Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

EMAC, LLC filed a declaratory judgment action against the County of Hanover and the Board of Supervisors of the County of Hanover (collectively, Defendants) challenging the Board’s decision to deny EMAC’s application for an extension of a conditional use permit. The circuit court granted Defendants’ demurrer and motion to dismiss, concluding (1) EMAC was required to prove that the existing zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied to its property and that it failed to allege any facts to satisfy this requirement; and (2) the Board’s decision denying EMAC’s extension request was supported by a rational basis and was fairly debatable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in ruling upon Defendants’ demurrer and motion to dismiss, the court properly interpreted the allegations in the amended complaint and the exhibits attached to it; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that EMAC was required to allege that the existing zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied to its land in order to state a cause of action; but (3) the circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrer on the ground that EMAC’s extension request was supported by a rational basis and was fairly debatable. View "EMAC, LLC v. County of Hanover" on Justia Law

Scott Harvard was a former senior executive officer of Shore Bank and Hampton Roads Bankshares (HRB). During the 2008 financial crisis, HRB elected to participate in the federal Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The TARP agreement required HRB to comply with the limits on executive compensation set forth in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) and its implementing regulations. In 2009, Harvard terminated his employment. Thereafter, Harvard filed a breach of contract action against Shore Bank and HRB alleging that HRB breached the parties’ employment agreement by refusing to make a “golden parachute payment” pursuant to the agreement. HRB filed a plea in bar, arguing that the prohibition on golden parachute payments in EESA section 111, as implemented by the June Rule, barred it from paying Harvard pursuant to the employment agreement. The circuit court rejected HRB’s argument and awarded Harvard $655,495 plus interest. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the award of damages in favor of Harvard, holding that EESA section 111, as implemented by the June Rule, prohibited the golden parachute payment under the circumstances of this case. View "Hampton Roads Bankshares, Inc. v. Harvard" on Justia Law

Virginia Fuel Corporation and Lambert Coal Company entered into an agreement by which Virginia Fuel agreed to acquire certain assets owned by Lambert. James C. Justice Companies, Inc. executed a guaranty guaranteeing Lambert’s obligations under the agreement. After Virginia Fuel stopped making payments under the agreement, Lambert filed suit against Virginia Fuel and Justice Companies, alleging breach of the agreement and breach of the guaranty. Virginia Fuel and Justice Companies counterclaimed for breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Lambert and dismissed Defendant’s affirmative defense of recoupment as well as Defendants’ counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lambert on its complaint, sustaining Lambert’s demurrer to Defendants’ counterclaim, and dismissing Defendants’ defense of recoupment. View "Virginia Fuel Corp. v. Lambert Coal Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendants owned adjacent properties. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging timber theft, trespass, and property damage and seeking an injunction, alleging that Defendants removed timber from her property without her permission. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff was entitled to recover any directly associated legal costs that she incurred as a result of the trespass but was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees; and (2) the trial court did not err in allowing Plaintiff’s claim for timber trespass to go to the jury. View "Chacey v. Garvey" on Justia Law

In 2006, CPM Virginia, LLC entered into an agreement with MJM Golf, LLC for the sale of a golf course. In 2013, CPM filed suit against MJM claiming that MJM failed to pay in full the purchase price by the date identified in the promissory note. MJM counterclaimed, alleging that CPM had violated the warranty provisions of the agreement. The trial court concluded that CPM breached the warranty requirements in the contract by failing to place eighteen inches of topsoil on top of fly ash on the property, thus entitling MJM to disregard the promissory note. The trial court canceled the note and awarded MJM $694,357 in damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warranty provisions in the agreement did not require CPM to cover the fly ash with eighteen inches of topsoil, and therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding a breach of contract and awarding damages to MJM as a result. Remanded. View "CPM Virginia, LLC v. MJM Golf, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1992, Plaintiff was convicted of a felony drug offense. In 2006, Plaintiff applied to the Fairfax County School Board for a teaching position and disclosed her prior conviction on her application. The Board subsequently hired Plaintiff as a special education teacher. In 2012, the school system’s Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources determined that, pursuant to Va. Code 22.1-296.1(A), Plaintiff’s 2006 hiring had been in error because her conviction made her ineligible for employment by the Board. The Board subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that section 22.1-296.1(A) made Plaintiff ineligible for hire. The circuit court entered an order declaring that the Board lacked authority to hire Plaintiff under section 22.1-296.1(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board lacked authority to make the contract, and therefore, the contract was void ab initio. View "Butler v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

Douglas Kozich pled guilty to one count of grand larceny and two counts of obtaining money by false pretenses. After a sentencing hearing, the court issued two-year active sentences, running consecutively, for each of the three offenses. Kozich later filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. At an evidentiary hearing on the petition, Kozich’s habeas counsel contended that Kozich’s trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present a specific drug-treatment plan at the sentencing hearing as an alternative to incarceration and by failing to file a timely motion to reconsider the sentence. The habeas court vacated the sentencing orders, concluding that the failure to file a timely motion to reconsider and to ensure that the court had an opportunity to rule on it constituted ineffective assistance, and Kozich was prejudiced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion to reconsider the sentences and to ensure that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on it was objectively unreasonable, and this omission demonstrated prejudice. View "Dir. of Dep’t of Corr. v. Kozich" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to thirty-three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. Defendant later filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to “prosecute” his appeal. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus, ruling that counsel was not deficient for failing to file a petition for appeal on Defendant’s behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s finding was not plainly wrong or unsupported by credible evidence. View "Velasquez-Lopez v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Talmage Ricks was convicted of strangulation resulting in bodily injury in violation of Va. Code 18.2-51.6. In a separate criminal case, Edward Chilton was also convicted of strangulation resulting in bodily injury. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. The Court of Appeals denied Ricks’ petition for appeal but reversed Chilton’s conviction and dismissed the indictment against him. The Supreme Court considered the two appeals together because they presented similar assignments of error regarding the wounding or bodily injury element necessary to prove the crime of strangulation in violation of section 18.2-51.6. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to prove bodily injury. View "Ricks v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Mitchell Kambis owns John Rolfe Realty and Elegant Homes of Virginia (collectively, the Kambis parties). Kambis and April Considine formed and were the sole members of Villa Deste, LLC. Patricia Wolfe, Considine’s mother, later loaned money to Villa Deste for the purchase and development of real estate and the construction of a home that Considine and Kambis later occupied. Kambis eventually transferred his interest in Villa Deste and its assets to Considine for value received. Later, the Kambis parties filed a second and third amended complaint alleging several claims agains Considine, Villa Deste, and Wolfe (collectively, the Considine parties). After a complex procedural history, the Kambis parties eventually nonsuited their claims against the Considine parties. The trial court also granted the Considine parties’ motion for sanctions, ordering Kambis to pay $84,541 in sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions, holding that the award of sanctions was properly based on the reasons enumerated in Va. Code 8.01-271.1. View "Kambis v. Considine" on Justia Law