Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Church entered into an engineering contract with Civil Engineer (Engineer) to design site plans for a rain tank system. Church entered into a contract with General Contractor (GC) for the construction of the rain tank. After GC installed the rain tank, the tank collapsed. Engineer designed and GC installed a different storm water management system, but Church refused to pay GC for installing the new storm water system. GC sued Church for payment, and Church counterclaimed against GC for breach of contract. Church filed a third-party claim against Engineer for repair and replacement costs it was found to owe GC because of the rain tank collapse. Church filed a separate suit against Engineer. The circuit court concluded that the rain tank collapse was the failure of Engineer, entered judgment for GC on its claims against Church, and awarded Church damages for delay and other damages associated with removing and replacing the rain tank. Engineer appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding Church’s claims timely and Engineer liable on Church’s breach of contract claims; and (2) reversed the circuit court’s judgment granting Church damages in the form of construction loan interest that was not incurred as a result of the breach of contract. Remanded. View "William H. Gordon Assocs. v. Heritage Fellowship, United Church of Christ" on Justia Law

In 2008, the circuit court found Defendant guilty of multiple non-homicide offenses that he had committed as a juvenile. Defendant was sentenced to six consecutive life terms. In 2012, Defendant filed a federal habeas petition contending that his life sentences were unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida. While discovery was pending, Defendant filed a request for a conditional pardon with the Governor’s office. The Governor issued an executive order granting Defendant a commutation of sentence and reduced his term of incarceration for a total of forty years. The Commonwealth subsequently argued that the Governor’s commutation of Defendant’s sentence made Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus moot. Defendant responded by claiming that the Governor’s executive order may only be construed as a “conditional pardon.” The district court granted Defendant’s motion to continue, ruling that the Governor did not have the authority to commute a non-capital offense. The federal district court certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the executive order from the Governor constitutes a partial pardon; and (2) the Governor’s actions were valid under the Virginia Constitution. View "Blount v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a compliant against Defendants in order to enforce a mechanics lien. Wells Fargo was named in the complaint because it was the trustee and secured party of certain property. Wells Fargo filed a motion for leave to file answer out of time and requested its fees and costs incurred with regard to the motion. The trial court granted Wells Fargo’s motion and ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Wells Fargo’s counsel $1200 for fees and costs incurred regarding the motion for leave to file answer out of time. The trial court also granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendants. In its final order, the trial court stated that the mechanics lien had been released and that it had issued the $1200 sanctions award against Plaintiff’s counsel for its failure to voluntarily extend the time in which Wells Fargo might file its answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding sanctions, as Plaintiff’s counsel did not engage in behavior that could be characterized as unprofessional, an ethics violation or behavior that is subject to statutory sanctions. View "Env’t Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Deerfield Correctional Center, allegedly injured her knee while working in the canning department of the Southampton complex. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth filed a special plea in bar asserting that Plaintiff’s action was barred by sovereign immunity because Plaintiff failed to state the agency that was allegedly liable for her injuries in her notice of claim as required by the Virginia Tort Claims Act (VTCA). The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s plea in bar. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity, as Plaintiff failed to meet the express notice requirements of the VTCA. View "Phelan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against their homeowners’ association (the HOA) challenging the validity of a 2008 amendment to the declaration of protective covenants and restrictions. The HOA filed a special plea in bar, arguing that the case should be dismissed as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations in Va. Code 55-515.1(E). The circuit court granted the special plea in bar and granted “prevailing party” attorney fees to the HOA. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the HOA filed a certification that did not comply with Va. Code 55-515.1(F), thus precluding the 2008 amendment from becoming effective for purposes of triggering the one-year limitations period in section 55-515.1(E). The Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiffs and reversed, holding (1) the one-year limitations period runs only from the date of an “effective” amendment; and (2) one of the requirements for an “effective” amendment - a proper certification - was not satisfied in this case, and therefore, circuit court erred in granting the HOA’s special plea in bar and dismissing the case as untimely. View "Tvardek v. Powhatan Village Homeowners Ass’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance. The court of appeals upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to quash the indictment; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the speedy trial statute; (3) the record did not support Defendant’s assertion that the circuit court denied Defendant the right to represent himself at trial; and (4) the circuit court did not err in granting a continuance to the Commonwealth. View "Herrington v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Wetlands America Trust, Inc. (WAT) held a conservation easement on property owned by White Cloud Nine Ventures, LP. When White Cloud commenced construction activities on the property, WAT filed the present action seeking a declaratory judgment that White Cloud’s construction activities and intended commercial use of a new facility on the property violated the easement’s restrictive covenants. White Cloud denied violating the easement and asserted as affirmative defenses that the easement was unenforceable because it was impermissibly vague and ambiguous and that WAT’s claims were barred by estoppel and laches. The trial court generally ruled in White Cloud’s favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the restrictive covenants in the easement are ambiguous and must be strictly construed against restriction and in favor of White Cloud. View "Wetlands America Trust v. White Cloud Nine" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and distribution of a Schedule I controlled substance. Defendant later filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the felony-murder conviction and sentence. In his petition, Defendant claimed that her trial counsel failed to give her reasonable advice on whether to plead guilty to felony murder. The circuit court dismissed the habeas petition without taking evidence ore tenus or by affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the circuit court should have received additional evidence beyond the recorded matters to determine whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Smith v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants, two sixteen-year-old males, were convicted of multiple felonies for breaking into the townhouse of a college student and raping her at knifepoint. On appeal, Defendants challenged the constitutionality of their sentences and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions for breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon. The court of appeals denied the petitions regarding the issues before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for appeal and affirmed, holding (1) the aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on Defendants did not violate the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both Defendants committed the crime of breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon. View "Vasquez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant. In 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint to recover damages for injuries she suffered in the collision, but the complaint contained a misnomer that misnamed Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently moved to nonsuit her claim, and the trial court granted the nonsuit. In 2012, Plaintiff refiled her complaint properly naming Defendant. Defendant filed a special plea in bar asserting that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the 2011 complaint did not toll the statute of limitations where Plaintiff failed to correct the misnomer within the time period contemplated by Va. Code 8.01-6. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although Plaintiff was not properly named in the 2011 complaint, there was no doubt that she was the party identified, and therefore, the tolling provisions of Va. Code 8.01-229(E) applied, and Plaintiff’s 2012 complaint was timely filed. View "Richmond v. Volk" on Justia Law