Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1936, the the Grand View Development Corporation distributed a large tract of real estate in a beach area to its shareholders via a deed. A referenced map included two parallel lines depicting an easement. Between the parallel lines was written “Along Present Mean High Water.” Due to changes in the sand and water levels since 1936, the easement is now under water. Plaintiffs, landowners of some of the properties conveyed by the 1936 deed, sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the location of the express easement moved with the mean high water line as the beach eroded. Defendants asserted that the easement had been extinguished. The circuit court ruled that Plaintiffs had a variable express easement that moved with the mean high water line. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the express easement created by the 1936 deed had been extinguished because the easement never moved from the mean high water line as it existed in 1936. View "Marble Techs., Inc. v. Mallon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Spectra-4 LLP and Spectet Limited Partnership, LLC, individually owned and leased neighboring commercial buildings. Uniwest Commercial Realty provided management services for the commercial buildings. As between Uniwest and Spectra-4, and between Uniwest and Spectet, two separate implied-in-fact contracts existed. The implied-in-fact contracts encompassed specific portions of previously expired express contract executed by a different set of parties. After Plaintiffs terminated Uniwest’s management services for both commercial buildings Uniwest withdrew premature termination fees and copying charges from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts. Plaintiffs filed warrants in debt against Uniwest alleging conversion. Plaintiffs later amended the complaints to include breach of contract claims. The district court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The circuit court reversed and entered judgment in favor of Uniwest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the implied-in-fact contracts permitted Uniwest’s withdrawal of premature termination fees from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts because the implied-in-fact contracts did not include terms and conditions permitting Uniwest to withdraw premature termination fees or copying charges from the operating accounts. View "Spectra-4, LLP v. Uniwest Commercial Realty" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Highways sought to acquire a 387-acre portion of Landowners’ property to facilitate road improvements. Before making an offer, Thomas Savage completed an appraisal ordered by the Commonwealth and valued the entire property at $500,000 and just compensation for the to-be acquired portion at $246,292. The Commissioner deposited $248,707 with the clerk of court, and Landowners withdrew the money. The Commissioner then filed a petition in condemnation requesting that a jury ascertain the value of the property. A second appraisal of the property assessed just compensation for the acquired portion of property at $92,127. During trial, Landowners sought, unsuccessfully, to admit into evidence Savage’s appraisal. A jury found just compensation for Landowners’ property to be $234,032. The trial court held that title in relevant portion of Landowners’ property vested in the Commonwealth and ordered Landowners to repay the Commissioner $14,675. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in finding that oral and written evidence of the property value as determined in the Savage appraisal was an offer to settle and, as such, was inadmissible at trial. Remanded. View "Ramsey v. Comm’r of Highways" on Justia Law

Joseph Tuggle, who lived in a residential group home for men with intellectual disabilities, died after suffering second and third degree burns on his body that were left untreated. Richard Wagoner, the president and owner of the corporation that owned the group home, was subsequently charged with abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult. Wagoner moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove his actions were a proximate cause of Tuggle’s death. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court applied the correct decisional standard in ruling on Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court and court of appeals erred in considering the loss of a substantial possibility of survival as the basis for deciding the motion to set aside the verdict; (2) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict; but (3) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict. View "Wagoner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of distributing child pornography. The court of appeals upheld the convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove distribution because the peer-to-peer software he used to access and download child pornography automatically placed the files into a shared folder accessible to other users of the software. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Defendant reproduced by any means, including by computer, sold, gave away, electronically transmitted, or distributed child pornography in violation of Va. Code 18.2-374.1:1(C)(i). View "Kelley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in an automobile accident in which the vehicles being operated by each of them collided. Plaintiff filed suit and attempted to serve the complaint and summons on Defendant at a prior address despite having knowledge of Defendant’s correct address. Plaintiff subsequently used Defendant’s proper address for service of additional pleadings but did not serve the complaint and summons at his current address. Plaintiff later obtained a default judgment awarding the full amount of damages she claimed. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to set aside the default judgment, averring that there existed some question regarding whether Defendant was validly served with process. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decision whether to grant Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the default judgment was within the circuit court’s discretion; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment. View "Sauder v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

The State Corporation Commission issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of electric transmission facilities. BASF Corporation appealed, challenging the approval of the transmission line’s route across an environmental remediation site on its property along the James River. James City County, Save the James Alliance Trust, and James River Association (collectively, JCC) also appealed, challenging the approval of an overhead transmission line that will cross the James River and a switching station that will be located in James City County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction or application of Va. Code 56-46.1’s requirements that the power company reasonably minimize adverse environmental impacts on the area concerned, and the Commission’s findings were not contrary to the evidence or without evidentiary support; and (2) the Commission erred in concluding that the switching station was a “transmission line” under Va. Code 56-46.1(F) and therefore not subject to local zoning ordinances. Remanded as to the JCC appellants. View "BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Vu Vo filed a lawsuit against Christopher Bartolomucci seeking damages for injuries he sustained in a vehicle collision. Bartolomucci filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that his vehicle he was driving at the time of the collision fell within the scope of the Federal Insurance Company’s insurance policy issued to Bartolomucci’s law firm. The circuit court allowed Bartolomucci’s suit to continue on the theory that he was covered by the policy. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Federal Insurance, holding that the policy did not cover Bartolomucci’s use of the vehicle at the time of the collision. At issue on appeal was the scope and application of the policy, which provided coverage for Bartolomucci’s vehicle only when that vehicle was “used in” the law firm’s business or personal affairs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy did not cover Bartolomucci’s use of the vehicle at the time of the collision because a morning commute by a law firm partner from home to work does not constitute “use” of the partner’s vehicle “in” a law firm’s business or personal affairs. View "Bartolomucci v. Federal Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc. filed a defamation action against three John Doe defendants alleging that they falsely represented themselves as Hadeed customers and posted negative reviews about Hadeed’s services on Yelp, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hadeed issued a subpoena duces tecum to Yelp seeking documents located in California revealing the identity and other information about the reviews’ authors. The circuit court entered an order enforcing the subpoena duces tecum and holding Yelp in civil contempt when it refused to comply. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that service of the subpoena on Yelp’s registered agent in Virginia provided the circuit court with jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena duces tecum. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and the contempt order of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court was not empowered to enforce the subpoena duces tecum against Yelp, as subpoena power was not conferred upon the circuit court by Yelp’s act in registering to conduct business in Virginia or designating a registered agent for service of process in Virginia. View "Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested on warrants charging him with several crimes. The general district court admitted Appellant to bail. The Commonwealth appealed the bail decision. The circuit court admitted Appellant to bail pending trial, setting his bond at $60,000. The Commonwealth again appealed the bail decision. The Court of Appeals revoked the circuit court’s order setting bond and ordered Appellant’s incarceration pending trial, concluding that Appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption against bail in the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its appellate review of the circuit court’s decision. View "Shannon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law