Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Talmage Ricks was convicted of strangulation resulting in bodily injury in violation of Va. Code 18.2-51.6. In a separate criminal case, Edward Chilton was also convicted of strangulation resulting in bodily injury. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. The Court of Appeals denied Ricks’ petition for appeal but reversed Chilton’s conviction and dismissed the indictment against him. The Supreme Court considered the two appeals together because they presented similar assignments of error regarding the wounding or bodily injury element necessary to prove the crime of strangulation in violation of section 18.2-51.6. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to prove bodily injury. View "Ricks v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Mitchell Kambis owns John Rolfe Realty and Elegant Homes of Virginia (collectively, the Kambis parties). Kambis and April Considine formed and were the sole members of Villa Deste, LLC. Patricia Wolfe, Considine’s mother, later loaned money to Villa Deste for the purchase and development of real estate and the construction of a home that Considine and Kambis later occupied. Kambis eventually transferred his interest in Villa Deste and its assets to Considine for value received. Later, the Kambis parties filed a second and third amended complaint alleging several claims agains Considine, Villa Deste, and Wolfe (collectively, the Considine parties). After a complex procedural history, the Kambis parties eventually nonsuited their claims against the Considine parties. The trial court also granted the Considine parties’ motion for sanctions, ordering Kambis to pay $84,541 in sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions, holding that the award of sanctions was properly based on the reasons enumerated in Va. Code 8.01-271.1. View "Kambis v. Considine" on Justia Law

Appellant entered Alford pleas of guilty to attempted carnal knowledge of a minor, indecent liberties with a minor, and related offenses. Appellant was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years of incarceration, with twenty-five years suspended, for a total time to serve of ten years. Appellant later filed a motion in the circuit court seeking a new sentencing hearing, alleging that his sentences for attempted carnal knowledge of a minor and use of a communications system to procure or promote certain sex offenses involving a minor exceeded the statutory maximum. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion for a new sentencing hearing and entered an amended sentencing order. Under the amended sentencing order, Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years of incarceration, with fifteen years suspended, for a total time to serve of ten years. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a defendant convicted of a felony has a right to be personally present at a new sentencing hearing at which his sentence is modified so as not to exceed the maximum sentence provided by law. Remanded. View "Grafmuller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Settlor established a revocable trust that designated his new wife and his only children, two sons from a previous marriage (the Sons), as beneficiaries. After Settlor died, the Trustee informed the Sons that she had decided that the Sons’ act of writing certain letters to an attorney and a beneficiary violated the Trust’s no contest clause. The Sons filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that their conduct did not trigger the no contest clause. The Trustee demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and ruled that the Sons and their descendants were the rightful remainder beneficiaries of the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Trustee’s demurrer and in concluding that the Sons and their respective descendants were rightful beneficiaries of the Trust. View "Rafalko v. Georgiadis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pled guilty to a single count of grant larceny. Petitioner was subsequently served with a notice to appear for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that her trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance because he failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of her plea. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition, finding (1) trial counsel adequately advised Petitioner of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea, and (2) alternatively, Petitioner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test under Strickland v. Washington because she did not show that she would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial if she had received competent advice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the performance of Petitioner’s counsel satisfied the constitutional standard of reasonableness. View "Fuentes v. Clarke" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, a contractor who had been hired by a homeowner to install a replacement liner in the homeowners’ swimming pool, was convicted of construction fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he received a statutorily compliant letter from the homeowner demanding a return of an advance he had previously received from the homeowner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the evidence failed to prove that the homeowners’ letter to Defendant made an unqualified demand for the return of the advance, Defendant’s conviction could not stand. View "Bowman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jameer Woodley was killed in a school bus accident. The decedent’s parents, who qualified as co-administrators of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against the Southampton County School Board and three bus drivers. A jury awarded damages to the statutory beneficiaries, including the decedent’s three older brothers. Plaintiffs presented to the trial court two proposed irrevocable trusts to receive the funds awarded to their minor sons. The trial court rejected the proposed trusts and directed payment of the awards to the clerk of court. The clerk later advised Plaintiffs that the funds would be deposited in a savings account at a bank with a rate-of-return of .10 percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it refused to direct payment of the minor beneficiaries’ awards to the personal representatives and instead ordered that the awards be placed in a bank account maintained by the clerk of court. View "In re Woodley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, maliciously shooting into an occupied vehicle, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and reckless handling of a firearm, a misdemeanor. After a trial on the misdemeanor charge and a preliminary hearing on the felonies, the general district court dismissed the misdemeanor reckless handling of a firearm charge and refused to certify Defendant’s felony charges to the circuit court for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth subsequently obtained direct indictments charging Defendant with first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and dismissed the indictments, holding that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from prosecuting Defendant for murder or attempted murder after Defendant’s acquittal of reckless handling of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s misdemeanor acquittal and subsequent felony convictions were based on the same issue of ultimate fact, the felony convictions were barred by the prohibition of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty in the District Court of Stafford County to petit larceny and three misdemeanor tampering charges. After Petitioner’s sentences expired, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. In a Notice to Appear, the ICE charged that Petitioner was subject to removal because his petit larceny conviction subjected Petitioner to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A). While in federal custody, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Stafford County, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the attorney representing him in the petit larceny case incorrectly informed him that his guilty plea would not have negative immigration consequences. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner was not in custody pursuant to the challenge conviction and because the petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a Virginia circuit court does not have jurisdiction to provide habeas corpus relief to a petitioner being detained by federal authorities because of immigration issues arising as a consequence of a state conviction after the sentence for the state conviction has expired. View "Escamilla v. Superintendent, Rappahannock Reg’l Jail" on Justia Law

Two weeks after Preston McKellar announced that he would be retiring as a structural welder for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, McKeller was injured during the course of his employment. Two weeks later, McKeller retired as scheduled. McKeller filed a claim against Northrop Grumman seeking medical benefits and temporary total disability compensation. A deputy commissioner with the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Commission awarded medical benefits as well as temporary total disability benefits. The Commission affirmed the award of medical benefits but denied the claim for temporary total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that McKellar’s retirement, rather than his injury, caused his loss of compensation because the record supported the Commission’s finding that McKellar intended to retire and not seek other employment income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy commissioner correctly found that McKeller was entitled to temporary total disability compensation because he was totally disabled and lacked all earning capacity. View "McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding" on Justia Law