Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court subsequently granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the indictment and also found Defendant guilty of shooting another person in the commission of a felony. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal. Defendant appealed, asserting that the lower courts erred in concluding that the facts did not support Defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and vacated the convictions, holding that the facts in the record supported Defendant’s claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. View "Hines v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to computer solicitation of a child. Defendant subsequently submitted a pro se notice of appeal, arguing that he was forced to sign the plea deal out of fear and anxiety. The trial court subsequently sentenced Defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. Thereafter, Defendant’s counsel filed a notice of appeal and a motion to withdraw guilty plea. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and, alternatively, that Defendant did not prove “manifest injustice” to withdraw his guilty plea. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction after the appeal was filed to consider Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court declined to address whether Defendant had shown manifest injustice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts erred in ruling that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea; but (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion on the alternative basis that Defendant failed to prove manifest injustice. View "Velazquez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2004, the prior owner of certain property acquired title to the property and granted a deed of trust on the property to Bank of America. The City of Portsmouth subsequently created the New Port Community Development Authority (CDA), which included the property at issue. In 2006, the CDA authorized the issuance of special assessment bonds, and the City enacted an ordinance establishing special assessments on properties in the CDA district. The prior owner subsequently subdivided the property and sold individual lots. In 2011, Bank of America sold the notes it held to Plaintiff and assigned it the deed of trust. Following the prior owner’s default, the property was foreclosed upon, and Plaintiff was the successful bidder. Plaintiff then filed suit, claiming that the special assessment lien was extinguished by the foreclosure sale and that the special assessments should be declared void because no CDA bond funds remained to construct additional improvements. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a special assessment lien has priority over a deed of trust that was recorded before the special assessments, and therefore, Virginia law foreclosed Plaintiff’s challenge. View "Cygnus Newport-Phase 1B, LLC v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the statutory rape of his half-sister, the aggravated malicious wounding of his father, and the malicious wounding of his stepmother. At sentencing, the trial court ordered lifetime probation following Defendant’s incarceration and ordered no contact with the victims as a condition of his suspended sentences. Defendant petitioned for appeal, challenging the trial court’s sentencing order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering lifetime probation and imposing the no-contact condition on his suspended sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no merit in Defendant’s challenges to the sentencing order. View "Du v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought an action against the Virginia State Board of Elections, the Department of Elections, and various officers in their official capacities, alleging that eleven districts were unconstitutional and seeking to enjoin the use of the current district map in future elections. Subpoenas duces tecum were served upon several members of the General Assembly (the Virginia Senators) and the Division of Legislative Services (DLS) demanding production of certain documents and communications. Claiming legislative privilege, the Virginia Senators and DLS (collectively, Appellants) filed motions to quash. The circuit court denied the motion to quash, holding that the legislative privilege does not extend to DLS or to documents and communications between members of the General Assembly and consultants, DLS, or other third parties. When Appellants refused to comply with the production order, the court held Appellants in civil contempt. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the order holding Appellants in contempt, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by holding Appellants in contempt because the material sought in the subpoenas duces tecum were protected by the legislative privilege. View "Edwards v. Vesilind" on Justia Law

Miller & Rhoads Building, LLC (MRB) purchased a building that was subject to a city-wide real estate tax and an annual special district tax. MRB sought a partial exemption from real estate taxes for the property under the City of Richmond’s Tax Abatement for Rehabilitated Real Estate Program (the Partial Exemption). The City applied the Partial Exemption to the base real estate tax but refused to apply it to the special district tax. MRB paid the special district taxes under protest and brought an action to correct the alleged erroneous assessments. At issue at trial was whether the Partial Exemption also applied to the City’s computation of the special district tax. The trial court ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the Partial Exemption did not apply to the special district tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the special district tax, while a real estate tax, is a different type of real estate tax that is not subject to the Partial Exemption. View "Miller & Rhoads Bldg., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained when police conducted a warrantless search of a stolen motorcycle parked in the driveway of a home where Defendant resided. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the police officer trespassed when he walked up the driveway of Defendant’s residence without permission or a search warrant and conducted an unconstitutional search by removing the motorcycle tarp to reveal its VIN. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer’s search of the motorcycle was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. View "Collins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from a Va. Code Ann. 56-542(D) investigation by the State Corporation Commission of the tolls charged by Toll Road Investors Partnership II, LP for the Dulles Greenway, a privately owned toll road located primarily in Loudoun County. The Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County and David Ramadan (collectively, Appellants) requested that the Commission reduce the tolls. After concluding the investigation, the Commission issued an order in which it decided not to substitute new toll rates for the Greenway under the authority of section 56-542(D). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction and application of section 56-542(D); and (2) the Commission did not err in its factual findings that the Greenway’s existing toll rates satisfy the section 56-542(D) criteria while Appellants’ proposed rates did not. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

While on probation for a petit larceny as a third offense conviction, Christopher Forbes pled guilty to robbery and abduction. Because the new convictions constituted a violation of Forbes’ probation, the circuit court held a probation revocation hearing. The court found Forbes in violation of the terms of his probation on the petit larceny conviction and revoked his suspended sentence. Forbes later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his counsel was ineffective in refusing to file an appeal after Forbes “made known his desire to do so.” The habeas court ruled that Forbes was denied the effective assistance of counsel in appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. The Warden of the Lunenburg Correctional Center appealed, arguing that Forbes was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at the revocation hearing, and therefore, he was not entitled to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Forbes had no federal constitutional right to counsel in his probation revocation hearing, and therefore, he could not have been denied the effective assistance of that counsel. View "Walker v. Forbes" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff, a member of the United States Army Reserve, was hired by the Roanoke County Sheriff’s Office (the Sheriff) as a deputy sheriff. In 2009, Plaintiff was deployed to Afghanistan, where she suffered physical and psychological injuries. In 2011, Plaintiff returned from Afghanistan and was rehired by the Sheriff. The Sheriff later terminated Plaintiff’s employment in 2013 due to her inability to return to work in a full-time capacity. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging (1) the Sheriff failed properly to reemploy Plaintiff and failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate her disability in violation of 38 U.S.C. 4313, and (2) the Sheriff was required to allow Plaintiff a two-year convalescence period before terminating her employment pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 4312. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff, concluding that sections 4312 and 4313 were inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims because they apply only until the moment of reemployment and because the Sheriff rehired Plaintiff in the same position that she had left during her deployment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sections 4312 and 4313 afford returning service members protection only during the act of rehiring, and because the Sheriff promptly rehired Plaintiff upon her return from deployment, summary judgment was proper. View "Huff v. Winston" on Justia Law