Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a sheriff’s deputy, was terminated after he reported to the sheriff alleged irregularities in several criminal cases. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that his termination was impermissible retaliation in violation of Va. Code 15.2-1512.4, which protects the right of “any local employee” to express opinions to elected officials on matters of public concern. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Plaintiff was not a local employee for the purposes of section 15.2-1512.4. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a sheriff’s deputy, who is not an employee of the sheriff, is not a local employee for purposes of section 15.2-1512.4. View "Roop v. Whitt" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, a native of Ethiopia, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At no time did Appellant’s court-appointed attorney advise Appellant of the collateral consequences of the plea and sentence upon his immigration status. Appellant was subsequently informed that he was subject to removal as a result of his conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced from his counsel’s failure to advise him of the adverse consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice resulted from the attorney’s failure to advise Appellant of the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement. View "Zemene v. Clarke" on Justia Law

EE Mart, LLC brought an action in a Virginia circuit court against Suzanne Delyon, the former chief financial officer of EE Mart, and the other LLCs that she owned, alleging claims relating to insurance proceeds paid to Delyon by Traveler’s Insurance Company (Traveler’s). After it nonsuited the case, EE Mart brought an action against Traveler’s, Delyon, and the other LLCs in a Maryland circuit court relating to Traveler’s payment of the insurance proceeds to Delyon. Delyon and the other LLCs then filed the present action in a Virginia circuit court seeking to enjoin EE Mart from proceeding with the Maryland action and seeking a declaratory judgment that the Maryland action was without merit. EE Mart counterclaimed, asserting the same claims it had pled in the original action. The trial court dismissed EE Mart’s counterclaim with prejudice, finding it was frivolous. Delyon and the other LLCs then sought sanctions against EE Mart, claiming that the original action, Maryland action, and the counterclaim to the present action were frivolous. The trial court granted the motion and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed with regard to the amount of sanctions awarded, holding that the trial court erred in its calculation of the attorney’s fees it could award as a sanction. View "EE Mart F.C., LLC v. Delyon" on Justia Law

A county code compliance investigator issued Appellant a notice of violation regarding her property. The county zoning administrator then determined that Appellant had committed a violation. The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld that violation determination. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to seek judicial review of the BZA’s final decision. Appellant, however, did not name the Board of Supervisors or any other party. The circuit court granted the zoning administrator’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant failed to add the Board of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding within the thirty-day statutory period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with the styling requirement in Va. Code 15.2-2314 is required to trigger the circuit court’s active jurisdiction, and no waiver to the thirty-day filing requirement occurred in this case. View "Frace v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to bring a legal malpractice claim against his criminal defense attorneys and their respective law firms. The circuit court dismissed the criminal malpractice claim on the grounds that the settlement and release of some defendants by way of a release agreement was a release of all defendants. Plaintiff subsequently filed a legal malpractice suit against the law firm that represented him in the criminal malpractice claim (Defendant), arguing that the firm breached its duty to him. A jury found Defendant liable to Plaintiff and awarded judgment in the amount of $5.75 million. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s second plea in bar, reversed the circuit court’s order affirming the jury award, vacated the jury award, and remanded the case, holding that the circuit court erred in refusing to sustain Defendant’s second plea in bar in which Defendant argued that Plaintiff was barred from recovering on his legal malpractice claim because, as a matter of law, Defendant did not breach its duty by failing to correctly anticipate a judicial ruling on an unsettled legal issue. View "Smith v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of Internet solicitation of a minor. The parties agreed that Defendant was accused of soliciting oral sex from a minor and that oral sex between an adult and a minor is an act forbidden by Virginia’s anti-sodomy law, Va. Code 18.2-361(A). After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 18.2-361(A) was facially unconstitutional in light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 18.2-361(A) was constitutional as applied to Defendant because the Lawrence decision did not prevent a state from criminalizing sodomy between an adult and a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-361(A) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant in this instance; and (2) it is proper to prohibit those applications of the statute that are unconstitutional and leaving the constitutional applications of the statute to be enforced. View "Toghill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Debara Brown filed a complaint as executor of the estate of her husband (the decedent), a private investigator, against Ali Al-Ibrahim Abid, alleging that Abid killed the decedent while he was attempting to serve divorce papers on Abid. Brown was granted leave to file an amended complaint to add a wrongful death claim against Sherwin Jacobs, the attorney who hired the decedent to serve Abid, claiming that Jacobs was negligent because he did not warn Abid of the risks of personally serving Abid. The circuit court ultimately dismissed the case against Jacobs with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in sustaining Jacobs’ demurrer to Brown’s amended complaint because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that a special relationship existed between Jacobs and the decedent imposing a duty upon Jacobs to warn the decedent of potential danger from criminal assault by a third party. View "Brown v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed under Va. Code 8.01-654(A)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tolling provision of Va. Code 8.01-229(D) was applicable to the limitations period of section 8.01-654(A)(2), and therefore, it was error to conclude that Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was untimely; but (2) because the allegedly withheld evidence was not material, Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the error. View "Hicks v. Dir., Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

The City of Fredericksburg brought suit against CVAS 2, LLC, which owns real estate within the City’s geographic area, seeking to have CVAS 2’s real estate sold in order to collect the LLC’s outstanding payments for delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. The circuit court entered a decree of sale ordering that CVAS 2’s real estate be sold in gross to pay the delinquent taxes, penalties and special assessments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City did not strictly comply with Va. Code 15.2-5158 and 58.1-3965(A) allowing for it to bring suit under the circumstances, and therefore, the circuit court lacked authority to order the sale of CVAS 2’s real estate. View "CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the sale of Tails, Inc. Tails was organized as a Virginia corporation but changed its state of incorporation to Delaware as part of a Plan of Reorganization and Purchase Agreement pursuant to which all of the assets of Tails were eventually sold to Buena Suerte Holdings, Inc. Certain Minority Shareholders filed a complaint demanding shareholder appraisal rights, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding whether the transactions leading to the sale gave rise to appraisal rights for the Minority Shareholders and requesting monetary damages for violations of the alleged appraisal rights. The circuit court sustained Tails’s demurrer to the complaint, noting (1) changing the Tails corporate domicile from Virginia to Delaware did not trigger appraisal rights, and (2) the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to support the causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the domestication of Tails as a Delaware corporation did not entitle the Minority Shareholders to appraisal rights; and (2) Delaware law properly applied in determining whether the Minority Shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights, and, under Delaware law, they were not. View "Fisher v. Tails, Inc." on Justia Law