Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court partially denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus and purportedly denying his request for attorney's fees and costs, holding that the circuit court misapplied a definition of "personnel information."In his mandamus petition, Appellant requested documents related to employment disputes in the Town of South Hill, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The circuit court denied the petition in part after applying definitions of "personnel record" from a previous version of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) instead of "personnel information." The court further refused to award attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the personnel information exemption under VFOIA. View "Hawkins v. Town of South Hill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed three rulings by the trial court in a pending criminal case in these consolidated appeals, holding that the trial court erred in barring public access to a pretrial bail hearing, by keeping certain motions and exhibits under seal, and by finding that the City of Newport News lacked standing to oppose any public access to sealed documents that the City had previously produced in response to a subpoena.The underlying case involved a murder indictment and ancillary charges against a Newport News police officer. Two newspaper publishers and a reporter filed an appeal challenging rulings barring access to the pretrial bail hearing and keeping motions and exhibits under seal. The City challenged the ruling that the City lacked standing to oppose public access to the sealed documents it produced in response to the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed all three holdings, holding that the trial court erred as to all three rulings. View "Daily Press, LLC v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court admitting the will at issue in this case to probate and appointing an administrator for the estate of James A. Townsey but otherwise reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief on counts two and three of the complaint.The circuit court admitted Townsey's will to probate, appointed an administrator for the estate, and awarded the proceeds of a brokerage account to a German charity. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly admitted the will to probate and appointed an administrator for Townsey's estate; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant on counts two and three of the complaint. View "Taylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln e.V." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Va. Code 40.1-29(J), joint employer liability in a collective action for unpaid wages cannot be imposed upon individuals who act directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.Plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated to recover wages allegedly unpaid by Christian Psychotherapy Services (CPS), their employer. Plaintiffs also named as defendants Jason Benedict and Cheryl Ludvik. In the complaint, Plaintiffs argued that Benedict and Ludvik should be considered as employers who were liable, jointly and severally, with CPS for the unpaid wages pursuant to section 40.1-29(J). The circuit court sustained Benedict's and Ludvik's pleas in bar, concluding that neither individual met the definition of "employer." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that section 40.1-2 adopts a narrower definition of "employer" than the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and thus excludes individuals from implied employer liability under section 40.1-29(J). View "Cornell v. Benedict" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Ashland, LLC's claim against Virginia-American Water Company for an alleged breach of contract, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Va. Const. art. IX, 4 deprived it of jurisdiction to adjudicate Ashland's contract claim.Ashland filed suit against Virginia-American, which provided water to Ashland pursuant to a tariff issued by the State Corporation Commission, after a power outage disrupted water service to Ashland, resulting in $515,000 in damages due to lost business and profits. Ashland's complaint asserted a breach of contract claim based on an alleged violation of the tariff. The circuit court concluded that the promulgation of a tariff by the Commission is an action of the Commission, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that circuit courts are free to read and then apply the terms of a tariff as adopted by the Commission as necessary to resolve a common law dispute. View "Ashland, LLC v. Virginia-American Water Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court awarding sanctions against Plaintiffs, holding that the circuit court erred in awarding the total amount of the attorney's fees claimed.Plaintiffs brought this claim alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy, and business conspiracy against Defendant, a former employee. After the circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motions to nonsuit as to all parties the circuit court granted Defendant's motion for sanctions, awarding sanctions of $213,197 - Defendant's total attorney's fees - against Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) was within its discretion to award sanctions against Plaintiffs; but (2) erred in awarding sanctions for certain conduct and in failing to segregate sanctionable claim from the attorney's fees requested. View "AV Automotive, LLC v. Gebreyessus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's claims against the Rappahannock Area Community Services Board (RACSB) based on its determination that RACSB was a municipal corporation entitled to sovereign immunity, holding that RACSB is not a municipal corporation.Appellant received psychological therapy through RACSB at its facilities when he was between six to eight years old. Appellant brought this action against the estate of Scott Henry and RACSB, alleging that Henry, a therapist employed by RACSB, molested him during his counseling sessions. RACSB filed a plea in bar, claiming that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as either an "arm" of the Commonwealth or as a municipal corporation performing a governmental function. The circuit court granted the plea in bar, concluding that RACSB was a municipal corporation that was performing a governmental function by providing mental health treatment to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RACSB was not a municipal corporation because it lacked the fundamental characteristics of such an entity. View "Fines v. Rappahannock Area Community Services Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court holding that no justiciable dispute existed between the parties following the court's holding that the plaintiff qualified as a third-party beneficiary of a 1973 ground lease, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing this declaratory-judgment action as nonjusticiable.A developer filed a declaratory judgment action against the lessee of an adjoining property seeking to resolve conflicting interpretations of a lease provision. The circuit court concluded that the developer was a third-party beneficiary of the long-term ground lease in this case and dismissed the case on the grounds that there were no further justiciable controversies to resolve. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal was premature because the parties continued categorically to disagree on what specific rights, if any, the developer had under the lease and when those rights could be asserted. View "Ames Center, L.C. v. Soho Arlington, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part rulings made by the State Corporation Commission during its triennial review of Appalachian Power Company's rates, terms, and conditions pursuant to Va. Code 56.585.1, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Commission (1) erred in finding that it was not reasonable for Appalachian to record its costs associated with the early retirement of its coal-fired power plants as asset impairments; (2) did not err when it implemented depreciation rates from the revised 2017 Depreciation Study for the years 2018 and 2019 in the triennial review; (3) did not err by refusing to apply Va. Code 56-585.1(E) retroactively; and (4) did not err in finding Appalachian's affiliate costs under an Inter-Company Power Agreement with Ohio Valley Electric Cooperation to be reasonable. View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding Appellant in violation of probation and sentencing him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence because the period of suspension had lapsed before his probation violation. The court of appeals disagreed, upholding the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's order was consistent with, not violative of, the revocation power authorized by Va. Code 19.2-306(A). View "Hill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law