Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in these two appeals was Va. Code Ann. 8.01-384(A), which provides that the absence of a contemporaneous objection when there is no opportunity to make a timely objection at the time a ruling or order is made shall not prejudice a party on motion for a new trial or on appeal. In both cases - Maxwell v. Commonwealth and Rowe v. Commonwealth - the court of appeals held that Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18 barred consideration of issues on appeal when the litigant had failed to make a contemporaneous objection in the circuit court. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in Maxwell, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that Maxwell’s assignment of error was defaulted for lack of a contemporaneous objection because Maxwell and his counsel lacked the opportunity to make an objection contemporaneously with the circuit court’s act of proceeding in Maxwell’s absence; and (2) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment in Rowe, as Rowe failed to articulate a cognizable objection at a time when the circuit court could take appropriate action, and Rowe did not lack the opportunity to make his objection to the circuit court. View "Maxwell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Victoria Coalson and Michael Stemke (together, Plaintiffs) were injured in an accident caused by Victor Canchola, who was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs each filed lawsuits against Canchola. A jury awarded Coalson $5,600 in compensatory damages and Stemke $14,000 in compensatory damages against Canchola. Plaintiffs were each awarded $100,000 each in punitive damages. Canchola filed a motion for remittitur of both punitive damages awards, arguing that the awards were excessive under Virginia law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court concluded that Coalson’s award was arbitrarily made and remitted Coalson’s punitive damages to $50,000. Coalson appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict awarding Coalson $100,000 in punitive damages, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Canchola’s motion for remittitur because Coalson’s punitive damages award was not excessive under Virginia law, nor did it offend Canchola’s due process rights. View "Coalson v. Canchola" on Justia Law

Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce from Wife. The circuit court granted the divorce and equitably distributed Husband’s and Wife’s property and debt. Husband appealed the equitable distribution award because it classified the increase in value of Husband’s investment/brokerage account as marital property, despite the fact that Husband owned the account before the marriage and both Husband and Wife agreed the account was separate property. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Wife, the non-owning spouse, had the burden of proving that the substantial appreciation in the value of the account was proximately caused by Husband’s significant personal efforts during the marriage and was therefore marital property, and that Wife failed to carry her burden. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the non-owning spouse has the initial burden of proving that significant personal efforts or marital contribution caused a substantial increase in the value of separate property. Remanded. View "David v. David" on Justia Law

Jay and Judith Turim were trustees of a family trust that owned property in a subdivision. Barbara Beach, the owner of a neighboring property in the subdivision, erected a wall at one end of the Turims’ purported private walk easement and had concrete poured over the steps located within the easement that provided usable access to the Turims’ lot. The Turims filed an amended complaint alleging a private nuisance against Beach and asking the trial court to issue an injunction requiring Beach to remove the wall and restore the steps. The circuit court held that an express easement had been created in favor of the Turims over Beach’s property and granted an injunction requiring Beach to remove the wall and to restore the steps within the easement to their former condition. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and vacated the injunction, holding that the Turims were the beneficiaries of an express easement over the private walk, as the subdivision deed did not create an express easement in favor of the Turims. View "Beach v. Turim" on Justia Law

The Byrd Theatre Foundation, a non-profit corporation, owned the Byrd Theatre, a historic landmark that housed a Wurlitzer theater pipe organ installed in 1928. David Barnett was injured when he was performing repairs to the organ and a wooden plank he stepped on gave way, causing him to fall four feet. Barnett sued the Foundation. Prior to trial, the Foundation filed a plea of charitable immunity, asserting that Barnett was a beneficiary of the Foundation at the time of his accident. The circuit court concluded that Barnett was not the Foundation’s beneficiary at the time of his accident. After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict against the Foundation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Foundation’s plea of charitable immunity, as Barnett was not in a “beneficial relationship” with the charity for purposes of charitable immunity. View "Byrd Theatre Found. v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Antonio Amos was convicted of assaulting his estranged wife, Felecia Amos, and ordered not to contact or harass Felecia. Felecia subsequently alleged that Antonio had harassed her. The Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney sought and obtained a rule to show cause against Antonio. After a hearing on the show cause order, the trial court ruled that Antonio had not violated the terms and conditions of his probation, held Felecia in contempt of court, and sentenced Felecia to jail for ten days. Felecia appealed. The court of appeals reversed Felecia’s summary contempt conviction, concluding that the trial court deprived Felecia of any opportunity to object at the time of the ruling and that, pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-384(A), Felecia did not default the arguments raised on appeal by failing to object at the time the trial court held her in contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in holding that the contemporaneous objection exception in section 8.01-384(A) allows a litigant who was precluded by the trial court from asserting a contemporaneous objection to the court’s ruling to raise the issue on appeal, notwithstanding the provisions of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18. View "Commonwealth v. Amos" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of unreasonably refusing to submit to a breath test in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-268.3. Defendant appealed, arguing in large part that the State did not establish a prima facie case of unreasonable refusal against Defendant because the arresting officer’s “Declaration and Acknowledgment of Refusal” form was erroneously admitted into evidence for lack of compliance with the procedures set forth in section 18.2-268.3(B) and (C). The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the refusal form, and its admission was, at most, harmless error; and (2) the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence on the theory that, absent the admission of the refusal form, the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of the unreasonable refusal offense, as the evidence was sufficient to establish Defendant’s guilt as a matter of law. View "D'Amico v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of felony murder and two felony drug offenses. The court of appeals reversed Appellant's felony murder conviction but refused to remand the case to the circuit court for resentencing of Appellant's two felony drug convictions on the basis that such relief was outside the scope of Appellant's assignment of error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in refusing to remand Appellant's two felony drug convictions for resentencing after reversing Appellant's felony murder conviction, as Appellant suffered no reviewable injury from the fact that the sentencing guidelines would have been different had he not been convicted of felony murder at the time the circuit court sentenced him for his felony drug convictions. View "Woodard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2303.1:1(A), which provides that cash payment made pursuant to a cash proffer offered or accepted for residential construction on a per-dwelling unit shall be accepted by any locality only after the completion of the final inspection of the property. Here several developers and Williamsburg Landing (collectively, Respondents) made proffers to the County, which included per-dwelling cash payments, related to the rezoning of their property. The cash payments for some dwelling units made by Respondents were accepted by the County under the terms of the proffers after June 30, 2010 and prior to the completion of a final inspection of the dwelling units. The County filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, contending that section 15.2-2303.1:1(A) had no application to proffers agreed to prior to its effective date of July 1, 2010. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that section 15.2-2303.1:1(A) applies to all payments of cash proffers due on or after July 1, 2010 regardless of whether the proffers were agreed to prior to that date. View "Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Windmill Meadows, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an assistant principal, filed an action against a local newspaper and and the author of the article at issue in this case, alleging libel, libel per se, and libel per quod, asserting that the article published by the newspaper damaged his reputation by falsely implying that he had “engaged in unethical conduct by obtaining preferential treatment for his son.” Defendants filed a demurrer denying that the article created such an implication. The circuit court overruled the demurrer. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, the circuit court granted Defendants’ motions to strike, entered a defense verdict, and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, the article was not reasonably capable of the defamatory meaning Plaintiff ascribed to it; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court erred by overruling Defendants’ demurrer, but the error was supplanted by the court’s final judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Webb v. Virginian-Pilot Media Cos., LLC" on Justia Law