Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for the Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority (ARHA) before being discharged for violating ARHA’s “absenteeism and tardiness policies.” Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court claiming that she had been improperly discharged. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement and her claim for money damages but held that Plaintiff was entitled to have her claims arbitrated under ARHA’s grievance procedure. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of ARHA, holding that the circuit court misapplied Va. Code 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b) and erred in ordering ARHA to arbitrate Plaintiff’s grievance. View "Alexandria Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its deed of trust on certain property was a valid first priority lien on the property. Defendant filed an answer requesting a declaration that its deed of trust was a valid first priority lien on the property. The circuit court ruled that Defendant’s deed of trust had priority over Bank’s deed of trust and that Va. Code 55-52, which codifies the doctrine of after-acquired title, could not elevate Bank’s deed of trust over Defendant’s deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 55-52 only applies between the parties to a deed and does not affect the rights of third parties or influence the relative priority of their interests; (2) a party who acquires a deed of trust pursuant to a court order is a lien creditor for purposes of section 55-96(A); and (3) a prior deed of trust recorded outside a party’s chain of title is not “duly admitted to record” for purposes of 55-96(A). View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Arrington" on Justia Law

In 1936, the the Grand View Development Corporation distributed a large tract of real estate in a beach area to its shareholders via a deed. A referenced map included two parallel lines depicting an easement. Between the parallel lines was written “Along Present Mean High Water.” Due to changes in the sand and water levels since 1936, the easement is now under water. Plaintiffs, landowners of some of the properties conveyed by the 1936 deed, sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the location of the express easement moved with the mean high water line as the beach eroded. Defendants asserted that the easement had been extinguished. The circuit court ruled that Plaintiffs had a variable express easement that moved with the mean high water line. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the express easement created by the 1936 deed had been extinguished because the easement never moved from the mean high water line as it existed in 1936. View "Marble Techs., Inc. v. Mallon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Spectra-4 LLP and Spectet Limited Partnership, LLC, individually owned and leased neighboring commercial buildings. Uniwest Commercial Realty provided management services for the commercial buildings. As between Uniwest and Spectra-4, and between Uniwest and Spectet, two separate implied-in-fact contracts existed. The implied-in-fact contracts encompassed specific portions of previously expired express contract executed by a different set of parties. After Plaintiffs terminated Uniwest’s management services for both commercial buildings Uniwest withdrew premature termination fees and copying charges from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts. Plaintiffs filed warrants in debt against Uniwest alleging conversion. Plaintiffs later amended the complaints to include breach of contract claims. The district court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The circuit court reversed and entered judgment in favor of Uniwest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the implied-in-fact contracts permitted Uniwest’s withdrawal of premature termination fees from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts because the implied-in-fact contracts did not include terms and conditions permitting Uniwest to withdraw premature termination fees or copying charges from the operating accounts. View "Spectra-4, LLP v. Uniwest Commercial Realty" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Highways sought to acquire a 387-acre portion of Landowners’ property to facilitate road improvements. Before making an offer, Thomas Savage completed an appraisal ordered by the Commonwealth and valued the entire property at $500,000 and just compensation for the to-be acquired portion at $246,292. The Commissioner deposited $248,707 with the clerk of court, and Landowners withdrew the money. The Commissioner then filed a petition in condemnation requesting that a jury ascertain the value of the property. A second appraisal of the property assessed just compensation for the acquired portion of property at $92,127. During trial, Landowners sought, unsuccessfully, to admit into evidence Savage’s appraisal. A jury found just compensation for Landowners’ property to be $234,032. The trial court held that title in relevant portion of Landowners’ property vested in the Commonwealth and ordered Landowners to repay the Commissioner $14,675. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in finding that oral and written evidence of the property value as determined in the Savage appraisal was an offer to settle and, as such, was inadmissible at trial. Remanded. View "Ramsey v. Comm’r of Highways" on Justia Law

Joseph Tuggle, who lived in a residential group home for men with intellectual disabilities, died after suffering second and third degree burns on his body that were left untreated. Richard Wagoner, the president and owner of the corporation that owned the group home, was subsequently charged with abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult. Wagoner moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove his actions were a proximate cause of Tuggle’s death. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court applied the correct decisional standard in ruling on Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court and court of appeals erred in considering the loss of a substantial possibility of survival as the basis for deciding the motion to set aside the verdict; (2) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict; but (3) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict. View "Wagoner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of distributing child pornography. The court of appeals upheld the convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove distribution because the peer-to-peer software he used to access and download child pornography automatically placed the files into a shared folder accessible to other users of the software. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Defendant reproduced by any means, including by computer, sold, gave away, electronically transmitted, or distributed child pornography in violation of Va. Code 18.2-374.1:1(C)(i). View "Kelley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in an automobile accident in which the vehicles being operated by each of them collided. Plaintiff filed suit and attempted to serve the complaint and summons on Defendant at a prior address despite having knowledge of Defendant’s correct address. Plaintiff subsequently used Defendant’s proper address for service of additional pleadings but did not serve the complaint and summons at his current address. Plaintiff later obtained a default judgment awarding the full amount of damages she claimed. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to set aside the default judgment, averring that there existed some question regarding whether Defendant was validly served with process. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decision whether to grant Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the default judgment was within the circuit court’s discretion; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment. View "Sauder v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

The State Corporation Commission issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of electric transmission facilities. BASF Corporation appealed, challenging the approval of the transmission line’s route across an environmental remediation site on its property along the James River. James City County, Save the James Alliance Trust, and James River Association (collectively, JCC) also appealed, challenging the approval of an overhead transmission line that will cross the James River and a switching station that will be located in James City County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction or application of Va. Code 56-46.1’s requirements that the power company reasonably minimize adverse environmental impacts on the area concerned, and the Commission’s findings were not contrary to the evidence or without evidentiary support; and (2) the Commission erred in concluding that the switching station was a “transmission line” under Va. Code 56-46.1(F) and therefore not subject to local zoning ordinances. Remanded as to the JCC appellants. View "BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Vu Vo filed a lawsuit against Christopher Bartolomucci seeking damages for injuries he sustained in a vehicle collision. Bartolomucci filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that his vehicle he was driving at the time of the collision fell within the scope of the Federal Insurance Company’s insurance policy issued to Bartolomucci’s law firm. The circuit court allowed Bartolomucci’s suit to continue on the theory that he was covered by the policy. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Federal Insurance, holding that the policy did not cover Bartolomucci’s use of the vehicle at the time of the collision. At issue on appeal was the scope and application of the policy, which provided coverage for Bartolomucci’s vehicle only when that vehicle was “used in” the law firm’s business or personal affairs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy did not cover Bartolomucci’s use of the vehicle at the time of the collision because a morning commute by a law firm partner from home to work does not constitute “use” of the partner’s vehicle “in” a law firm’s business or personal affairs. View "Bartolomucci v. Federal Ins. Co." on Justia Law