Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002, James Edmonds executed a will that left all of his personal property to his wife, Elizabeth, and the remainder of his property to a revocable living trust. After James died, his original will could not be located. Elizabeth filed a complaint seeking to have a copy of the will and trust to be probated. The trial court ordered that a photocopy of the 2002 will be probated, concluding that Elizabeth had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not revoked. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that James did not destroy the original 2002 will with the intention of revoking it. View "Edmonds v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

A seven-year-old first grade student died at school as a result of a severe allergic reaction to a peanut provided to her by a classmate. The tragic death of the child received widespread publicity in local, national, and international news reports that contained many statements and comments made by Defendants, several school and county health department officials. Plaintiff, the student’s mother, brought this action claiming that Defendants’ statements were maliciously designed to divert public indignation from the failures of Defendants to exercise proper care for the child by falsely implying and insinuating that Plaintiff bore responsibility for the death of her child. The circuit court sustained Defendants’ demurrer and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that complaint set forth facts that, if taken as true, were sufficient to support a cause of action for defamation. View "Pendleton v. Newsome" on Justia Law

Julia Cain and her daughters Raven and Reannah Cain filed a personal injury complaint against Defendant, who rear-ended them while they were driving. After a trial, the jury awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages to Raven, $5,000 in compensatory damages to Reannah, $2,000 in compensatory damages to Julia, and $500 in punitive damages to each plaintiff. The Cains appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of Defendant’s post-accident conduct; but (2) the trial court erred in giving an instruction addressing the disfavored nature of punitive damages, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "Cain v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for damages arising from a vehicle accident. Defendant admitted liability, and the case was tried before a jury on the issue of damages. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $9,000. The circuit court granted Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and for additur for a total award of $197,513. Upon Defendant’s election declining to accept the additur award, the circuit court awarded Plaintiff a new trial. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in setting aside the jury verdict and awarding additur. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict in the amount of $9,000, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court should not have set aside the first verdict. View "Cosby v. Clem" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority (ARHA) before being discharged for violating ARHA’s “absenteeism and tardiness policies.” Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court claiming that she had been improperly discharged. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement and her claim for money damages but held that Plaintiff was entitled to have her claims arbitrated under ARHA’s grievance procedure. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of ARHA, holding that the circuit court misapplied Va. Code 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b) and erred in ordering ARHA to arbitrate Plaintiff’s grievance. View "Alexandria Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its deed of trust on certain property was a valid first priority lien on the property. Defendant filed an answer requesting a declaration that its deed of trust was a valid first priority lien on the property. The circuit court ruled that Defendant’s deed of trust had priority over Bank’s deed of trust and that Va. Code 55-52, which codifies the doctrine of after-acquired title, could not elevate Bank’s deed of trust over Defendant’s deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 55-52 only applies between the parties to a deed and does not affect the rights of third parties or influence the relative priority of their interests; (2) a party who acquires a deed of trust pursuant to a court order is a lien creditor for purposes of section 55-96(A); and (3) a prior deed of trust recorded outside a party’s chain of title is not “duly admitted to record” for purposes of 55-96(A). View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Arrington" on Justia Law

In 1936, the the Grand View Development Corporation distributed a large tract of real estate in a beach area to its shareholders via a deed. A referenced map included two parallel lines depicting an easement. Between the parallel lines was written “Along Present Mean High Water.” Due to changes in the sand and water levels since 1936, the easement is now under water. Plaintiffs, landowners of some of the properties conveyed by the 1936 deed, sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the location of the express easement moved with the mean high water line as the beach eroded. Defendants asserted that the easement had been extinguished. The circuit court ruled that Plaintiffs had a variable express easement that moved with the mean high water line. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the express easement created by the 1936 deed had been extinguished because the easement never moved from the mean high water line as it existed in 1936. View "Marble Techs., Inc. v. Mallon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Spectra-4 LLP and Spectet Limited Partnership, LLC, individually owned and leased neighboring commercial buildings. Uniwest Commercial Realty provided management services for the commercial buildings. As between Uniwest and Spectra-4, and between Uniwest and Spectet, two separate implied-in-fact contracts existed. The implied-in-fact contracts encompassed specific portions of previously expired express contract executed by a different set of parties. After Plaintiffs terminated Uniwest’s management services for both commercial buildings Uniwest withdrew premature termination fees and copying charges from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts. Plaintiffs filed warrants in debt against Uniwest alleging conversion. Plaintiffs later amended the complaints to include breach of contract claims. The district court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The circuit court reversed and entered judgment in favor of Uniwest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the implied-in-fact contracts permitted Uniwest’s withdrawal of premature termination fees from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts because the implied-in-fact contracts did not include terms and conditions permitting Uniwest to withdraw premature termination fees or copying charges from the operating accounts. View "Spectra-4, LLP v. Uniwest Commercial Realty" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Highways sought to acquire a 387-acre portion of Landowners’ property to facilitate road improvements. Before making an offer, Thomas Savage completed an appraisal ordered by the Commonwealth and valued the entire property at $500,000 and just compensation for the to-be acquired portion at $246,292. The Commissioner deposited $248,707 with the clerk of court, and Landowners withdrew the money. The Commissioner then filed a petition in condemnation requesting that a jury ascertain the value of the property. A second appraisal of the property assessed just compensation for the acquired portion of property at $92,127. During trial, Landowners sought, unsuccessfully, to admit into evidence Savage’s appraisal. A jury found just compensation for Landowners’ property to be $234,032. The trial court held that title in relevant portion of Landowners’ property vested in the Commonwealth and ordered Landowners to repay the Commissioner $14,675. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in finding that oral and written evidence of the property value as determined in the Savage appraisal was an offer to settle and, as such, was inadmissible at trial. Remanded. View "Ramsey v. Comm’r of Highways" on Justia Law

Joseph Tuggle, who lived in a residential group home for men with intellectual disabilities, died after suffering second and third degree burns on his body that were left untreated. Richard Wagoner, the president and owner of the corporation that owned the group home, was subsequently charged with abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult. Wagoner moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove his actions were a proximate cause of Tuggle’s death. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court applied the correct decisional standard in ruling on Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court and court of appeals erred in considering the loss of a substantial possibility of survival as the basis for deciding the motion to set aside the verdict; (2) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict; but (3) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict. View "Wagoner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law