and brought an action to correct the alleged erroneous assessments. At issue at trial was whether the Partial Exemption also applied to the City’s computation of the special district tax. The trial court ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the Partial Exemption did not apply to the special district tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the special district tax, while a real estate tax, is a different type of real estate tax that is not subject to the Partial Exemption. View "Miller & Rhoads Bldg., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained when police conducted a warrantless search of a stolen motorcycle parked in the driveway of a home where Defendant resided. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the police officer trespassed when he walked up the driveway of Defendant’s residence without permission or a search warrant and conducted an unconstitutional search by removing the motorcycle tarp to reveal its VIN. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer’s search of the motorcycle was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. View "Collins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from a Va. Code Ann. 56-542(D) investigation by the State Corporation Commission of the tolls charged by Toll Road Investors Partnership II, LP for the Dulles Greenway, a privately owned toll road located primarily in Loudoun County. The Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County and David Ramadan (collectively, Appellants) requested that the Commission reduce the tolls. After concluding the investigation, the Commission issued an order in which it decided not to substitute new toll rates for the Greenway under the authority of section 56-542(D). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction and application of section 56-542(D); and (2) the Commission did not err in its factual findings that the Greenway’s existing toll rates satisfy the section 56-542(D) criteria while Appellants’ proposed rates did not. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

While on probation for a petit larceny as a third offense conviction, Christopher Forbes pled guilty to robbery and abduction. Because the new convictions constituted a violation of Forbes’ probation, the circuit court held a probation revocation hearing. The court found Forbes in violation of the terms of his probation on the petit larceny conviction and revoked his suspended sentence. Forbes later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his counsel was ineffective in refusing to file an appeal after Forbes “made known his desire to do so.” The habeas court ruled that Forbes was denied the effective assistance of counsel in appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. The Warden of the Lunenburg Correctional Center appealed, arguing that Forbes was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at the revocation hearing, and therefore, he was not entitled to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Forbes had no federal constitutional right to counsel in his probation revocation hearing, and therefore, he could not have been denied the effective assistance of that counsel. View "Walker v. Forbes" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff, a member of the United States Army Reserve, was hired by the Roanoke County Sheriff’s Office (the Sheriff) as a deputy sheriff. In 2009, Plaintiff was deployed to Afghanistan, where she suffered physical and psychological injuries. In 2011, Plaintiff returned from Afghanistan and was rehired by the Sheriff. The Sheriff later terminated Plaintiff’s employment in 2013 due to her inability to return to work in a full-time capacity. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging (1) the Sheriff failed properly to reemploy Plaintiff and failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate her disability in violation of 38 U.S.C. 4313, and (2) the Sheriff was required to allow Plaintiff a two-year convalescence period before terminating her employment pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 4312. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff, concluding that sections 4312 and 4313 were inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims because they apply only until the moment of reemployment and because the Sheriff rehired Plaintiff in the same position that she had left during her deployment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sections 4312 and 4313 afford returning service members protection only during the act of rehiring, and because the Sheriff promptly rehired Plaintiff upon her return from deployment, summary judgment was proper. View "Huff v. Winston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer (Defendant), claiming that Defendant violated Va. Code Ann. 40.1-51.2:1 by terminating his employment in retaliation for his complaining about unsafe practices at Defendant’s facility. Plaintiff sought punitive damages in addition to other remedies. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the award of punitive damages and otherwise affirmed, holding that “appropriate relief” in section 40.1-51.2:2, the provision providing the remedies for violations of section 40.1-51.2:1, does not include punitive damages. View "Property Damage Specialists, Inc. v. Rechichar" on Justia Law

Eliseo Granado was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Granado filed a notice of appeal. On the deadline for filing a written statement of facts, Granado filed a proposed written statement of facts in the circuit court clerk’s office, but the clerk’s office did not include the original proposed written statement of facts in the contents of the record submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied Granado’s petition for appeal, concluding that the statement of facts was not timely filed and was not part of the record to be considered on appeal, and therefore, the record was insufficient to address the assignments of error raised by Granado. Granado then filed a demand for review by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals. The panel denied Granado’s petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals erred by ruling that there was no statement of facts in the record for its consideration because that the statement of facts was timely filed in the circuit court and was properly part of the record. View "Granado v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Shannon Walters sustained serious injuries when her 1995 Mazda Miata convertible overturned while she was driving it with the soft top closed. Walters filed negligence and breach of implied warranty of merchantability claims against Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of American, Inc. (collectively, Mazda), arguing that the soft top’s latching system was defective and that she was injured after the windshield headed disconnected from the top and collapsed into the occupant compartment. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Walters. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mazda had no legally recognized duty to design or supply a soft top that provided occupant protection in a rollover crash; and (2) the opinion offered by Walters’ expert that the Mada Miata latching system was defectively designed lacked an adequate foundation, and therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting it. Final judgment entered for Mazda. View "Holiday Motor Corp. v. Walters" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of statutory burglary, possession of a firearm by a felon, assault and battery of a family member, pointing or brandishing a firearm, and credit card theft in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-192(1)(a). At issue on appeal was whether section 18.2-192(1)(a) requires proof of the specific intent to use, sell or transfer a credit card that has been taken from a cardholder without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that credit card theft under the first prong of section 18.2-192(1)(a) is a general intent crime completed upon an unlawful taking and does not require that the Commonwealth allege or prove the specific intent required to support a conviction under the second prong of the statute. View "Scott v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law