Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant entered Alford pleas of guilty to attempted carnal knowledge of a minor, indecent liberties with a minor, and related offenses. Appellant was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years of incarceration, with twenty-five years suspended, for a total time to serve of ten years. Appellant later filed a motion in the circuit court seeking a new sentencing hearing, alleging that his sentences for attempted carnal knowledge of a minor and use of a communications system to procure or promote certain sex offenses involving a minor exceeded the statutory maximum. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion for a new sentencing hearing and entered an amended sentencing order. Under the amended sentencing order, Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years of incarceration, with fifteen years suspended, for a total time to serve of ten years. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a defendant convicted of a felony has a right to be personally present at a new sentencing hearing at which his sentence is modified so as not to exceed the maximum sentence provided by law. Remanded. View "Grafmuller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Settlor established a revocable trust that designated his new wife and his only children, two sons from a previous marriage (the Sons), as beneficiaries. After Settlor died, the Trustee informed the Sons that she had decided that the Sons’ act of writing certain letters to an attorney and a beneficiary violated the Trust’s no contest clause. The Sons filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that their conduct did not trigger the no contest clause. The Trustee demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and ruled that the Sons and their descendants were the rightful remainder beneficiaries of the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Trustee’s demurrer and in concluding that the Sons and their respective descendants were rightful beneficiaries of the Trust. View "Rafalko v. Georgiadis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pled guilty to a single count of grant larceny. Petitioner was subsequently served with a notice to appear for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that her trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance because he failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of her plea. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition, finding (1) trial counsel adequately advised Petitioner of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea, and (2) alternatively, Petitioner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test under Strickland v. Washington because she did not show that she would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial if she had received competent advice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the performance of Petitioner’s counsel satisfied the constitutional standard of reasonableness. View "Fuentes v. Clarke" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, a contractor who had been hired by a homeowner to install a replacement liner in the homeowners’ swimming pool, was convicted of construction fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he received a statutorily compliant letter from the homeowner demanding a return of an advance he had previously received from the homeowner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the evidence failed to prove that the homeowners’ letter to Defendant made an unqualified demand for the return of the advance, Defendant’s conviction could not stand. View "Bowman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jameer Woodley was killed in a school bus accident. The decedent’s parents, who qualified as co-administrators of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against the Southampton County School Board and three bus drivers. A jury awarded damages to the statutory beneficiaries, including the decedent’s three older brothers. Plaintiffs presented to the trial court two proposed irrevocable trusts to receive the funds awarded to their minor sons. The trial court rejected the proposed trusts and directed payment of the awards to the clerk of court. The clerk later advised Plaintiffs that the funds would be deposited in a savings account at a bank with a rate-of-return of .10 percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it refused to direct payment of the minor beneficiaries’ awards to the personal representatives and instead ordered that the awards be placed in a bank account maintained by the clerk of court. View "In re Woodley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, maliciously shooting into an occupied vehicle, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and reckless handling of a firearm, a misdemeanor. After a trial on the misdemeanor charge and a preliminary hearing on the felonies, the general district court dismissed the misdemeanor reckless handling of a firearm charge and refused to certify Defendant’s felony charges to the circuit court for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth subsequently obtained direct indictments charging Defendant with first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and dismissed the indictments, holding that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from prosecuting Defendant for murder or attempted murder after Defendant’s acquittal of reckless handling of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s misdemeanor acquittal and subsequent felony convictions were based on the same issue of ultimate fact, the felony convictions were barred by the prohibition of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty in the District Court of Stafford County to petit larceny and three misdemeanor tampering charges. After Petitioner’s sentences expired, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. In a Notice to Appear, the ICE charged that Petitioner was subject to removal because his petit larceny conviction subjected Petitioner to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A). While in federal custody, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Stafford County, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the attorney representing him in the petit larceny case incorrectly informed him that his guilty plea would not have negative immigration consequences. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner was not in custody pursuant to the challenge conviction and because the petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a Virginia circuit court does not have jurisdiction to provide habeas corpus relief to a petitioner being detained by federal authorities because of immigration issues arising as a consequence of a state conviction after the sentence for the state conviction has expired. View "Escamilla v. Superintendent, Rappahannock Reg’l Jail" on Justia Law

Two weeks after Preston McKellar announced that he would be retiring as a structural welder for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, McKeller was injured during the course of his employment. Two weeks later, McKeller retired as scheduled. McKeller filed a claim against Northrop Grumman seeking medical benefits and temporary total disability compensation. A deputy commissioner with the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Commission awarded medical benefits as well as temporary total disability benefits. The Commission affirmed the award of medical benefits but denied the claim for temporary total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that McKellar’s retirement, rather than his injury, caused his loss of compensation because the record supported the Commission’s finding that McKellar intended to retire and not seek other employment income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy commissioner correctly found that McKeller was entitled to temporary total disability compensation because he was totally disabled and lacked all earning capacity. View "McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding" on Justia Law

Scott Surovell filed a verified petition for writ of mandamus requesting documents pertaining to various aspects of executions conducted in Virginia from the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) through the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (“VFOIA”). After a hearing, the circuit court ordered VDOC to produce some of the requested documents. VDOC appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in requiring production of the documents at issue, whether in redacted form or in full. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ordering VDOC to produce the requested documents at issue and to redact current and prior execution manuals, holding (1) the circuit court must make a de novo determination of the propriety of withholding the documents at issue to such an extent such disclosure would jeopardize security, but in doing so, the circuit court must accord “substantial weight” to VDOC’s determinations; (2) because the Court was unable to decipher what weight the circuit court afforded VDOC’s expert testimony, the matter must be remanded to the circuit court to apply the standard articulated herein to the facts; and (3) the circuit court erred to the extent it ordered redaction because VDOC is not required to redact exempt documents. View "Dep’t of Corr. v. Surovell" on Justia Law

Gary Wooten purchased property before marrying Iracy Wooten. Gary subsequently executed a deed of trust to secure a loan. Thereafter, Gary conveyed the property to himself and Iracy as tenants by the entirety. Approximately two weeks later, the lender recorded the deed of trust executed solely by Gary. Five years later, the lender filed suit against Gary and Iracy seeking a judicial reformation of the deed of trust to include Iracy as grantor or to declare her interest in the property to be encumbered by the deed of trust. Iracy responded that she knew nothing of the deed of trust or the loan and first learned of them during divorce proceedings with Gary. Meanwhile, a final divorce decree was entered ordering that the property be sold and any remaining proceeds be divided equally between the parties. In the lender’s proceeding, the lender argued that Iracy was judicially estopped from denying that her interest was subject to Gary’s deed of trust and that the divorce decree justified this conclusion. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel based solely upon the divorce decree. Remanded. View "Wooten v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law