Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1957, special commissioners, appointed in a partition suit, conveyed to Wilkinson an 18.35-acre tract adjoining Route 704 in Washington County. In 1961, the State Highway Commissioner instituted condemnation, acquiring a 3.83-acre strip of land through the tract for construction of Interstate Highway I-81, leaving a 4.88-acre parcel north of I-81 that retained frontage on Route 704 and a 9.64-acre parcel south of I-81 that became landlocked. Condemnation commissioners awarded Wilkinson $1450 for the land taken and $2450 for damages to the residue property. After the condemnation, Wilkinson gained access to the landlocked tract for farming purposes by renting a neighboring 18-acre tract now owned by the Cliftons. In 2006, Wilkinson discontinued farming and ceased to rent the Clifton property. In 2008, the Cliftons, having failed to reach an agreement with Wilkinson’s widow for a purchase of the landlocked parcel, terminated her permissive use of the access lane and blocked it. Wilkinson sought a declaratory judgment that she had an easement by necessity. The trial court ruled that she was entitled to an easement by necessity. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the tract did not become landlocked by a conveyance from a former owner severing a former unity of title, so no implied grant of a right of ingress and egress arose. View "Clifton v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Ubaldo Rodriguez was an employee the general contractor hired by Leesburg Business Park, LLC (LBP) to construct warehouse buildings on a parcel of undeveloped land owned by LBP. Ubaldo suffered fatal injuries in the course of employment. Cecilia Rodriguez, Ubaldo’s widow and the administrator of his estate, filed a wrongful death action against LBP. LBP filed a plea in bar, which the circuit court granted on the grounds that Cecilia’s claim was barred because Ubaldo was the statutory co-employee of LBP. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, LBP moved to reconsider its plea in bar, arguing that it was Ubaldo’s statutory employer and that Cecilia’s recovery was limited to Workers’ Compensation benefits only. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ubaldo’s work at the time of the accident was not part of LBP’s “trade, business, or occupation,” and therefore, LBP was not Ubaldo’s statutory employer at the time of the accident under Va. Code Ann. 65.2-302(A). Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Leesburg Bus. Park, LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, alleging claims for tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with business expectancy, and business conspiracy. The district court (1) dismissed the business conspiracy claim for failure to allege an unlawful act or purpose, and (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining two tort claims as barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Va. Code Ann. 8.01-248, thus rejecting Plaintiff’s contention that his tortious interference claims constituted an injury to his property, which would be subject to a five-year statute of limitations under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243(B). Plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit entered an order of certification requesting the Virginia Supreme Court to answer two questions of law. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) causes of action for tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with business expectancy qualify as the requisite unlawful act to proceed on a business conspiracy claim under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-499 and -500; and (2) the five-year statute of limitations in section 8.01-243(B) applies to claims of tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with business expectancy because both claims involve injury to property rights. View "Dunlap v. Cottman Transmissions Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in these two appeals was Va. Code Ann. 8.01-384(A), which provides that the absence of a contemporaneous objection when there is no opportunity to make a timely objection at the time a ruling or order is made shall not prejudice a party on motion for a new trial or on appeal. In both cases - Maxwell v. Commonwealth and Rowe v. Commonwealth - the court of appeals held that Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18 barred consideration of issues on appeal when the litigant had failed to make a contemporaneous objection in the circuit court. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in Maxwell, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that Maxwell’s assignment of error was defaulted for lack of a contemporaneous objection because Maxwell and his counsel lacked the opportunity to make an objection contemporaneously with the circuit court’s act of proceeding in Maxwell’s absence; and (2) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment in Rowe, as Rowe failed to articulate a cognizable objection at a time when the circuit court could take appropriate action, and Rowe did not lack the opportunity to make his objection to the circuit court. View "Maxwell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Victoria Coalson and Michael Stemke (together, Plaintiffs) were injured in an accident caused by Victor Canchola, who was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs each filed lawsuits against Canchola. A jury awarded Coalson $5,600 in compensatory damages and Stemke $14,000 in compensatory damages against Canchola. Plaintiffs were each awarded $100,000 each in punitive damages. Canchola filed a motion for remittitur of both punitive damages awards, arguing that the awards were excessive under Virginia law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court concluded that Coalson’s award was arbitrarily made and remitted Coalson’s punitive damages to $50,000. Coalson appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict awarding Coalson $100,000 in punitive damages, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Canchola’s motion for remittitur because Coalson’s punitive damages award was not excessive under Virginia law, nor did it offend Canchola’s due process rights. View "Coalson v. Canchola" on Justia Law

Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce from Wife. The circuit court granted the divorce and equitably distributed Husband’s and Wife’s property and debt. Husband appealed the equitable distribution award because it classified the increase in value of Husband’s investment/brokerage account as marital property, despite the fact that Husband owned the account before the marriage and both Husband and Wife agreed the account was separate property. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Wife, the non-owning spouse, had the burden of proving that the substantial appreciation in the value of the account was proximately caused by Husband’s significant personal efforts during the marriage and was therefore marital property, and that Wife failed to carry her burden. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the non-owning spouse has the initial burden of proving that significant personal efforts or marital contribution caused a substantial increase in the value of separate property. Remanded. View "David v. David" on Justia Law

Jay and Judith Turim were trustees of a family trust that owned property in a subdivision. Barbara Beach, the owner of a neighboring property in the subdivision, erected a wall at one end of the Turims’ purported private walk easement and had concrete poured over the steps located within the easement that provided usable access to the Turims’ lot. The Turims filed an amended complaint alleging a private nuisance against Beach and asking the trial court to issue an injunction requiring Beach to remove the wall and restore the steps. The circuit court held that an express easement had been created in favor of the Turims over Beach’s property and granted an injunction requiring Beach to remove the wall and to restore the steps within the easement to their former condition. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and vacated the injunction, holding that the Turims were the beneficiaries of an express easement over the private walk, as the subdivision deed did not create an express easement in favor of the Turims. View "Beach v. Turim" on Justia Law

The Byrd Theatre Foundation, a non-profit corporation, owned the Byrd Theatre, a historic landmark that housed a Wurlitzer theater pipe organ installed in 1928. David Barnett was injured when he was performing repairs to the organ and a wooden plank he stepped on gave way, causing him to fall four feet. Barnett sued the Foundation. Prior to trial, the Foundation filed a plea of charitable immunity, asserting that Barnett was a beneficiary of the Foundation at the time of his accident. The circuit court concluded that Barnett was not the Foundation’s beneficiary at the time of his accident. After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict against the Foundation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Foundation’s plea of charitable immunity, as Barnett was not in a “beneficial relationship” with the charity for purposes of charitable immunity. View "Byrd Theatre Found. v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Antonio Amos was convicted of assaulting his estranged wife, Felecia Amos, and ordered not to contact or harass Felecia. Felecia subsequently alleged that Antonio had harassed her. The Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney sought and obtained a rule to show cause against Antonio. After a hearing on the show cause order, the trial court ruled that Antonio had not violated the terms and conditions of his probation, held Felecia in contempt of court, and sentenced Felecia to jail for ten days. Felecia appealed. The court of appeals reversed Felecia’s summary contempt conviction, concluding that the trial court deprived Felecia of any opportunity to object at the time of the ruling and that, pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-384(A), Felecia did not default the arguments raised on appeal by failing to object at the time the trial court held her in contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in holding that the contemporaneous objection exception in section 8.01-384(A) allows a litigant who was precluded by the trial court from asserting a contemporaneous objection to the court’s ruling to raise the issue on appeal, notwithstanding the provisions of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18. View "Commonwealth v. Amos" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of unreasonably refusing to submit to a breath test in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-268.3. Defendant appealed, arguing in large part that the State did not establish a prima facie case of unreasonable refusal against Defendant because the arresting officer’s “Declaration and Acknowledgment of Refusal” form was erroneously admitted into evidence for lack of compliance with the procedures set forth in section 18.2-268.3(B) and (C). The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the refusal form, and its admission was, at most, harmless error; and (2) the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence on the theory that, absent the admission of the refusal form, the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of the unreasonable refusal offense, as the evidence was sufficient to establish Defendant’s guilt as a matter of law. View "D'Amico v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law