Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Fairfax County School Board suspended Plaintiff, a food and nutrition services manager at Twain Middle School, without pay for three days for allegedly violating Fairfax County Public Schools regulations. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Va. Code 22.1-315(A) requires school boards to conduct a hearing prior to suspending an employee without pay. The circuit court granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute does not require a school board to hold a hearing prior to suspending a non-teaching employee without pay for fewer than five days. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of the statute. View "Payne v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

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This case concerned a dispute over the disposition of shares of stock in a family held business after the death of the business’s founding generation. Plaintiff, one of the founder’s children and a stockholder, filed suit after the death of her mother, Norma, to whom shares in the business were transferred upon the founder’s death. Plaintiff alleged that a shareholders’ agreement controlled disposition of Norma’s shares and that the business was required to purchase those shares. Defendants argued that Norma’s estate planning documents controlled the disposition of Norma’s stock, and accordingly, those shares were to go into an inter vivos trust. The circuit court concluded that the shares were to pass to the inter vivos trust established by Norma’s estate planning documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shareholders’ agreement governed disposition of Norma’s shares of the business’s stock. View "Jimenez v. Corr" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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Defendant, a divorced mother of three minor children, was prosecuted under Va. Code 22.1-254 and -263 for failing to ensure that her children arrived at school in a timely manner. The circuit court convicted Defendant of three Class 3 misdemeanors, one per child. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 22.1-254, which requires compulsory school attendance, should not be applied to prosecute tardiness when a child was otherwise enrolled in and regularly attending school. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s convictions, holding that section 22.1-254(A) cannot be construed in a manner that encompasses tardiness. View "Blake v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of “expos[ing] his . . . sexual or genital part” to a minor child in violation of Va. Code 18.2-370(A)(1). Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court had applied an improper definition of the term “expose.” The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that “expose” means not only to lay bare to view but to feel or touch, and therefore, because Defendant “made known” his bare penis to the victim’s touch, he physically and tactilely exposed his genital part to the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the term “expose” under section 18.2-370(A)(1) includes tactile exposure, as exposure is limited to a visual display where the child saw, or could have seen, the uncovered genitalia; and (2) the evidence in this case was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction under one count of the indictment. View "Farhoumand v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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At a cookout Daniel Hylton was hosting, eight-year-old Tabitha Lasley was injured when she was thrown to the ground from an ATV she had been operating. Tabitha’s father, Gene Mosley, was present and supervising Tabitha during the incident. Tabitha and her mother, Juanita Lasley (collectively, Lasley), filed a complaint alleging that Hylton had been negligent and grossly negligent by allowing and assisting Tabitha to operate the ATV. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Hylton, concluding that Hylton had no duty to Tabitha that could support a finding of negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a child’s parent is present and supervising and knows of risks associated with an activity, a host does not breach the duty of reasonable care when he allows the child to participate in an activity with the parent’s permission; and (2) Hylton satisfied his duty of reasonable care to Tabitha when he ensured that Tabitha was being supervised by Moseley and had his permission to ride the ATV. View "Lasley v. Hylton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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DHRI, Inc. entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of land from William Hanback. DHRI later sued Defendant for specific performance of the land purchase contract. On June 9, 2004, the trial court entered a decree providing that Hanback should sell the property to DHRI and DHRI should pay to Hancock certain sums. On November 21, 2012, Hancock filed a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that after closing on the property, DHRI refused to pay funds owed him under the June 9, 2004 order. After a hearing, the circuit court issued a rule to show cause to DHRI. The court then determined that DHRI had not paid Hancock the required amount of $350,000, found DHRI in contempt of the June 9, 2004 order, and entered judgment for Defendant against Plaintiff in the amount of $350,000. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the rule to show cause, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion because the June 9, 2004 order did not contain definite terms as to the total amount DRHI was required to pay and when such payment was due. View "DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. Here the Supreme Court considered Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Commonwealth did not commit Brady violations or present false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected; (2) Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s claims were either barred or without merit. View "Lawlor v. Warden" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendant, an oral maxillofacial surgeon, after Defendant’s thwarted attempted to extract three of Plaintiff’s wisdom teeth resulted in permanent numbness in Plaintiff’s lower left jaw area. Plaintiff contended that Defendant was negligent in failing to properly diagnose the condition of his wisdom teeth and in recommending and performing the teeth extractions. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of the risk of surgery discussions between him and Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in excluding from evidence Defendant’s risk of surgery discussions with Plaintiff. View "Fiorucci v. Chinn" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of statutory burglary in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-91. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the Commonwealth established only that he went into a crawl space underneath a dwelling house and failed to prove that he actually broke into and entered the actual house. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that the crawl space in this case constituted part of the dwelling house. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the crawl space was structurally part of the dwelling house, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction of statutory burglary. View "Grimes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was convicted of possession of counterfeit currency in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-173 after being found with eighteen twenty-dollar bills on his person that were counterfeit. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, as the Commonwealth failed to prove that he possessed the bills, that he knew they were forged, or that he had the intent to utter or employ them as true. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances were sufficient to support an inference that Defendant possessed the bills, knew the bills to be counterfeit, and had the requisite intent to utter the counterfeit money in his possession. View "Hawkins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law