Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Richmond brought an enforcement action against the owners of real property (Owners) and the lessee of the property (Lessee), seeking removal of a billboard that Lessee maintained on the property, or, in the alternative, an order requiring the billboard to be lowered to a conforming height. Owners and Lessee filed separate complaints for declaratory judgment against the City, alleging that the City could not require removal of the billboard if the City had been paid taxes for more than fifteen years pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2307. The circuit court sustained the demurrers filed by the City and dismissed the complaint, concluding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation and that private property owners did not have the statutory vested rights protections unless a local government chose to adopt an implementing ordinance thereunder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by holding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Lessee leased property owned by Owners pursuant to a lease agreement. A billboard was located on the property that had been declared illegal because it exceeded the permitted height limitations. Lessee and Owners filed a joint application for a variance with the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) to allow the billboard to remain at its existing height. The BZA denied the variance. The circuit court upheld the BZA’s decision. Lessee appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by applying an improper standard of review when considering the BZA’s decision to deny the request for a variance. Remanded. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a petition requesting the circuit court to hold that Donald Gibson was a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act. After a trial, the jury found that Gibson was a sexually violent predator. Upon determining Gibson’s suitability for conditional release, the circuit court shifted the burden of proof to Gibson to demonstrate that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release. The court subsequently concluded that Gibson did not meet the criteria for conditional release and ordered that Gibson be committed to the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services for appropriate treatment and confinement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by requiring Gibson to bear the burden of proof to establish that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release. Remanded. View "Gibson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Jerry Ferguson constructed a causeway extending to an island in the Rappahannock River. Plaintiffs later acquired the property adjacent to the island and causeway and all riparian rights appurtenant to the shoreline. In 1988, Ferguson acquired the island and causeway via quitclaim deed. In 2006, Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a judgment against Ferguson for interfering with their riparian rights. The suit ended with a settlement agreement in which Ferguson agreed to purchase Plaintiffs’ shoreline property. Ferguson defaulted on his payment. In 2010, the circuit court entered an order concluding that Plaintiffs were the owners of the shoreline property and Ferguson owned no shoreline property or riparian rights in the area claimed by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an ejectment action against Ferguson alleging that his oyster house on the island was located within their riparian zone. The circuit court awarded Plaintiffs fee simple possession of the oyster house. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Ferguson could not rely on Va. Code Ann. 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) to defeat Plaintiffs’ claim for ejectment or to establish ownership rights in the bottomlands under the island and causeway; and (2) the circuit court did not err in ordering Ferguson to vacate the oyster house. View "Ferguson v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Shirley Gregg Dean (Shirley) and Marion Casey Dean (Casey) married in 1978. Shirley died in 1999. At the time, Shirley’s daughters (the sisters) decided not to probate their mother’s estate, basing their decision on their belief that Shirley had an oral contract with Casey for him to provide for them in his will. After Casey died in 2010, the sisters sued Casey’s estate for breach of an oral contract between Casey and Shirley. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the sisters, concluding that they carried their burden of proving that there was an oral agreement between Casey and Shirley to leave one-third of Casey’s estate to Shirley’s children if Shirley predeceased Casey. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court ruling that a contract existed between Shirley and Casey, holding that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence as to the terms of the agreement between Casey and Shirley. View "Dean v. Morris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of malicious wounding and robbery. Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for malicious wounding and five years’ imprisonment for robbery, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of malicious wounding and that insufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court of appeals denied the appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the malicious wounding jury instruction. The habeas court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury and the elements of malicious wounding; but (2) Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to the instruction, as the erroneous malicious wounding instruction did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. View "Dominguez v. Pruett" on Justia Law

The American Tradition Institute and Robert Marshall (collectively, “ATI”) sent a request to the University of Virginia (“UVA”), seeking all documents that Dr. Michael Mann, a climate scientist and former professor, had produced and/or received while working for UVA. When ATI failed to receive the documents, it filed a petition for mandamus and injunctive relief in the trial court. The trial court conducted an in camera review of some of the documents UVA designated as exempt from disclosure, and subsequently entered an order finding UVA carried its burden of proof that the records withheld under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act met each of the requirements for exclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by denying the request for disclosure of the documents at issue; and (2) the trial court did not err in allowing UVA to demand a reasonable fee for the cost of reviewing the documents sought under the statutory exclusions. View "American Tradition Inst. v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va." on Justia Law

In 1957, special commissioners, appointed in a partition suit, conveyed to Wilkinson an 18.35-acre tract adjoining Route 704 in Washington County. In 1961, the State Highway Commissioner instituted condemnation, acquiring a 3.83-acre strip of land through the tract for construction of Interstate Highway I-81, leaving a 4.88-acre parcel north of I-81 that retained frontage on Route 704 and a 9.64-acre parcel south of I-81 that became landlocked. Condemnation commissioners awarded Wilkinson $1450 for the land taken and $2450 for damages to the residue property. After the condemnation, Wilkinson gained access to the landlocked tract for farming purposes by renting a neighboring 18-acre tract now owned by the Cliftons. In 2006, Wilkinson discontinued farming and ceased to rent the Clifton property. In 2008, the Cliftons, having failed to reach an agreement with Wilkinson’s widow for a purchase of the landlocked parcel, terminated her permissive use of the access lane and blocked it. Wilkinson sought a declaratory judgment that she had an easement by necessity. The trial court ruled that she was entitled to an easement by necessity. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the tract did not become landlocked by a conveyance from a former owner severing a former unity of title, so no implied grant of a right of ingress and egress arose. View "Clifton v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Ubaldo Rodriguez was an employee the general contractor hired by Leesburg Business Park, LLC (LBP) to construct warehouse buildings on a parcel of undeveloped land owned by LBP. Ubaldo suffered fatal injuries in the course of employment. Cecilia Rodriguez, Ubaldo’s widow and the administrator of his estate, filed a wrongful death action against LBP. LBP filed a plea in bar, which the circuit court granted on the grounds that Cecilia’s claim was barred because Ubaldo was the statutory co-employee of LBP. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, LBP moved to reconsider its plea in bar, arguing that it was Ubaldo’s statutory employer and that Cecilia’s recovery was limited to Workers’ Compensation benefits only. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ubaldo’s work at the time of the accident was not part of LBP’s “trade, business, or occupation,” and therefore, LBP was not Ubaldo’s statutory employer at the time of the accident under Va. Code Ann. 65.2-302(A). Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Leesburg Bus. Park, LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, alleging claims for tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with business expectancy, and business conspiracy. The district court (1) dismissed the business conspiracy claim for failure to allege an unlawful act or purpose, and (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining two tort claims as barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Va. Code Ann. 8.01-248, thus rejecting Plaintiff’s contention that his tortious interference claims constituted an injury to his property, which would be subject to a five-year statute of limitations under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243(B). Plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit entered an order of certification requesting the Virginia Supreme Court to answer two questions of law. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) causes of action for tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with business expectancy qualify as the requisite unlawful act to proceed on a business conspiracy claim under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-499 and -500; and (2) the five-year statute of limitations in section 8.01-243(B) applies to claims of tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with business expectancy because both claims involve injury to property rights. View "Dunlap v. Cottman Transmissions Sys., LLC" on Justia Law