Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Insured filed a complaint alleging that Insured had breached a title insurance policy. Insured also alleged that Insurer had acted in bad faith and requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 38.2-209. Insured demanded a jury trial “on all counts so triable.” Insurer sought to have the trial judge, rather than the jury, consider the issues of bad faith and attorney’s fees. The jury was permitted to award attorney’s fees. The jury found in favor of Insured and awarded $442,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The trial court judge vacated the jury’s award of attorney’s fees and costs, ruling that section 38.2-209(A) requires a judge, not a jury, to determine whether an insurer committed a bad faith breach of an insurance contract warranting an award of attorney’s fees. Reconsidering the evidence de novo, the judge then concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Insurer had acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a judge, not a jury, must determine whether an insurer has acted in bad faith under the policy; and (2) section 38.2.209(A) does not implicate the right to a jury trial under Va. Const. art. I, 11. View "REVI, LLC v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

When Paul Lee and Lisa Spoden divorced, Lisa held an ownership interest in Lee’s company, Strategic Health Care Company, Inc. (“SHC”). As part of the divorce proceeding, Lee and Spoden entered into a written agreement (the “Term Sheet”) that operated as a property settlement agreement. Spoden subsequently filed a breach of contract complaint against Lee and SHC claiming that they had violated the Term Sheet. Thereafter, Spoden filed a petition for a rule to show cause against both Lee and SHC. In the contempt proceeding, the trial court concluded that Lee had not violated the Term Sheet and that SHC was not bound by the Term Sheet. Thereafter, Lee and SHC unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment in the breach of contract action based on res judicata. The jury eventually returned a verdict for Spoden and awarded her $138,880 in damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded, holding that the trial court (1) erred in failing to dismiss Spoden’s claims that had already been decided in the contempt proceeding; (2) erred in excluding evidence related to the trial court’s ruling in the contempt proceeding as it related to the ownership of certain property; and (3) did not err in denying the defendants’ motion to vacate the judgment as excessive. View "Lee v. Spoden" on Justia Law

Jennifer Ploutis’ home was insured under a policy issued by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company when water pipes in the home burst, damaging the home and certain contents. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the cost of certain repairs, Ploutis filed a complaint for breach of contract against Allstate. Upon the request of Ploutis, the action was nonsuited. Well after two years after the damage was sustained, Ploutis filed the present action. Allstate filed a demurrer asserting that Ploutis failed to comply with the conditions precedent under the policy by bringing the action within two years “after the inception of loss or damage.” The circuit court overruled the demurrer, concluding that the limitations period was tolled pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3), which tolls the “statute of limitations” with respect to nonsuited actions. Judgment was entered in favor of Ploutis. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and entered final judgment for Allstate, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that section 8.01-229(E)(3) applies to the contractual period of limitations for filing an action under Allstate’s policy. View "Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ploutis" on Justia Law

Draper Paving, the subcontractor for a road project, employed Richard Slone as a dump truck driver and assigned him to work on the project. Slone died from injuries he received in an accident while working on the project. At the time of the accident, Draper Paving had taken out a motor vehicle insurance policy with Selective Insurance Company of America. Karen Slone Bratton and Selective Insurance filed separate declaratory judgment actions seeking to determine whether Slone fell within the scope of the Selective Insurance policy’s coverage. The circuit court concluded that Bratton was not entitled to insurance proceeds from Selective Insurance because Slone did not fall within the scope of the policy at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Slone was occupying both a dump truck and company pickup truck - both covered autos - at the time of the accident under the Selective Insurance policy. Because the policy’s coverage limit for each covered auto applied independently to multiple covered autos involved in the same accident, Bratton was entitled to proceeds under the Selective Insurance policy for both the dump truck and the company pickup truck. Remanded. View "Bratton v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Defendant made a conditional plea of guilty to charges of cocaine distribution and unlawful possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, claiming that police officers unlawfully entered his apartment and seized his weapons and drugs. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantees entry by the policy officers into Defendant’s apartment, and the trial court did not thus err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Evans v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Based on an anonymous tip implicating Defendant, Defendant was arrested and charged with abduction, robbery, and statutory burglary. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for retrial, concluding that the trial court erred by admitting a police officer to testify as to the specific content of the anonymous tip that implicated Defendant in violation of Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in reversing Defendant’s convictions but on narrower, non-constitutional grounds, holding that the officer’s testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, and its admission was not harmless under non-constitutional principles. View "Commonwealth v. Swann" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning the care and custody of the children of Kristin Burns, the circuit court enjoined Burns from pursuing any further action until after she completed certain mental and parental fitness evaluations. On March 25, 2015, the court denied Burns’ motion for leave to file documents in this matter for the reasons stated in its previous order. On the fifteenth day after entry of the March 25, 2015, when her petition for review was due, Burns dispatched the petition to the Clerk’s Office of the Court of Appeals by pre-paid transmittal with a third-party commercial carrier for next-day delivery. The Court of Appeals denied the petition as untimely, concluding that Burns did not file the petition within fifteen days of entry of the March 25, 2015 order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for purposes of Va. Code 8.01-626, a petition for review is deemed to have been “presented to a judge of the Court of Appeals" when it has been filed with the Clerk’s Office of the Court of Appeals; and (2) therefore, Burns’ petition was timely filed with the Court of Appeals. View "Burns v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs applied for a special use permit requesting a permit to operate a boarding kennel in accordance with Clark County Zoning Ordinances. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, a nearby neighbor and member of the Clarke County Planning Commission, alleging defamation and tortious interference with a contract. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendant sent defamatory emails and made false public statements defaming Plaintiffs. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s demurrer on all counts, concluding that the statements were not defamatory and were protective by legislative immunity and that the allegations did not set forth a claim for tortious interference. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) none of the disputed statements by Defendant were sufficiently defamatory in nature to survive demurrer; and (2) the allegations failed to state a claim for tortious interference with contract. View "Schaecher v. Bouffault" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was fired, his former supervisor swore out a misdemeanor assault and battery complaint against Plaintiff for events that allegedly occurred immediately after Plaintiff’s termination. The supervisor also told other employees at Plaintiff’s former workplace that Plaintiff had cut or stabbed him. The misdemeanor assault and battery charge was later dismissed. Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former supervisor and his former employer (collectively, Defendants) alleging malicious prosecution and defamation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of Plaintiff’s work history and quality of past job performance, as the excluded evidence was probative of future lost income, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to subject Plaintiff’s former employer to punitive damages liability. Remanded. View "Egan v. Butler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned property located in the City of Norfolk. Gary and Margaret Cordovana owned the property located on one side of Plaintiff’s property, and 1273 West Ocean View, LLC and Dion Hayle (collectively, “1273 WOV”) owned the property on the other side of Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff sued the Cordovanas and 1273 WOV alleging that Defendants were directing large quantities of water run-off and pollutants from their properties onto Plaintiff’s property. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege a valid cause of action for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se. View "Collett v. Cordovana" on Justia Law