Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Samantha Cucco filed for divorce from Michael Luttrell. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce that incorporated a Property, Custody, and Support Settlement Agreement (the PSA) executed by the parties. Pursuant to the PSA, the divorce decree provided that Luttrell’s monthly spousal support payments to Cucco would terminate “as a result of action by the Court taken pursuant to [Va. Code 20-109]…relative to cohabitation.” Luttrell later filed a motion for adjustment of spousal support, alleging that Cucco had been cohabiting continuously with her fiancee for at least one year. In response, Cucco argued that because her relationship was with another woman, she was not “cohabiting” within the meaning of section 20-109(A). The circuit court concluded that only opposite-sex couples could cohabit for purposes of section 20-109(A), denied Luttrell’s motion, and awarded Cucco attorney’s fees pursuant to the cost-shifting provision in the PSA. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated the award of attorney’s fees, holding that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that same-sex couples cannot “cohabit” for purposes of section 20-109(A). Remanded. View "Luttrell v. Cucco" on Justia Law

The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency sought a prime contractor to provide event-planning services. Plaintiffs offered their services as joint subcontractors to Navar, Inc. Plaintiffs and Navar entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) and a Teaming Agreement, which provided that if Navar were awarded a prime contract then it would negotiate in good faith with Plaintiffs. The Defense Agency awarded Navar a five-year prime contract, but Navar did not extend subcontracts to either Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sued Navar, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and trade secret misappropriation. A jury found (1) Navar had breached the NDA and Teaming Agreement, and (2) Navar misappropriated one plaintiff’s trade secretes under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The trial court set aside the verdict on breach of the Teaming Agreement and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the total amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Navar could not be found liable for breach of contract because nothing in the Act or the NDA required Navar to use Plaintiffs as subcontractors; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding the Teaming Agreement was unenforceable as a binding contract. View "Navar, Inc. v. Federal Bus. Council" on Justia Law

The City filed a petition for condemnation asking for a determination of just compensation for property taken and damages to the residue. The circuit court awarded Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC $44,141 for the value of the fee take and more than $2.1 million for the damages to the residue, including loss of visibility and loss of direct access. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Dominion damages to the residue and entered final judgment in favor of the City on that claim, holding that Dominion failed to present any evidence by which any of over $2.1 in damages that the circuit court awarded could be apportioned to the City’s take of a utility easement and a temporary construction easement outside the area of reservation. View "City of Chesapeake v. Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant seeking damages for sexual assault and battery, aggravated sexual assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, an adult, had a sexual relationship with Plaintiff from 1971 through 1975 while Plaintiff was a minor. Plaintiff reached the age of majority in 1975. Defendant filed a plea in bar asserting that the suit was barred by the pertinent statute of limitations. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed Plaintiff’s suit with prejudice, holding that Va. Code 8.01-249(6), which revives an expired statute of limitations in certain cases of childhood sexual abuse, was inapplicable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8.01-249(6) was inapplicable in this case. View "Haynes v. Haggerty" on Justia Law

In 2010, JSR Mechanical (JSR) filed a complaint against Aireco Supply alleging breach of contract and negligence. Aireco filed an answer, but there were no further pleadings filed for the next four years. In 2014, under the authority of Va. Code 8.01-335(B), the circuit court entered a final order stating that the case was discontinued and stricken from the docket. In 2015, JSR filed a motion to reinstate the case. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that just cause and sufficient grounds did not exist for granting Plaintiff’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, once a plaintiff has complied with the timeliness and notice requirements of Va. Code 8.01-335(B), the circuit court does not have discretion to deny a procedural motion to reinstate a case that has been discontinued or dismissed pursuant to the statute based on lack of “good cause” or “just cause.” Remanded. View "JSR Mechanical, Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Dmitry Mikhaylov pleaded guilty to assault and battery of Lisa Sales. In 2013, Sales filed a civil suit against Mikhaylov seeking damages for the assault and battery. Throughout the proceeding, Mikhaylov took the position that Sales had fabricated the story and that he had a mitigating explanation for his earlier guilty plea. Sales filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the counts for assault and battery, arguing that Mikhaylov’s guilty plea was admissible evidence of civil battery and assault and was sufficient to establish Mikhaylov’s liability as a matter of law. Despite concluding that Defendant could not deny that he committed an assault and battery on the grounds of the judicial estoppel doctrine, the court denied Sales’ motion for partial summary judgment. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Sales on assault and battery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in applying judicial estoppel to preclude Mikhaylov from denying that he had assaulted or battered Sales and in incorporating its error into a jury instruction; and (2) abused its discretion by permitting Sales to introduce expert opinions not previously disclosed during the discovery process. Remanded. View "Mikhaylov v. Sales" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a successor in title to property interests retained by grantors in two severance deeds executed in 1886 and 1887, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the term “minerals” used in the deeds did not effect a conveyance of the natural gas and coal bed methane underlying her land. The circuit court sustained demurrers to Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints, holding that the term “minerals” included the gas as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming the holding in Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., holding that the two severance deeds at issue in this case conveyed the gas as a matter of law. View "Dye v. CNX Gas Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Two attorneys (together, “defense counsel”) were sanctioned $200 each during the course of their representation of Client, who was the defendant in a wrongful death suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that defense counsels’ “misconduct” in submitting a jury instruction with an error tainted the jury. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that counsel’s representation was not a deliberate act to mislead the court. The court, however, concluded that counsels’ inadvertence rose to the level of a sanctionable act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning defense counsel for a mutual mistake when the error was inadvertent and, upon its discovery, was timely noted. View "Ragland v. Soggin" on Justia Law

Two attorneys (together, “defense counsel”) were sanctioned $200 each during the course of their representation of Client, who was the defendant in a wrongful death suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that defense counsels’ “misconduct” in submitting a jury instruction with an error tainted the jury. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that counsel’s representation was not a deliberate act to mislead the court. The court, however, concluded that counsels’ inadvertence rose to the level of a sanctionable act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning defense counsel for a mutual mistake when the error was inadvertent and, upon its discovery, was timely noted. View "Ragland v. Soggin" on Justia Law

The parents of Kenia Lopez-Rosario, an adult with several physical and cognitive disabilities, petitioned the circuit court appoint them as Lopez-Rosario’s co-guardians. The circuit court granted guardianship to the parents. Subsequently, Lopez-Rosario had surgery to remove her gallbladder, and the surgeon, Dr. Christine Habib, allegedly made an error that injured Lopez-Rosario. Lopez-Rosario filed a negligence suit against Dr. Habib and her employer. Defendants filed a plea in bar/motion to dismiss, arguing that Lopez-Rosario could not file suit in her own name because her parents had been appointed as her guardians. The circuit court granted the plea in bar/motion to dismiss, concluding that Lopez-Rosario did not have standing to sue in her own name. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to Va. Code 64.2-2025, Lopez-Rosario’s parents had the authority and obligation to prosecute lawsuits on Lopez-Rosario’s behalf, and therefore, Lopez-Rosario lacked standing to file suit in her own name. View "Lopez-Rosario v. Habib" on Justia Law