Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether quetiapine, which is a Schedule VI controlled substance, is a “controlled substance subject to abuse” within the meaning of Va. Code 18.2-247(B)(ii). Defendant was charged with distribution of an imitation Schedule I or II controlled substance for distributing quetiapine and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion to strike, arguing that he could only be convicted of a misdemeanor for selling a Schedule VI drug because the substance was already a controlled substance. The trial court denied the motion to strike and found Defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that (1) Defendant distributed an imitation controlled substance, (2) the substance was in a form such that it could be mistaken for a Schedule I or II controlled substance, and (3) Defendant made an implied representation that the substance was a Schedule I or II controlled substance. View "Powell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a complaint alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium violated Va. Code 36-96.3(B)(ii) by failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules or services that were necessary to afford Michael Fishel equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. Fishel and his wife moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging additional causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Windsor Plaza. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the evidence relating to conversion of a bicycle storage space into an accessible parking space supported a claim for reasonable modification rather than a claim for reasonable accommodation; (2) did not err in ruling granting Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike; (3) erred in ruling that Windsor Plaza’s request for attorney’s fees against the Commonwealth was not barred by sovereign immunity, but the error was harmless; (4) did not err in concluding that the statute of limitations barred the Fishels’ additional claims; and (5) did not err by refusing to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees against the Fischels. View "Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs hired Defendants, an automotive business and its owner, to repair and restore a 1960 Ford Thunderbird. After disputes arose between the parties, Plaintiffs filed this action in the circuit court alleging breach of contract, violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), fraud and detinue. Defendants moved to strike Plaintiffs’ evidence as to all counts. The trial court granted the motion as to the fraud and VCPA counts. After a trial on the breach of contract count, the jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) striking the evidence after commenting that two witnesses were “believable” and “credible,” as the comments did not usurp the function of the jury; and (2) striking the evidence on the VCPA claim because the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury. View "Owens v. DRS Auto. FantomWorks, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fairfax County School Board suspended Plaintiff, a food and nutrition services manager at Twain Middle School, without pay for three days for allegedly violating Fairfax County Public Schools regulations. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Va. Code 22.1-315(A) requires school boards to conduct a hearing prior to suspending an employee without pay. The circuit court granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute does not require a school board to hold a hearing prior to suspending a non-teaching employee without pay for fewer than five days. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of the statute. View "Payne v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over the disposition of shares of stock in a family held business after the death of the business’s founding generation. Plaintiff, one of the founder’s children and a stockholder, filed suit after the death of her mother, Norma, to whom shares in the business were transferred upon the founder’s death. Plaintiff alleged that a shareholders’ agreement controlled disposition of Norma’s shares and that the business was required to purchase those shares. Defendants argued that Norma’s estate planning documents controlled the disposition of Norma’s stock, and accordingly, those shares were to go into an inter vivos trust. The circuit court concluded that the shares were to pass to the inter vivos trust established by Norma’s estate planning documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shareholders’ agreement governed disposition of Norma’s shares of the business’s stock. View "Jimenez v. Corr" on Justia Law

Defendant, a divorced mother of three minor children, was prosecuted under Va. Code 22.1-254 and -263 for failing to ensure that her children arrived at school in a timely manner. The circuit court convicted Defendant of three Class 3 misdemeanors, one per child. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 22.1-254, which requires compulsory school attendance, should not be applied to prosecute tardiness when a child was otherwise enrolled in and regularly attending school. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s convictions, holding that section 22.1-254(A) cannot be construed in a manner that encompasses tardiness. View "Blake v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of “expos[ing] his . . . sexual or genital part” to a minor child in violation of Va. Code 18.2-370(A)(1). Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court had applied an improper definition of the term “expose.” The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that “expose” means not only to lay bare to view but to feel or touch, and therefore, because Defendant “made known” his bare penis to the victim’s touch, he physically and tactilely exposed his genital part to the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the term “expose” under section 18.2-370(A)(1) includes tactile exposure, as exposure is limited to a visual display where the child saw, or could have seen, the uncovered genitalia; and (2) the evidence in this case was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction under one count of the indictment. View "Farhoumand v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At a cookout Daniel Hylton was hosting, eight-year-old Tabitha Lasley was injured when she was thrown to the ground from an ATV she had been operating. Tabitha’s father, Gene Mosley, was present and supervising Tabitha during the incident. Tabitha and her mother, Juanita Lasley (collectively, Lasley), filed a complaint alleging that Hylton had been negligent and grossly negligent by allowing and assisting Tabitha to operate the ATV. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Hylton, concluding that Hylton had no duty to Tabitha that could support a finding of negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a child’s parent is present and supervising and knows of risks associated with an activity, a host does not breach the duty of reasonable care when he allows the child to participate in an activity with the parent’s permission; and (2) Hylton satisfied his duty of reasonable care to Tabitha when he ensured that Tabitha was being supervised by Moseley and had his permission to ride the ATV. View "Lasley v. Hylton" on Justia Law

DHRI, Inc. entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of land from William Hanback. DHRI later sued Defendant for specific performance of the land purchase contract. On June 9, 2004, the trial court entered a decree providing that Hanback should sell the property to DHRI and DHRI should pay to Hancock certain sums. On November 21, 2012, Hancock filed a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that after closing on the property, DHRI refused to pay funds owed him under the June 9, 2004 order. After a hearing, the circuit court issued a rule to show cause to DHRI. The court then determined that DHRI had not paid Hancock the required amount of $350,000, found DHRI in contempt of the June 9, 2004 order, and entered judgment for Defendant against Plaintiff in the amount of $350,000. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the rule to show cause, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion because the June 9, 2004 order did not contain definite terms as to the total amount DRHI was required to pay and when such payment was due. View "DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. Here the Supreme Court considered Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Commonwealth did not commit Brady violations or present false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected; (2) Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s claims were either barred or without merit. View "Lawlor v. Warden" on Justia Law