Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant made a conditional plea of guilty to charges of cocaine distribution and unlawful possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, claiming that police officers unlawfully entered his apartment and seized his weapons and drugs. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantees entry by the policy officers into Defendant’s apartment, and the trial court did not thus err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Evans v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Based on an anonymous tip implicating Defendant, Defendant was arrested and charged with abduction, robbery, and statutory burglary. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for retrial, concluding that the trial court erred by admitting a police officer to testify as to the specific content of the anonymous tip that implicated Defendant in violation of Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in reversing Defendant’s convictions but on narrower, non-constitutional grounds, holding that the officer’s testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, and its admission was not harmless under non-constitutional principles. View "Commonwealth v. Swann" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning the care and custody of the children of Kristin Burns, the circuit court enjoined Burns from pursuing any further action until after she completed certain mental and parental fitness evaluations. On March 25, 2015, the court denied Burns’ motion for leave to file documents in this matter for the reasons stated in its previous order. On the fifteenth day after entry of the March 25, 2015, when her petition for review was due, Burns dispatched the petition to the Clerk’s Office of the Court of Appeals by pre-paid transmittal with a third-party commercial carrier for next-day delivery. The Court of Appeals denied the petition as untimely, concluding that Burns did not file the petition within fifteen days of entry of the March 25, 2015 order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for purposes of Va. Code 8.01-626, a petition for review is deemed to have been “presented to a judge of the Court of Appeals" when it has been filed with the Clerk’s Office of the Court of Appeals; and (2) therefore, Burns’ petition was timely filed with the Court of Appeals. View "Burns v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs applied for a special use permit requesting a permit to operate a boarding kennel in accordance with Clark County Zoning Ordinances. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, a nearby neighbor and member of the Clarke County Planning Commission, alleging defamation and tortious interference with a contract. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendant sent defamatory emails and made false public statements defaming Plaintiffs. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s demurrer on all counts, concluding that the statements were not defamatory and were protective by legislative immunity and that the allegations did not set forth a claim for tortious interference. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) none of the disputed statements by Defendant were sufficiently defamatory in nature to survive demurrer; and (2) the allegations failed to state a claim for tortious interference with contract. View "Schaecher v. Bouffault" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was fired, his former supervisor swore out a misdemeanor assault and battery complaint against Plaintiff for events that allegedly occurred immediately after Plaintiff’s termination. The supervisor also told other employees at Plaintiff’s former workplace that Plaintiff had cut or stabbed him. The misdemeanor assault and battery charge was later dismissed. Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former supervisor and his former employer (collectively, Defendants) alleging malicious prosecution and defamation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of Plaintiff’s work history and quality of past job performance, as the excluded evidence was probative of future lost income, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to subject Plaintiff’s former employer to punitive damages liability. Remanded. View "Egan v. Butler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned property located in the City of Norfolk. Gary and Margaret Cordovana owned the property located on one side of Plaintiff’s property, and 1273 West Ocean View, LLC and Dion Hayle (collectively, “1273 WOV”) owned the property on the other side of Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff sued the Cordovanas and 1273 WOV alleging that Defendants were directing large quantities of water run-off and pollutants from their properties onto Plaintiff’s property. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege a valid cause of action for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se. View "Collett v. Cordovana" on Justia Law

Douglas and Wanda Evans obtained title to a parcel of real property as tenants by the entirety with right of survivorship by way of a deed. In 1976, Douglas executed a general warranty deed purporting to convey to Wanda all of his interest in the property. In 1993, Wanda executed a deed purporting to convey by general warranty “all of her interest in” the property to herself as trustee of the Wanda S. Evans Trust, which granted the property to her son, William, subject to a life estate in Douglas. After both Wanda and Douglas died, William filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to quiet title int he property. The circuit court concluded that the 1993 deed was ineffective to transfer any interest in the property to the trust because the 1976 deed was ineffective to divest Douglas of his interest since it was not executed by both Douglas and Wanda as grantors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the 1976 deed was ineffective and void because there was sufficient evidence to establish the mutual consent of Douglas and Wanda to the conversion of their tenancy by the entirety ownership of the property to the fee simple ownership in Wanda. View "Evans v. Evans" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff bought a parcel of property from Fauber Enterprises, Inc., the basement of the house flooded when it rained. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Fauber, Fauber’s real estate agent, and others, alleging violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the instructions given on the standard of proof were incorrect. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plaintiff must prove a violation of the VCPA by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by concluding that Plaintiff was required to prove her VCPA claims by clear and convincing evidence. Remanded. View "Ballagh v. Fauber Enters." on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Defendant to represent her in a criminal matter. After a trial, Plaintiff was found guilty of felony assault and battery. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that she was deprived of her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The habeas court granted the petition and vacated Plaintiff’s conviction, concluding that Defendant’s representation was constitutionally deficient. Plaintiff subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor assault and battery. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against Defendant alleging that Defendant’s actions during the original criminal matter constituted malpractice. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because she was not actually innocent of the criminal act of assault that gave rise to the criminal matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of pleading that the pecuniary injury she sought to recover was proximately caused by Defendant’s legal malpractice, rather than being proximately caused by her criminal actions. View "Desetti v. Chester" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an LLC formed to own, develop, and sell real estate. Defendants were two entities formed to develop and sell real estate under the management and control of two of Plaintiff’s managers. The managers transferred funds from Plaintiff to Defendants, which used the funds to develop and sell their respective properties. Plaintiff was later dissolved, and a liquidating trustee appointed by the circuit court demanded the immediate repayment of the money owed by Defendants to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking the imposition of constructive trusts on Defendants’ respective properties and proceeds from the sale of their properties. The circuit court granted Defendants’ plea in bar and dismissed the amended complaint, concluding that the complaint was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not prove its entitlement to the tolling of the statute of limitations. View "Birchwood-Manassas Assocs., LLC v. Birchwood at Oak Knoll Farm, LLC" on Justia Law