Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pike underwent complex surgery at Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center to reconstruct the back of his mouth and was taken, for recovery, to the Surgical Trauma Intensive Care Unit. Unit patients are often in very critical condition and each nurse is responsible for two patients at most. Following a surgery such as Pike’s, it is important to keep the patient’s head stable to enable blood to flow. Pike's doctors did not write any orders specifically governing the position of his head or neck. A surgeon at the hospital testified that he would rely on the skill and expertise of the nurse to position the patient’s head. Five days after the surgery, Pike was found in a position that would cause “venous compromise.” The staff was instructed to avoid this practice. That afternoon, Pike’s physician found Pike again in that position, his face and neck massively swollen. Pike had to undergo further surgery, which was not successful. Pike's malpractice complaint was dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity. Pike argued that Hagaman, a registered nurse, was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, noting that Hagaman’s discretion was cabined by physicians’ orders, that she could not refuse to accept a particular patient, that the hospital “had a high degree of control over Hagaman," who was supervised by senior staff, and that she was subject to hospital policies. The hospital pays her wages and determines her schedule. View "Pike v. Hagaman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three felony drug offenses. Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. A panel of the Court of Appeals ordered reversal and remand to the circuit court for a new trial, ruling that the facts and circumstances available to the arresting officer at the time of the stop did not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was violating or about to violate the law. The full court reversed the panel decision and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the investigatory stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger was justified by reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law was occurring, and therefore, Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "Mason v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Samantha Cucco filed for divorce from Michael Luttrell. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce that incorporated a Property, Custody, and Support Settlement Agreement (the PSA) executed by the parties. Pursuant to the PSA, the divorce decree provided that Luttrell’s monthly spousal support payments to Cucco would terminate “as a result of action by the Court taken pursuant to [Va. Code 20-109]…relative to cohabitation.” Luttrell later filed a motion for adjustment of spousal support, alleging that Cucco had been cohabiting continuously with her fiancee for at least one year. In response, Cucco argued that because her relationship was with another woman, she was not “cohabiting” within the meaning of section 20-109(A). The circuit court concluded that only opposite-sex couples could cohabit for purposes of section 20-109(A), denied Luttrell’s motion, and awarded Cucco attorney’s fees pursuant to the cost-shifting provision in the PSA. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated the award of attorney’s fees, holding that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that same-sex couples cannot “cohabit” for purposes of section 20-109(A). Remanded. View "Luttrell v. Cucco" on Justia Law

The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency sought a prime contractor to provide event-planning services. Plaintiffs offered their services as joint subcontractors to Navar, Inc. Plaintiffs and Navar entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) and a Teaming Agreement, which provided that if Navar were awarded a prime contract then it would negotiate in good faith with Plaintiffs. The Defense Agency awarded Navar a five-year prime contract, but Navar did not extend subcontracts to either Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sued Navar, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and trade secret misappropriation. A jury found (1) Navar had breached the NDA and Teaming Agreement, and (2) Navar misappropriated one plaintiff’s trade secretes under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The trial court set aside the verdict on breach of the Teaming Agreement and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the total amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Navar could not be found liable for breach of contract because nothing in the Act or the NDA required Navar to use Plaintiffs as subcontractors; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding the Teaming Agreement was unenforceable as a binding contract. View "Navar, Inc. v. Federal Bus. Council" on Justia Law

The City filed a petition for condemnation asking for a determination of just compensation for property taken and damages to the residue. The circuit court awarded Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC $44,141 for the value of the fee take and more than $2.1 million for the damages to the residue, including loss of visibility and loss of direct access. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Dominion damages to the residue and entered final judgment in favor of the City on that claim, holding that Dominion failed to present any evidence by which any of over $2.1 in damages that the circuit court awarded could be apportioned to the City’s take of a utility easement and a temporary construction easement outside the area of reservation. View "City of Chesapeake v. Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant seeking damages for sexual assault and battery, aggravated sexual assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, an adult, had a sexual relationship with Plaintiff from 1971 through 1975 while Plaintiff was a minor. Plaintiff reached the age of majority in 1975. Defendant filed a plea in bar asserting that the suit was barred by the pertinent statute of limitations. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed Plaintiff’s suit with prejudice, holding that Va. Code 8.01-249(6), which revives an expired statute of limitations in certain cases of childhood sexual abuse, was inapplicable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8.01-249(6) was inapplicable in this case. View "Haynes v. Haggerty" on Justia Law

In 2010, JSR Mechanical (JSR) filed a complaint against Aireco Supply alleging breach of contract and negligence. Aireco filed an answer, but there were no further pleadings filed for the next four years. In 2014, under the authority of Va. Code 8.01-335(B), the circuit court entered a final order stating that the case was discontinued and stricken from the docket. In 2015, JSR filed a motion to reinstate the case. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that just cause and sufficient grounds did not exist for granting Plaintiff’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, once a plaintiff has complied with the timeliness and notice requirements of Va. Code 8.01-335(B), the circuit court does not have discretion to deny a procedural motion to reinstate a case that has been discontinued or dismissed pursuant to the statute based on lack of “good cause” or “just cause.” Remanded. View "JSR Mechanical, Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Dmitry Mikhaylov pleaded guilty to assault and battery of Lisa Sales. In 2013, Sales filed a civil suit against Mikhaylov seeking damages for the assault and battery. Throughout the proceeding, Mikhaylov took the position that Sales had fabricated the story and that he had a mitigating explanation for his earlier guilty plea. Sales filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the counts for assault and battery, arguing that Mikhaylov’s guilty plea was admissible evidence of civil battery and assault and was sufficient to establish Mikhaylov’s liability as a matter of law. Despite concluding that Defendant could not deny that he committed an assault and battery on the grounds of the judicial estoppel doctrine, the court denied Sales’ motion for partial summary judgment. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Sales on assault and battery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in applying judicial estoppel to preclude Mikhaylov from denying that he had assaulted or battered Sales and in incorporating its error into a jury instruction; and (2) abused its discretion by permitting Sales to introduce expert opinions not previously disclosed during the discovery process. Remanded. View "Mikhaylov v. Sales" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a successor in title to property interests retained by grantors in two severance deeds executed in 1886 and 1887, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the term “minerals” used in the deeds did not effect a conveyance of the natural gas and coal bed methane underlying her land. The circuit court sustained demurrers to Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints, holding that the term “minerals” included the gas as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming the holding in Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., holding that the two severance deeds at issue in this case conveyed the gas as a matter of law. View "Dye v. CNX Gas Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Two attorneys (together, “defense counsel”) were sanctioned $200 each during the course of their representation of Client, who was the defendant in a wrongful death suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that defense counsels’ “misconduct” in submitting a jury instruction with an error tainted the jury. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that counsel’s representation was not a deliberate act to mislead the court. The court, however, concluded that counsels’ inadvertence rose to the level of a sanctionable act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning defense counsel for a mutual mistake when the error was inadvertent and, upon its discovery, was timely noted. View "Ragland v. Soggin" on Justia Law