Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice against healthcare providers (Defendants). During pretrial discovery, Plaintiff filed two separate motions to compel, which the trial court denied. Prior to trial, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a new complaint against the same defendants alleging the same cause of action. The trial court entered an agreed order incorporating the discovery conducted and taken in the 2010 action into the 2012 action. After the jury returned a defense verdict, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary rulings, challenging the trial court’s denial of her motions to compel in the nonsuited action. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court’s agreed order did not expressly incorporate the motions, objections, or rulings made by the court in the 2010 nonsuit action into the 2012 action, these rulings could not be challenged in this appeal. View "Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a severance deed conveying ownership of, and the right to remove, coal and timber underlying and appurtenant to a certain tract of land. The parties to this appeal were the successors-in-interest to the grantors named in the severance deed (the Surface Owners) and the successor-in-interest to the grantees of the coal rights named in the deed (the Coal Owner). The Surface Owners and the Coal Owner asserted conflicting claims to royalties generated by the extraction of coal bed methane gas (CBM) from the coal seams underlying the property. The Surface Owners filed this declaratory judgment action against the Coal Owner asserting that they were the sole owners of the CBM produced from their land and that they were entitled to all the royalties therefrom. The circuit court granted judgment for the Surface Owners, declaring that the Surface Owners owned the CBM and were entitled to receive the royalties therefrom. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Surface Owners had at all times owned all mineral estates within their lands except coal, and therefore, the Surface Owners were entitled to all royalties accrued from the production of CBM produced from their land and those yet to accrue. View "Swords Creek Land P'ship v. Belcher" on Justia Law

Shellie Rae Rose filed a petition for a protective order against Jeffrey Paul Stephens, her former boyfriend. After a hearing, the circuit court granted Rose’s petition, concluding that Rose had been reasonably placed in apprehension of bodily injury by Stephens’ actions, which constituted stalking. Stephens appealed, arguing that the evidence did not establish the elements of stalking because Rose failed to show that he directed “an act of violence, force or threat” toward her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding of stalking on the part of Stephens, and therefore, the court did not err in granting Rose’s petition for a protective order. View "Stephens v. Rose" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated sexual battery for offenses committed against his stepdaughter. As a condition of Defendant’s probation, the court ordered that Defendant submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer. Defendant challenged this probation condition on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the condition was reasonable under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probation condition at issue was not reasonable in light of the offenses for which Defendant was convicted, his background, and the surrounding circumstances. View "Murry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Stacy McMahon (McMahon) and Melanie White Wirick (Wirick), formerly Melanie White, were the biological parents of Addison Grace White (Addison). McMahon and Wirick were never married. When Addison reached school age, the parties agreed that McMahon would have primary physical custody of Addison during hte school year and Wirick would have primary physical custody during the summer. McMahon later filed a petition seeking to change Addison’s surname from White to McMahon. Wirick objected to the name change. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that a name change was not in Addison’s best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err to the extent that it relied on the holding in Spero v. Heath to determine whether the name change was in Addison’s best interest; and (2) did not err in concluding that the name change was not in Addison’s best interest. View "McMahon v. Wirick" on Justia Law

Loudoun County’s Board of Supervisors required the Loudoun County Sheriff’s Office to implement three employment practices to reduce the hours that would be considered overtime. The Board also raised the number of hours constituting the law-enforcement employees’ regularly scheduled work hours. Certain law-enforcement employees, including deputies who worked on patrol, filed suit against the County, the Sheriff’s Office, and the Sheriff, alleging that Defendants violated state and federal law by wrongfully calculating and underpaying overtime hours. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the patrol deputies’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) two of the employment practices adopted by the Sheriff’s Office violated the Virginia Gap Pay Act; and (2) the remaining employment practice neither violated the Act nor violated the employees’ contractual employment rights. View "Bailey v. County of Loudoun" on Justia Law

Patricia Kohn, the wife of John Kohn and the administrator of her husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death complaint against several officers and instructors associated with the Norfolk Police Department and the Norfolk Police Academy, alleging that John died as a result of multiple blows to the head inflicted during his training to become a City of Norfolk police officer. Defendants filed a plea in bar asserting that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the plea in bar and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that the exclusivity provision of the Act barred this action. View "Kohn v. Marquis" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dominion Virginia Power filed an application with the State Corporation Commission seeking approval of a power station and transmission interconnection facilities associated with the generation plant. Dominion’s application also sought approval of a rate adjustment clause (RAC) to recover the costs of the power station and the associated transmission infrastructure. As part of the RAC, Dominion sought an enhancement on its general rate of return on common equity (ROE) for a certain period and proposed applying the enhanced ROE to the costs of the power station and associated transmission infrastructure. The Commission approved the power station and associated transmission infrastructure and allowed Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly interpreted Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(6) to allow Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure associated with the power station and included in the subsection (A)(6) RAC for that facility. View "Attorney Gen. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes associated with the robbery of a victim and the invasion of his home. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing his proffered jury instruction, which should be given if a witness whose testimony is at issue is an accomplice and if his or her testimony is uncorroborated. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal of the proposed jury instruction, concluding that the testimony at issue had been corroborated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the witness here was an accomplice and his testimony was not corroborated, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing Defendant’s proffered jury instruction. Remanded. View "Via v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Decedent was fatally injured when a train struck the dump truck Decedent was operating. RGR, LLC operated a business offloading and reloading lumber adjacent to the railroad tracks. Decedent’s Estate filed a wrongful death action against RGR and others, alleging that Defendants created a hazardous condition by stacking lumber near the railroad tracks, which blocked the view of Decedent so that he could not see the approaching train in time to avoid the collision. The jury returned a verdict for the Estate in the amount of $2.5 million. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and entered final judgment for RGR, holding that the evidence established that Decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because he did not look to see if a train was approaching, and his failure to do so was a proximate cause of the accident. View "RGR, LLC v. Settle" on Justia Law