Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Gregory Devon Murphy was indicted for capital murder of a child and two counts of malicious wounding. The Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria found Murphy was incompetent to stand trial, and Murphy received treatment continuing in Central State Hospital in Dinwiddie County. In 2015, Murphy filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County arguing, inter alia, that the Director of Central State Hospital was detaining him without lawful authority. The Director moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Dinwiddie Court lacked jurisdiction under Va. Code 8.01-654(B)(1). The court rejected the augment, finding that section 8.01-654(A)(1) permitted the petition to be filed in any circuit court. The Director filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the Dinwiddie Court from proceeding in Murphy’s habeas matter, arguing that the Dinwiddie Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear Murphy’s petition and that she had no other adequate remedy. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that the Dinwiddie Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy and the Director had alternative remedies. View "In re Vauter" on Justia Law

Defendant was two months short of his eighteenth birthday when he shot and killed Timothy Irving. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eight felonies, including first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison for the first degree murder charge. Defendant appealed the trial court’s refusal to appoint a neuropsychologist at the Commonwealth’s expense to assist in the preparation of his presentence report and its decision to impose a life sentence. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal with regard to the denial of his motion for a neuropsychologist but granted his petition with regard to the sentence imposed. The court of appeals then concluded that the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant because a sentence of life did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder and that because Defendant was not facing a mandatory life sentence, Miller v. Alabama did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that mandated review by the court of appeals; and (2) Miller has no application to the present case. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with forgery, uttering, and attempting to obtain money by false pretenses. Johnson was ordered to appear for a preliminary hearing but did not appear on the scheduled date. Consequently, a grand jury indicted Defendant for three counts of felony failure to appear. Defendant moved to dismiss two of the three indictments on the grounds of double jeopardy, arguing that, at most, he could be convicted of one felony failure to appear. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to three counts of felony failure to appear. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that “the unit of prosecution for failure to appear corresponds to the number of individual felony offenses for which a defendant is obligated to appear.” View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Virginia Department of State Police (VSP), an agency of the Commonwealth, under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) alleging that he was denied a promotion because of his service in the United States Army Reserves. The trial court granted the VSP’s plea of sovereign immunity and dismissed Plaintiff’s USERRA claim, concluding that the VSP could not be sued on a federal right of action in state court absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly held that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff’s USERRA claim against the VSP. View "Clark v. Virginia Department of State Police" on Justia Law

Frank Still and Jane Still, who were married, created trusts in 1991 and amended those trusts in 1999. Also in 1999, Frank executed a durable power of attorney. Frank designated Jane as his attorney-in-fact should he become incapacitated and LaVerne Lemen, his daughter, as his successor attorney-in-fact. Frank’s other child was Jeffrey Still. Frank’s power of attorney vested his agent with broad powers. In 2011, Jane died, and Lemen and Still received nothing from Jane’s estate. Upon Jane’s death, Lemen became Frank’s attorney-in-fact, and she and Still became co-trustees of Frank’s trust and the executors of his will. Lemen and Still relied on the broad power of attorney to create an inter vivos trust that disinherited Jane’s heirs and provided for Lemen and Still to receive Frank’s entire estate at his death. William Reineck, Jane’s heir, filed suit against Lemen and Still, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lemen and Still. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with the exception of the award of attorney’s fees against Reineck personally, holding (1) Lemen’s actions were authorized by the power of attorney; and (2) the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. View "Reineck v. Lemen" on Justia Law

In 1997, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University awarded General Contractor a prime contract for construction work. General Contractor hired Subcontractors to complete portions of the project. Sureties acted as sureties to Subcontractors. After construction was substantially completed, Virginia Tech made final payment to General Contractor in 1999, which made final payment to Subcontractors. All work was concluded in 2000. In 2012, Virginia Tech asserted a claim against General Contractor seeking compensation for the cost of remedying defective workmanship. In 2014, General Contractor settled the claim with Virginia Tech and, the same year, filed this action alleging breach of contract and common law indemnity claims against Subcontractors and breach of contract claims against Sureties. In 2015, the court dismissed the case in its entirety, concluding, as relevant to this appeal, that the statute of limitations barred the breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations had run by the filing of the suit in 2014, and because any breach of Subcontractors occurred at the time of their respective performances, the statute of limitations had similarly run against Sureties. View "Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Thompson Masonry Contractor, Inc." on Justia Law

After Frances Robinson was fired from her employment with the Salvation Army, she filed a wrongful termination suit alleging that she was terminated for refusing requests from her store manager to engage in fornication. Robbins claimed common law wrongful termination for refusing to commit fornication and contended that the fornication statute, Va. Code Ann. 18.2-344, remained viable as a basis for her common law wrongful termination claim despite the ruling in Martin v. Ziherl that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Salvation Army. Robinson appealed, asking the Supreme Court to find that section 18.2-344 provides the basis for a valid public policy ground to support her Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville claim for wrongful termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-344 does not support a public policy Bowman claim for wrongful termination in this case; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Salvation Army. View "Robinson v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

PS Business Parks, LP obtained a judgment against Deutsch & Gilden, Inc. PS Business filed a garnishment summons naming Deutsch & Gilden, Inc. as the judgment debtor and SunTrust Bank as the garnishee. SunTrust processed a legal order debit against an account titled to Deutsch ending in 95497 and filed a check drawn from an account ending in 61663. The circuit court quashed the garnishment of account 61663 and ordered payment to PS Business of $15,050, the amount of the check drawn on account 95497. The Supreme Court reversed the order of payment from account 95497, finding that SunTrust’s indebtedness to Deutch exceeded $15,050. On remand, the circuit court found that Deutsch was indebted to PS Business in the amount of $706,755, and that SunTrust was indebted to Deutsch in the amount of $1.2 million. SunTrust appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by placing the burden of proof on SunTrust, the garnishee, instead of on PS Business, the judgment creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) during the garnishment proceeding, the circuit court improperly shifted the burden of persuasion to SunTrust; and (2) the circuit court’s finding that SunTrust was indebted to Deutsch in the sum of $1.2 million during the garnishment period was plainly wrong. View "SunTrust Bank v. PS Business Parks, LP" on Justia Law

Ravi Prasad purchased a lot at a tax sale. Shorty thereafter, Appellee mistakenly began renovating a house on a nearby lot owned by William and Elnora Washington, spending more than $23,500 on the renovations. When the Washingtons refused to pay Appellee for the work he procured for their house, Prasad filed a complaint asking the circuit court to impose a constructive trust on the Washingtons’ lot. Specifically, Prasad alleged that the Washingtons had been unjustly enriched as a result of fraud perpetrated by them through misrepresenting the address of the house. The circuit court entered a decision in favor of Prasad and imposed a constructive trust on the Washingtons’ lot in favor of Prasad with a money judgment in the amount he expended on the house. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment for the Washingtons, holding that under long-standing common law principles regarding notice imputed to purchasers of real property, because it was Prasad’s failure to exercise due diligence in his purchase of his lot that resulted in his misidentification of the Washingtons’ parcel as the property he was purchasing, Prasad was not entitled to recover compensation for the permanent improvements he made on the premises. View "Washington v. Prasad" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a contract dispute between the purchaser (Purchaser) and the seller (Seller) of a corporation pursuant to a corporative merger agreement. The agreement provided for three different liability limitations (damage caps) in the event of Seller’s breaches. Seller breached several requirements of the agreement by failing to use certain accounting principles to accurately establish the financial condition of Seller’s corporation and, accordingly, the appropriate adjustment to the consideration to be paid by Purchaser. The amount of the adjustment was controlled by the indemnity Purchaser was entitled to receive under the relevant damage caps. The circuit court entered final judgment for Purchaser. The agent for the stockholders of Seller and former stockholders of Seller appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly construed the merger agreement as to which damage cap was controlling under the facts of the case. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and reversed, holding that the circuit court applied the incorrect damage cap. View "Shareholder Representative Services v. Airbus Americas, Inc." on Justia Law