Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At a cookout Daniel Hylton was hosting, eight-year-old Tabitha Lasley was injured when she was thrown to the ground from an ATV she had been operating. Tabitha’s father, Gene Mosley, was present and supervising Tabitha during the incident. Tabitha and her mother, Juanita Lasley (collectively, Lasley), filed a complaint alleging that Hylton had been negligent and grossly negligent by allowing and assisting Tabitha to operate the ATV. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Hylton, concluding that Hylton had no duty to Tabitha that could support a finding of negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a child’s parent is present and supervising and knows of risks associated with an activity, a host does not breach the duty of reasonable care when he allows the child to participate in an activity with the parent’s permission; and (2) Hylton satisfied his duty of reasonable care to Tabitha when he ensured that Tabitha was being supervised by Moseley and had his permission to ride the ATV. View "Lasley v. Hylton" on Justia Law

DHRI, Inc. entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of land from William Hanback. DHRI later sued Defendant for specific performance of the land purchase contract. On June 9, 2004, the trial court entered a decree providing that Hanback should sell the property to DHRI and DHRI should pay to Hancock certain sums. On November 21, 2012, Hancock filed a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that after closing on the property, DHRI refused to pay funds owed him under the June 9, 2004 order. After a hearing, the circuit court issued a rule to show cause to DHRI. The court then determined that DHRI had not paid Hancock the required amount of $350,000, found DHRI in contempt of the June 9, 2004 order, and entered judgment for Defendant against Plaintiff in the amount of $350,000. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the rule to show cause, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion because the June 9, 2004 order did not contain definite terms as to the total amount DRHI was required to pay and when such payment was due. View "DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. Here the Supreme Court considered Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Commonwealth did not commit Brady violations or present false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected; (2) Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s claims were either barred or without merit. View "Lawlor v. Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendant, an oral maxillofacial surgeon, after Defendant’s thwarted attempted to extract three of Plaintiff’s wisdom teeth resulted in permanent numbness in Plaintiff’s lower left jaw area. Plaintiff contended that Defendant was negligent in failing to properly diagnose the condition of his wisdom teeth and in recommending and performing the teeth extractions. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of the risk of surgery discussions between him and Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in excluding from evidence Defendant’s risk of surgery discussions with Plaintiff. View "Fiorucci v. Chinn" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of statutory burglary in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-91. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the Commonwealth established only that he went into a crawl space underneath a dwelling house and failed to prove that he actually broke into and entered the actual house. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that the crawl space in this case constituted part of the dwelling house. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the crawl space was structurally part of the dwelling house, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction of statutory burglary. View "Grimes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of counterfeit currency in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-173 after being found with eighteen twenty-dollar bills on his person that were counterfeit. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, as the Commonwealth failed to prove that he possessed the bills, that he knew they were forged, or that he had the intent to utter or employ them as true. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances were sufficient to support an inference that Defendant possessed the bills, knew the bills to be counterfeit, and had the requisite intent to utter the counterfeit money in his possession. View "Hawkins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-266. The arresting officer found Defendant sleeping in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, which was parked in his private driveway, with the key in the ignition. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because he was not “operating” the vehicle “on a highway.” The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was in actual physical control of his vehicle, and therefore, under prior case law, the evidence was sufficient to conclude that he was an operator of the vehicle; and (2) section 18.2-266 contains no “on a highway” requirement for the operation of motor vehicles. View "Sarafin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Mother and Father (“Parents”) were the parents of twin girls. Mother was a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Tribe”), Father was not a member of any tribe, and the children were either members of, or eligible to be members of, the Tribe. The Dinwiddie Department of Social Services (DDSS) filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (“J&DR court”) denied the petitions. The DDSS appealed. The Tribe and Parents sought to transfer the case to tribal court. The trial court held that good cause existed not to transfer the proceeding to tribal court and denied the motion to transfer. The court then terminated Parents’ parental rights. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the motion to transfer, vacated the award terminating Parents' parental rights, and remanded. In so doing, the court rejected the traditional “best interests of the child” test in favor of a more limited test involving a substantial risk of harm to a child arising from the transfer to a tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded in light of the standards articulated by the court of appeals in Thompson v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Family Servs. View "Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

Construction Manager subcontracted with Subcontractor to do work on a construction project. After the project was substantially complete, Subcontractor recorded a mechanic’s lien for unpaid work on the project. Subcontractor then filed a complaint against Construction Manager as the general contractor of the project, the owner of the property (Landowner), and the bank that financed the project (Bank) to enforce its mechanic’s lien. Construction Manager did not enter an appearance in the case. The circuit court subsequently granted an application filed by Landowner and Bank and released the real estate that had been subject to Subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien. Bank filed a motion to dismiss the mechanic’s lien claim on the basis that Subcontractor failed to timely serve Construction Manager, who it alleged to be a necessary party to the mechanic’s lien enforcement action. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the mechanic’s lien claim with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Construction Manager, as the general contractor, was not a necessary party to Subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien enforcement action. Remanded. View "Synchronized Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Prav Lodging, LLC" on Justia Law

Twelve years after he pled guilty to capital murder in exchange for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole Appellant filed a motion to vacate his sentence. Appellant, who was seventeen years old when he committed the murder, argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama applied retroactively to his case. The circuit denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing scheme applicable to Appellant’s conviction was not a mandatory life without the possibility of parole scheme; and (2) therefore, even if Miller applied retroactively, it was not applicable to the Virginia sentencing statutes at issue in this case. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law