Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Douglas and Wanda Evans obtained title to a parcel of real property as tenants by the entirety with right of survivorship by way of a deed. In 1976, Douglas executed a general warranty deed purporting to convey to Wanda all of his interest in the property. In 1993, Wanda executed a deed purporting to convey by general warranty “all of her interest in” the property to herself as trustee of the Wanda S. Evans Trust, which granted the property to her son, William, subject to a life estate in Douglas. After both Wanda and Douglas died, William filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to quiet title int he property. The circuit court concluded that the 1993 deed was ineffective to transfer any interest in the property to the trust because the 1976 deed was ineffective to divest Douglas of his interest since it was not executed by both Douglas and Wanda as grantors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the 1976 deed was ineffective and void because there was sufficient evidence to establish the mutual consent of Douglas and Wanda to the conversion of their tenancy by the entirety ownership of the property to the fee simple ownership in Wanda. View "Evans v. Evans" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff bought a parcel of property from Fauber Enterprises, Inc., the basement of the house flooded when it rained. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Fauber, Fauber’s real estate agent, and others, alleging violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the instructions given on the standard of proof were incorrect. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plaintiff must prove a violation of the VCPA by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by concluding that Plaintiff was required to prove her VCPA claims by clear and convincing evidence. Remanded. View "Ballagh v. Fauber Enters." on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Defendant to represent her in a criminal matter. After a trial, Plaintiff was found guilty of felony assault and battery. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that she was deprived of her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The habeas court granted the petition and vacated Plaintiff’s conviction, concluding that Defendant’s representation was constitutionally deficient. Plaintiff subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor assault and battery. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against Defendant alleging that Defendant’s actions during the original criminal matter constituted malpractice. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because she was not actually innocent of the criminal act of assault that gave rise to the criminal matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of pleading that the pecuniary injury she sought to recover was proximately caused by Defendant’s legal malpractice, rather than being proximately caused by her criminal actions. View "Desetti v. Chester" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an LLC formed to own, develop, and sell real estate. Defendants were two entities formed to develop and sell real estate under the management and control of two of Plaintiff’s managers. The managers transferred funds from Plaintiff to Defendants, which used the funds to develop and sell their respective properties. Plaintiff was later dissolved, and a liquidating trustee appointed by the circuit court demanded the immediate repayment of the money owed by Defendants to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking the imposition of constructive trusts on Defendants’ respective properties and proceeds from the sale of their properties. The circuit court granted Defendants’ plea in bar and dismissed the amended complaint, concluding that the complaint was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not prove its entitlement to the tolling of the statute of limitations. View "Birchwood-Manassas Assocs., LLC v. Birchwood at Oak Knoll Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002, James Edmonds executed a will that left all of his personal property to his wife, Elizabeth, and the remainder of his property to a revocable living trust. After James died, his original will could not be located. Elizabeth filed a complaint seeking to have a copy of the will and trust to be probated. The trial court ordered that a photocopy of the 2002 will be probated, concluding that Elizabeth had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not revoked. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that James did not destroy the original 2002 will with the intention of revoking it. View "Edmonds v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

A seven-year-old first grade student died at school as a result of a severe allergic reaction to a peanut provided to her by a classmate. The tragic death of the child received widespread publicity in local, national, and international news reports that contained many statements and comments made by Defendants, several school and county health department officials. Plaintiff, the student’s mother, brought this action claiming that Defendants’ statements were maliciously designed to divert public indignation from the failures of Defendants to exercise proper care for the child by falsely implying and insinuating that Plaintiff bore responsibility for the death of her child. The circuit court sustained Defendants’ demurrer and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that complaint set forth facts that, if taken as true, were sufficient to support a cause of action for defamation. View "Pendleton v. Newsome" on Justia Law

Julia Cain and her daughters Raven and Reannah Cain filed a personal injury complaint against Defendant, who rear-ended them while they were driving. After a trial, the jury awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages to Raven, $5,000 in compensatory damages to Reannah, $2,000 in compensatory damages to Julia, and $500 in punitive damages to each plaintiff. The Cains appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of Defendant’s post-accident conduct; but (2) the trial court erred in giving an instruction addressing the disfavored nature of punitive damages, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "Cain v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for damages arising from a vehicle accident. Defendant admitted liability, and the case was tried before a jury on the issue of damages. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $9,000. The circuit court granted Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and for additur for a total award of $197,513. Upon Defendant’s election declining to accept the additur award, the circuit court awarded Plaintiff a new trial. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in setting aside the jury verdict and awarding additur. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict in the amount of $9,000, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court should not have set aside the first verdict. View "Cosby v. Clem" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority (ARHA) before being discharged for violating ARHA’s “absenteeism and tardiness policies.” Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court claiming that she had been improperly discharged. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement and her claim for money damages but held that Plaintiff was entitled to have her claims arbitrated under ARHA’s grievance procedure. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of ARHA, holding that the circuit court misapplied Va. Code 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b) and erred in ordering ARHA to arbitrate Plaintiff’s grievance. View "Alexandria Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its deed of trust on certain property was a valid first priority lien on the property. Defendant filed an answer requesting a declaration that its deed of trust was a valid first priority lien on the property. The circuit court ruled that Defendant’s deed of trust had priority over Bank’s deed of trust and that Va. Code 55-52, which codifies the doctrine of after-acquired title, could not elevate Bank’s deed of trust over Defendant’s deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 55-52 only applies between the parties to a deed and does not affect the rights of third parties or influence the relative priority of their interests; (2) a party who acquires a deed of trust pursuant to a court order is a lien creditor for purposes of section 55-96(A); and (3) a prior deed of trust recorded outside a party’s chain of title is not “duly admitted to record” for purposes of 55-96(A). View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Arrington" on Justia Law