Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) operated a gas-fired electric general station located in the City of Richmond. The City assessed tax for natural gas consumed at the station. VEPCO challenged the assessments, arguing that it was not subject to the tax. The Tax Commissioner affirmed the City’s decision that VEPCO was subject to the tax. VEPCO appealed, arguing that it was not subject to the tax because its consumption was outside the scope of Va. Code Ann. 58.1-3814(H). The circuit court concluded that VEPCO was not subject to the tax because it consumed natural gas at the station to generate electricity, rather than to furnish heat or light. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of section 58.1-3814(H). View "City of Richmond v. Va. Elec. & Power Co." on Justia Law

In 1989, Dorothy Hamm executed a deed of gift transferring her one-half interest in a parcel of property to Melba Clark. The deed of gift reserved a life estate for Dorothy. Dorothy died in 2004. In her will, Dorothy left any interest she had in the property to her son, Edward Hamm. In the deed of gift, Dorothy included a provision that sought to create a contingent reversionary interest in Dorothy in the event that Melba’s son, Reginald Clarke, ever acquired any interest in the property. Melba later died intestate, and the administrator of her estate sought a declaration that the possibility-of-reverter provision in the deed was void as an impermissible restraint on alienation. The circuit court agreed and struck the possibility of reverter from the conveyance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in declaring the possibility-of-reverter provision to be void, as no rule of law or equity forbade Dorothy from making her conveyance subject to the condition that the conveyance to Melba would revert if Reginald ever acquired any interest in the property. View "Hamm v. Hazelwood" on Justia Law

A pretrial detainee asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against guards and nurses at a regional jail. The jail authority had purchased a general liability insurance policy (the VaCorp Policy) from the Virginia Association of Counties Group Self Insurance Risk Pool (Risk Pool Association) and also elected to participate in a government-sponsored insurance program (the VaRISK Plan) managed by the Division of Risk Management (DRM). While the federal suit was pending, the detainee filed a declaratory judgment action against DRM and the Risk Pool Association seeking a determination of their respective liabilities for insuring the jail defendants. The Risk Pool Association and the DRM filed opposing third-party claims for declaratory relief. The detainee later settled with the jail defendants. The circuit court concluded (1) the VaRISK Plan was the sole primary coverage and that the DRM had the exclusive duty to defend the jail defendants, and (2) the Risk Pool Association had no duty to contribute toward the defense costs incurred by the jail defendants in the federal suit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the VaCorp Policy and VaRISK Plan provided co-primary liability coverage to the jail defendants; and (2) VaRISK Plan’s $2 million coverage extension applicable to medical malpractice claims did not apply to the section 1983 civil rights claim alleging violations of federal constitutional law. Remanded. View "Commonwealth, Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Va. Ass'n of Counties Group Self Ins. Risk Pool" on Justia Law

In 2014, the trustee under a deed of trust conveyed the Parrish property to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which sent the Parrishes a notice to vacate and filed a summons for unlawful detainer in the general district court. The Parrishes alleged that the foreclosure was invalid because their deed of trust incorporated 12 C.F.R. 1024.41(g), which, they asserted, prohibits foreclosure if a borrower submitted a completed loss mitigation application more than 37 days before the foreclosure sale. They alleged that they had submitted such an application. The court awarded Fannie Mae possession. On appeal, Fannie Mae argued that the court should exclude any defense contesting the foreclosure’s validity because the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try title in a proceeding on unlawful detainer. Fannie Mae contended that because the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction on appeal from the general district court was derivative of the general district court’s jurisdiction, the circuit court also lacked jurisdiction. The court awarded Fannie Mae possession. The Supreme Court of Virginia vacated, restoring the parties to their status quo before the unlawful detainer proceeding. Courts not of record lack power to try title unless expressly conferred by the General Assembly. The court cited Code sections 16.1-77(3) and 8.01-126 and acknowledged the practical implications of its holding. View "Parrish v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

Dominion obtained necessary certificates for transmission lines to connect Dominion’s recently-approved Wise County power plant with an existing Russell County substation. In 2008, Dominion offered Hylton $19,100 to purchase a 7.88-acre easement. Hylton owned 354 acres across 20 contiguous and two non-contiguous tracts. He owned the surface and mineral rights of some tracts and only the mineral rights of others. Dominion included an appraisal, acknowledging that, according to Hylton, two major coal seams run through or near the property and that Hylton’s ability to sell or lease those mineral rights might be damaged. The appraisal did not consider mineral rights in determining fair market value. The parties signed an agreement granting Dominion the right to enter and construct the transmission line. Dominion filed its petition for condemnation, limited to the surface use of Hylton’s property and moved to prohibit Hylton from presenting evidence of “the separate value of coal,” damage to tracts not taken, and “damages for duplicative or inconsistent claims.” Hylton later moved to dismiss, arguing that Dominion’s pre-petition offer to purchase was not a bona fide offer, under Code 25.1-204, so that Dominion had failed to meet jurisdictional requirements for condemnation. The trial court dismissed and awarded Hylton attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the dismissal and the denial of Dominion’s motion in limine with regard to evidence related to the separate value of the coal and the potential surface mine. Because the issue of whether the unity of lands doctrine applies with respect to neighboring lands, not part of the taking, is a question of fact, denying the motion on that issue was appropriate. View "Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Hylton" on Justia Law

In 2007, four women moved into a Blacksburg apartment. Days later, on August 19, a service technician measured high levels of carbon monoxide at the apartment’s front door. Receiving no answer from the occupants, he entered and found them unconscious in their bedrooms. Days later, the town building official (Cook), the code official, and Mann, a mechanical engineer in heating and air conditioning design, were present for testing of the atmospheric-vented gas fired hot water heater manufactured by State. Cook later testified they were able to recreate the “back draft and carbon monoxide” conditions only when “the water heater was running, all the doors to the bedrooms were closed . . . the air conditioning was running.” Mann testified that, because of sediment, water was continuously draining out of the heater causing a continuous flow of fresh water, resulting in the gas burner continuously firing to heat the water. Testing revealed there was insufficient fresh air in the apartment for proper venting, so the heater generated carbon monoxide. In a case alleging breach of warranty and negligence, seeking more than 24 million dollars in damages, the trial court found State not liable. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, upholding the use of a jury instruction concerning superseding cause and the admission of evidence on superseding causation. View "Dorman v. State Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement Defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor hit-and-run and driving while intoxicated. The United States Department of Homeland Security subsequently notified Defendant that his temporary protected status would be revoked as a result of his criminal convictions. Defendant sought habeas corpus relief, alleging that his prior counsel had given him erroneous advice about the effect of his plea agreement on his immigration status and that, had he been given accurate information, he would have gone to trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court ruled in favor of Defendant and granted the writ. The Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in holding that Defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment of the habeas court was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. View "Clarke v. Galdamez" on Justia Law

Andrews, a senior property manager of a public housing complex, challenged the termination of her employment with the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) through RRHA’s grievance procedure. A hearing officer ordered her reinstatement snf advised that, under the terms of RRHA’s Grievance Policy, “[e]ither party may . . . appeal the decision to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia.” The circuit court reversed that decision as “‘contradictory to law’” under Code 2.2-3006. The Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated the hearing officer’s decision, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear RRHA’s appeal. Either party may appeal a hearing officer’s decision to a circuit court for review on grounds that it is “contradictory to law,” Code 2.2-3006(B), but no such right is available when the challenge to the decision presents a question whether it is“consistent with policy,” RRHA did not make a prima facie showing for invoking judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision under Code 2.2-3006(B) because the substance of RRHA’s appeal challenged only the hearing officer’s interpretation and application of RRHA’s policies. View "Andrews v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Auth." on Justia Law

In 2003, Dumville met with attorney Thorsen to prepare her will. Thorsen understood that Dumville wanted a will that would, upon her death, convey all of her property to her mother if her mother survived her, and, if her mother predeceased her, to the Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Dumville was 43 and lived with three cats, which she desired to go to the RSPCA upon her death. Thorsen prepared, and Dumville executed, the will. She died in 2008, her mother having predeceased her. Thorsen, as co-executor of the estate, notified the RSPCA that it was the sole beneficiary of Dumville’s estate. Thorsen was informed that, in the opinion of the title insurance company, the will left only the tangible estate, not real estate, to the RSPCA. Thorsen brought suit in a collateral proceeding to correct this “scrivener’s error” based on Dumville’s clear original intent. The court found the language unambiguously limited the RSPCA bequest to tangible personal property, while the intangible estate passed intestate to Dumville’s heirs at law. The RSPCA received $72,015.60, but the bequest, less expenses, would have totaled $675,425.50 absent the error. RSPCA sued Thorsen for negligence, as a third-party beneficiary of his contract with Dumville. The court found for the RSPCA. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed: RSPCA was a clearly and definitely identified third-party beneficiary. View "Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law

Wilkins was convicted of petit larceny, a subsequent offense, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Before trial, Wilkins’s counsel objected to Wilkins being tried while wearing jail-issued clothing, described as "green, sort of scrub outfit,” black sneakers, and “a visible bracelet.” The court ordered a recess for Wilkins’s counsel to look in “a clothes closet” maintained by the public defender’s office. The record does not indicate whether Wilkins’s counsel used the opportunity. After the recess, Wilkins’s counsel unsuccessfully renewed his objection, explaining that Wilkins’s friend” had twice attempted to bring Wilkins non-jail-issued clothes but that the Portsmouth City Jail had refused to accept them. Wilkins did not put on any evidence. The jury was instructed that Wilkins was presumed innocent, but did not receive any instruction concerning his clothing or appearance. While the jury was deliberating, the judge reviewed Wilkins’ behavioral issues and referred to the clothing issue as part of “a pattern of trying to avoid going to trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction. There is no indication that Wilkins’s outfit was marked in any manner that would indicate it was from any detention facility. Neither the “sneakers” nor the “visible bracelet,” as described, were clear indicia of incarceration. Wilkins failed to meet his burden of proving that his clothing was readily identifiable as jail-issued clothing. View "Wilkins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law