Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joey Bennett and Derek Folston, police officers working for the City of Norfolk, were responding to a domestic disturbance call in separate vehicles when Folston’s vehicle struck Donnell Worlsey, who was riding a bicycle. Worsley died as a result of injuries. Carolyn McBride, as administrator of Worsley’s estate, filed simple negligence claim against Bennett and Folston (together, Defendants), individually and as employees of the City. The trial court held that Defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity because they had exercised discretion in determining whether and how to respond to the dispatch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in exercising their judgment and discretion about the best means of effectuating a governmental function by embracing the requisite special risks, including operating their vehicles in an emergency manner involving speeds in excess of the speed limit, Defendants triggered the application of sovereign immunity. View "McBride v. Bennett" on Justia Law

After a trial, the circuit court found Defendant guilty of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated Sixth Amendment rights by denying him a continuance on the day of trial for the purported purpose of substituting court appointed counsel with retained counsel of his choice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s continuance request was deficient as a matter of law because Defendant established no factual predicate for seeking substitution of other counsel in place of his court appointed counsel under the authority of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance and in proceeding to trial with Defendant being represented by his court appointed attorney. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Charles Settle was fatally injured when a train struck the dump truck he was operating. At the time of the collision, Settle was traveling on Kapp Valley Way, and RGR, LLC had stacked lumber near the railroad tracks. Georgia Settle, as personal representative of her husband’s estate, sued RGR and other defendants, alleging that RGR created a hazardous condition by stacking lumber near the railroad tracks and breached its duty of reasonable care to Settle by blocking the view of those traveling on Kapp Valley Way. The jury rendered a verdict awarding $2.5 million to Mrs. Settle. RGR appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in holding that RGR owed a duty of reasonable care to Settle or in instructing the jury on that duty; (2) the court did not err in finding that Settle was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that RGR’s negligence was a proximate cause of the collision; but (3) the circuit court erred in calculating the offset required under Va. Code 8.01-35.1. Remanded. View "RGR, LLC v. Settle" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice against healthcare providers (Defendants). During pretrial discovery, Plaintiff filed two separate motions to compel, which the trial court denied. Prior to trial, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a new complaint against the same defendants alleging the same cause of action. The trial court entered an agreed order incorporating the discovery conducted and taken in the 2010 action into the 2012 action. After the jury returned a defense verdict, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary rulings, challenging the trial court’s denial of her motions to compel in the nonsuited action. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court’s agreed order did not expressly incorporate the motions, objections, or rulings made by the court in the 2010 nonsuit action into the 2012 action, these rulings could not be challenged in this appeal. View "Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a severance deed conveying ownership of, and the right to remove, coal and timber underlying and appurtenant to a certain tract of land. The parties to this appeal were the successors-in-interest to the grantors named in the severance deed (the Surface Owners) and the successor-in-interest to the grantees of the coal rights named in the deed (the Coal Owner). The Surface Owners and the Coal Owner asserted conflicting claims to royalties generated by the extraction of coal bed methane gas (CBM) from the coal seams underlying the property. The Surface Owners filed this declaratory judgment action against the Coal Owner asserting that they were the sole owners of the CBM produced from their land and that they were entitled to all the royalties therefrom. The circuit court granted judgment for the Surface Owners, declaring that the Surface Owners owned the CBM and were entitled to receive the royalties therefrom. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Surface Owners had at all times owned all mineral estates within their lands except coal, and therefore, the Surface Owners were entitled to all royalties accrued from the production of CBM produced from their land and those yet to accrue. View "Swords Creek Land P'ship v. Belcher" on Justia Law

Shellie Rae Rose filed a petition for a protective order against Jeffrey Paul Stephens, her former boyfriend. After a hearing, the circuit court granted Rose’s petition, concluding that Rose had been reasonably placed in apprehension of bodily injury by Stephens’ actions, which constituted stalking. Stephens appealed, arguing that the evidence did not establish the elements of stalking because Rose failed to show that he directed “an act of violence, force or threat” toward her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding of stalking on the part of Stephens, and therefore, the court did not err in granting Rose’s petition for a protective order. View "Stephens v. Rose" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated sexual battery for offenses committed against his stepdaughter. As a condition of Defendant’s probation, the court ordered that Defendant submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer. Defendant challenged this probation condition on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the condition was reasonable under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probation condition at issue was not reasonable in light of the offenses for which Defendant was convicted, his background, and the surrounding circumstances. View "Murry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Stacy McMahon (McMahon) and Melanie White Wirick (Wirick), formerly Melanie White, were the biological parents of Addison Grace White (Addison). McMahon and Wirick were never married. When Addison reached school age, the parties agreed that McMahon would have primary physical custody of Addison during hte school year and Wirick would have primary physical custody during the summer. McMahon later filed a petition seeking to change Addison’s surname from White to McMahon. Wirick objected to the name change. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that a name change was not in Addison’s best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err to the extent that it relied on the holding in Spero v. Heath to determine whether the name change was in Addison’s best interest; and (2) did not err in concluding that the name change was not in Addison’s best interest. View "McMahon v. Wirick" on Justia Law

Loudoun County’s Board of Supervisors required the Loudoun County Sheriff’s Office to implement three employment practices to reduce the hours that would be considered overtime. The Board also raised the number of hours constituting the law-enforcement employees’ regularly scheduled work hours. Certain law-enforcement employees, including deputies who worked on patrol, filed suit against the County, the Sheriff’s Office, and the Sheriff, alleging that Defendants violated state and federal law by wrongfully calculating and underpaying overtime hours. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the patrol deputies’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) two of the employment practices adopted by the Sheriff’s Office violated the Virginia Gap Pay Act; and (2) the remaining employment practice neither violated the Act nor violated the employees’ contractual employment rights. View "Bailey v. County of Loudoun" on Justia Law

Patricia Kohn, the wife of John Kohn and the administrator of her husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death complaint against several officers and instructors associated with the Norfolk Police Department and the Norfolk Police Academy, alleging that John died as a result of multiple blows to the head inflicted during his training to become a City of Norfolk police officer. Defendants filed a plea in bar asserting that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the plea in bar and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that the exclusivity provision of the Act barred this action. View "Kohn v. Marquis" on Justia Law